Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–10, Documents on American Republics, 1969–1972

256. Study Prepared in the Department of State¹ ²

Washington, March 13, 1972

CRITICAL SUMMARY

NSSM 144—SOVIET NAVAL DEPLOYMENTS IN THE CARIBBEAN

Introduction and Terms of Reference

NSSM 144 directed that a study evaluating the effects on U.S. interests of Soviet naval deployments to Cuba and the Caribbean be prepared. The study was also to develop options to advance or protect U.S. interests.

Specifically, the study was to consider:

—The frequency and type of Soviet naval deployments to Cuba since 1969,

—Soviet objectives,

—Effects of these deployments on U.S. interests,

—Current U.S. surveillance and monitoring practices and possible changes,

—Other countering measures available to the U.S.

—The U.K. role,

—U.S. base requirements in the area and the effects on those requirements of the various measures available to the U.S.

Summary

The study presents a history (Summer 1969–Winter 1971–72) of Soviet naval activity in Cuba and the Caribbean, describes the submarine support facility at Cienfuegos (capable of servicing nuclear powered submarines), and considers probable future developments. (The study concludes the Soviets are likely to continue to maintain a small continuous naval presence and reconnaissance capability in the Caribbean.) Of particular interest is the study’s view that “The Soviets have been and will probably continue to be sensitive to possible U.S. reactions to their deployments. The pattern and nature of each Soviet naval deployment appears to have been tailored to explore these reactions before proceeding [escalating] with the next, avoiding abrupt changes.”

The study also addresses the question of whether the Soviets have established a naval “base” in Cuba, observing that the key point “is not whether the Soviets have a base or facility in Cuba defined in terms of real estate,” etc., but“whether they have access to and can perform in Cuban territory certain naval related support functions.” The study concludes that they do and that with little or no expansion in terms of identifiable facilities (barracks, tenders, etc.), they could perform essential services on a wider variety of ships and in greater numbers than has been seen to date. In addition, the study observes that the Soviets have the option of maintaining a modest naval presence in the Caribbean without shore support from Cuba (as they did for many years in the Mediterranean and are doing now in the Indian Ocean).

Finally, the study considers the various U.S./Soviet understandings on Cuba, whereby in essence the Soviets agreed to “dismantle the arms which [the U.S.] described as offensive, and to crate and return them to the Soviet Union,” in exchange for a U.S. pledge not to invade Cuba. It concludes on the basis of the public exchanges accompanying the secret U.S./Soviet exchange of September–October 1970 [access was denied the NSC/IPMG for the purposes of this study], that the Soviets have violated at least the spirit, if not the letter, of this understanding by maintaining (although their use has never been proved) two barges associated with servicing nuclear (meaning nuclear-powered and/or nuclear weapons carrying) submarines at Cienfuegos. Furthermore, the study concludes that recent Soviet activity involving the servicing of nuclear submarines, including an E–II nuclear-powered cruise missile [usually classified as anti-shipping, not “offensive”] submarine, in or from Cuba is designed to test the U.S. interpretation of the September–October 1970 “understanding.”

The study considers that the Soviet naval deployment to the Caribbean enhances Cuba’s sense of security vis-a-vis the U.S. while not (at least at current levels) affecting significantly the balance of power in Latin America. The study also considers the role of the U.K. and France in the Caribbean as negligible, since neither views the area as a matter of great concern to themselves and both consider the Soviet deployment there to be a U.S. responsibility (except that they might permit U.S. use of their facilities in the region). The study foresees no serious obstacles to continued U.S. access over the next few years to those bases not on U.S. territory from which military efforts in the Caribbean would be supported.

Major Issues

The study identifies four main issues:

• —The nature and purpose of the Soviet general naval deployments to the Caribbean, and
• —The extent to which these deployments are supported from Cuban-based facilities.
• —The nature and purpose of any future deployments of Soviet strategic missile submarines to the Caribbean, and
• —The extent to which these submarines are supported from Cuban-based facilities.

Soviet Objectives

The study identifies a variety of objectives for Soviet naval deployments to the Caribbean:

I. General

• —Establishing a Soviet presence,
• —Support for Cuba,
• —A bargaining chip.

II. General Purpose Forces Deployments

• —Establishing a usable military instrument,
• —Utilizing servicing facilities,
• —Improving overall Soviet naval operational capabilities,
• —Expanding intelligence collection and communications capabilities,
• —Providing contingency attack submarine forces.

III. Strategic Forces Deployments

(The study assesses as unlikely, given the high political costs and risk of confrontation with the U.S., that the Soviets will in the next year mount continuous SSBN patrols in the Caribbean, either directly from Cuban ports or even indirectly by use of a Cuban-based tender operating in international waters.)

—Avoiding existing U.S. air defenses and planned ABM systems, particularly the missile early warning systems which are oriented toward the East, West, and North (although not avoiding a new SLBM launch protection system for the Caribbean).

—Increasing significantly time on station by developing and using Cuban-based facilities.

Deploying random unsupported SSBN patrols to test U.S. surveillance ability or, in a crisis, preparing for an actual attack.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

The study envisions six broad categories of actions available to the President in response to Soviet naval deployments to the Caribbean and activities in Cuba. The study cautions that “The U.S. should be under no illusion that the situation in Soviet eyes is comparable to the conditions in 1962.”

I. Diplomatic Actions Directed at the USSR

• —Clarify understandings. Although possibly useful as a means of reducing miscalculation, the study indicates that any U.S. initiative in this regard would almost surely lead the Soviets to attempt to link this formally with U.S. naval activities in the Baltic, Black, and North Seas, the U.S. forward-based systems and homeporting.

  [Comment: This appears to be a real risk with making such a demarche.]

• —Low key diplomatic initiative.

  [Comment: This would raise the same linkage problem, without doing more than stressing the obvious—U.S. sensitivity to Soviet Cuban-based activities.]

• —Raise matter during Presidential visit to Moscow.

  [Comment: Moot, at least for the near future.]

• Offer a quid pro quo. Would mean conceding the linkage question at the start and would encourage additional Soviet pressure on other U.S. interests.

  [Comment: This is clearly unattractive, at least at present.]

• —Suspension of selected negotiations and exchanges.

  [Comment: This would, in the present context, be overreacting as well as detrimental to other important U.S. interests.]

• —Postpone or cancel the Presidential visit.

  [Comment: Moot.]

II. Diplomatic Actions Involving Cuba

• —Undertake measures (low level contacts, support removal of OAS trade embargo, etc.) with the view of seeking eventual normalization of U.S.-Cuban relations.

  [Comment: This is unlikely at least until after November. In addition, it would not by itself guarantee reduction or elimination of the Soviet military presence in Cuba, and would have to be accompanied by actions directed at the USSR.]

• —Offer to discuss the return of Guantanamo with a view to negotiating the removal of, or constraints on, the Soviet military presence and activities in Cuba. As the study recognizes, this would be realistic only if the Soviets developed their naval support facilities to such an extent that they presented serious security implications to the U.S.

  [Comment: Aside from the current Cuban contention that U.S. occupation of Guantanamo is illegal and the strategic value of Guantanamo to the U.S., such an offer, unless accompanied by actions directed at the USSR, would not by itself guarantee reduction or elimination of the Soviet military presence in Cuba.]

III. Multilateral Initiatives

The study concludes that, in the absence of a clear and imminent threat to the nations concerned, U.S. efforts to secure multilateral support against the Soviet naval presence in the Caribbean or Soviet acquisition of naval facilities in Cuba would be unsuccessful.

IV. Countermeasures Directed at the Soviets, Short of Direct Military Confrontation

• —Moderate and selective augmentation of reconnaissance/surveillance operations (as the situation requires).

  The study is concerned that such a low-keyed response might tempt further Soviet probing of U.S. intent and resolve.

  [Comment: Despite the cost attractiveness and economy of force required to implement this measure, it might well prove deficient in demonstrating U.S. displeasure at the presence of Soviet naval units and their activities in the Caribbean.]

• —Initiate or increase U.S. presence and activities in such areas as the Barents Sea, Kola Gulf, and the Sea of Okhotsk to counterpoise the political and military impact of Soviet naval deployments to the Caribbean. The study makes clear that it does not envision a permanent deployment of U.S. forces in any or all of these regions. Rather, U.S. activities would be deliberately tailored to Soviet activities in terms of timing, nature, and level, and could take the form of exercise or transiting operations.

  [Comment: This would signal our strong displeasure over Soviet deployments to the Caribbean with only a low risk of U.S./USSR confrontation. It could also serve as a tacit offer to reduce such measures to the extent the Soviets reduce their Caribbean deployment. However, there would appear to be a lower limit to our willingness to curtail our naval activities in these areas (e.g., Poseidon and Polaris-bearing submarine patrols) in exchange for Soviet curtailment in the Caribbean in the absence of more thorough arms control agreements.

V. Confrontation

The study recognizes this type of action would be appropriate only in the event of highly provocative Soviet activities (e.g., support of strategic missile submarines from Cuban-based facilities). Confrontation might include the following:

• —Issue a diplomatic ultimatum to the Soviets.
• —Conduct active close-in harassment of Soviet naval and air units operating in the Caribbean. [This would, of course, involve violation of the recently concluded U.S./USSR Incidents at Sea agreement.]
• —Deploy ASW sensor systems, an ASW carrier and other units to Cuban waters, reinforce tactical air squadrons in the Caribbean area, and take other military preparatory measures.

• —Attempt to jam Soviet military communication between the USSR and Cuba.

  [Comment: This might lead to greater risks for us, in that it could lessen the prospects for responsible Soviet behavior.]

• —Prepare for quarantining or blockading Cuban ports.

• —Explicitly withdraw our 1970 reaffirmation of the 1962 U.S. no-invasion pledge and position forces to invade.

  [Comment: The study points out the real risk of a direct clash of U.S., Soviet, and Cuban military forces inherent in the use of certain of the above measures. At the least they would create a political crisis of serious proportions.]

VI. Psychological Actions

The study does not attempt to develop as specific courses of action the range of psychological activities which would be appropriate to support all of the courses of action described above.

[Comment: Such actions could play an important role in generating support for any U.S. actions designed to reduce Soviet naval deployments in the Caribbean and activities in Cuba.]

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–189, National Security Study Memoranda (NSSM), NSSM 144. Top Secret. All brackets are in the original. It was sent under a March 13 covering memorandum from Ronald I. Spiers, in his capacity as Chairman of the NSC/IPMG, to Kissinger in response to NSSM 144, January 14. (Ibid.)
2. The Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs at the Department of State prepared a study on Soviet naval deployments to the Caribbean.