266. Paper Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency1 2

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The following points are pertinent relative to Cuban exile capabilities in the paramilitary or military fields:

  • a. There is no Cuban exile group which has the support of the U.S. Government.
  • b. There is no Cuban exile group which has significant support from any foreign nation with the exception of President Figueres of Costa Rica. President Figueres has allowed Cuban exiles of a liberal tendency, headed by Manuel Ray, to convene a congress in Costa Rica. The purpose of the congress was to design a Cuban exile strategy which would enable the exiles to work effectively against a possible rapprochement between the U.S. and Cuba.
  • c. The Torriente group which in past years has contacted the Brazilian Government for assistance is now, for all practical purposes, disbanded. Torriente, as an individual, is discredited among Cuban exiles. The individuals that made up his military organization have gone their separate ways. The Torriente group, to the best of our knowledge, has no military capability whatsoever at this time.
  • d. It is our estimate that no Cuban exile group can successfully establish a beachhead in Cuba at this time via paramilitary or military techniques.
  • e. It is the U.S. Government’s current policy to interdict exile groups who attempt to mount paramilitary operations against Cuba from U.S. territory.
  1. Source: Central Intelligence Agency, ODCI Files, Job 80–R01731R. Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. Sent to Helms under a December 11, 1972, memorandum from the Deputy Director for Plans to Deputy Director of Central Intelligence Theodore G. Shackley.
  2. CIA provided talking points regarding Cuban exile capabilities.