Office of the Historian

90. Memorandum From William J. Jorden of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)1

Washington, September 13, 1973.

SUBJECT

  • Brazilian Views on Chile

It seems clear that we and the Brazilians are moving on a parallel track concerning Chile. The attached memo is based on [less than 1 line not declassified] a talk with Marcos Cortes, Special Assistant to Foreign Minister Gibson Barboza. The latter apparently authorized the contact. The main points were:

1) Brazil expects an early request from the new Chilean Government for economic, and possibly other, assistance. This probably would mean help in restoring essential services and in providing a better food supply for the Chilean people.

2) The Brazilians are disposed to honor such a request one way or another.

3) Brazil expects similar requests to be made to the US.

4) Discreet coordination between Washington and Brasília could avoid duplication and assure that aid goes in the right amounts to the right places.

5) Brazil is prepared to use this channel [less than 1 line not declassified] for communications on this subject if we wish.

6) [2½ lines not declassified]

As you know, we have instructed our Ambassador, John Crimmins, to deliver roughly the same message to the Brazilians through Foreign Minister Gibson Barboza. He was unable to do so yesterday because [Page 255] he was in Rio on business. He may have delivered the message today (no firm word yet) or will certainly do so tomorrow.

In my judgment, it would be better to handle this exchange on the Ambassador-Foreign Minister level. Both understand the problems and subtleties. If we use the lower level contact, it would mean both parties constantly having to go to higher authority for guidance, instructions, etc. Thus, I think we should go back through this channel informing Mr. Cortes that we appreciate very much the message he conveyed. Our Ambassador will be discussing this with the Foreign Minister and we believe the two of them should determine the level and manner of further contacts on this subject.

Recommendation:

That you approve sending a message to Brasília [less than 1 line not declassified] for delivery to Mr. Cortes along the above lines, accompanied by instructions to the Ambassador informing him of our preference that he handle the matter personally unless he sees advantages in doing otherwise.

  1. Summary: Jorden informed Kissinger that with discreet coordination, Washington and Brasília could rationalize the process of distributing assistance to the new Chilean Government. The Department instructed Crimmins to meet with Foreign Minister Gibson Barboza to discuss the matter.

    Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 772, Country Files, Latin America, Brazil, Vol. 4, 1973–1974. Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only; Completely Outside the System. Sent for action. The attached memorandum, entitled [title not declassified] is not published. Scowcroft approved the recommendation for Kissinger. On September 14, Kissinger, [text not declassified] stated, “We appreciated very much the message conveyed through him from Foreign Minister Gibson Barboza. Our Ambassador will be discussing this matter with the Foreign Minister and indeed may already have done so. We believe the Minister and the Ambassador should determine the manner and level of further contacts on this subject.” The message was to be cleared by Crimmins before it was relayed to Cortés. (Ibid.)

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