Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–12, Documents on East and Southeast Asia, 1973–1976

11. Minutes of the Acting Secretary of State’s Staff Meeting, Washington, August 1, 1974, 11:15 a.m.¹ ²

Washington, August 1, 1974, 11:15 a.m.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
SECRETARY KISSINGER’S MEETING with EA

The meeting was convened at 11:15 a.m. on Thursday, August 1, 1974 in Conference Room 6210, Department of State, Washington, D.C. Secretary Kissinger took the chair.

Participants

• Secretary Kissinger
• Mr. Sneider
• Mr. Hummel
• Mr. Ingersoll
• Carol Laise
• Mr. Lord
• Mr. Armacost
• Mr. Duemling
• Mr. Martens
• Mr. Armstrong
• Mr. Bleha
• Mr. Wenzei
• Mr. Heavner
• Mr. Colantonio
• Mr. Cuthell
• Mr. Ranard
• Mr. Sherman
• Mr. Moser
• Mr. Dexter
• Mr. Rives
• Mr. Geber
• Mr. Helble
• and a reporter

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Who is in charge of this?

MR. HUMMEL: I think I am, for all my sins.

Sir, I can assure you that all of us have the appropriate amount of trepidation about this experience.

As we understand it, and I thought it would be wise, to check you in reference to the purpose of the meeting. Essentially, it’s two-fold:

One is to hear from you and to get guidance from you.

And the other is for you to get some impression of us, and our problems, and how we think about the problems.

And we have a couple of pieces of paper that I think —

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Yes, I have that.

MR. HUMMEL: you may have looked at.

Well I don’t know how you would like to do this, sir.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Well, I frankly don’t think there is much benefit in my going on about foreign policy. I am not exactly restrained in my public utterances on that. So my views are fairly well known. I think it would be much ore useful for me if I learned what your thinking is, and then let me comment on what your views are — rather than let me go through an exposition which would have to be very general, anyway.

MR. HUMMEL: All right, sir.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Naturally, I have some talking points here of staggering profundity of what I should say, but if I go through all of these, none of you will have a chance to talk.

MR. HUMMEL: All right, sir, we can go directly to EA issues.

Dick Sneider might say a few brief words about a paper that we have circulated and then we have three issues that I think are in some of your briefing materials, too.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Yes.

MR. SNEIDER: You have read this paper.

I think the essence of the issue is that as we build a structure of peace in this world, the problems of East Asia are, in a sense, particularly acute because this is an area that we have had two conflicts in and we still have some continuing conflicts in the region.

In years past, the development of a regional strategy to deal with our problems there, was a fairly simple one, because this was a cold war strategy, in other words a sort of a black and white situation. This obviously doesn’t pertain at the present time.

We do — and there is a real question whether one can really frame a regional strategy. Some efforts have been made, as you recall, sir — even since in 1927 to 1969 it was a dismal failure, and more and more it would appear that —

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Why do you think this was a dismal failure?

MR. SNEIDER: Well, we didn’t come out with a final policy, because more and more the problems of the region cannot be dealt with as strictly regional problems. They tend to be multilateral, and because the powers that are involved in the region are essentially global powers, rather than regional powers, the real powers of the United States and the Soviet Union and China and Japan — really, there is a question, therefore, whether we should continue to pursue an effort that we still have on the books, of trying to develop a regional strategy — or whether we should continue along a course which tends to look at these issues both from the country viewpoint and a multilateral issue viewpoint.

And there are a number of questions that are raised in this paper that relate to this central point.

And I think that with that, I’ll — this is the general framework that we are concerned about projecting our policies — not for the next year or so, but over the next decade — where we can develop some sense of stability in this region.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Well, I have no particular interest in whether it’s done on a regional basis or some other framework.

I do have an interest that we have some sense that we know where we are going and what we are trying to achieve, and not handle all issues purely tactically.

One reason why I am going to have these meetings with various bureaus, is that I have been here long enough now, to see that there’s an enormous tendency to make policy by cable, and to react constantly to the day-to-day impulses and then to get a cable up to me.

I think it’s a bad method of proceeding, because it’s in any case bad because it means none of us step back and ask ourselves what our purposes are.

And also, that we talk about institutionalizing foreign policy which, judging from the newspapers, means just doing what everybody wants.

But if we are serious about this, it means that even a nonobsessional expert should be able to become Secretary of State, or even a nonexpert who is not obsessional ought to be able to do it. And if the whole machine keeps itself, simply producing cables — the seventh Floor direction becomes very doubtful.

So it’s that which I am trying to stimulate by these meetings, which unfortunately, my schedule happens to be too crowded; but what difference does it make — Supposing I say I don’t care whether it’s regional or not — then what do we do?

MR. SNEIDER: We still have to deal with the critical issues that do affect our development of some sort of structure stability in the region, and deal with them as issues in and of themselves.

I think it might be useful, Mr. Secretary, for us to focus on a few of these issues rather than all of them.

MR. HUMMEL: We have sort of refined a couple of other topics. I think it’s in one of your papers, in Win Lord’s formulations, and we thought that these three — or any others — might be discussed a little bit more specifically.

And we have asked Oscar Armstrong to lead off so that you will hear from our —

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Let me ask one question that interests me, in addition to that:

To what extent do you think developments in the region are affected by what happens in Indochina?

Supposing South Viet-Nam collapses, what is the impact of the collapse of South Viet-Nam — if that should happen — on the perceptions of other countries in that area, with respect to the United states? How important is Indochina to us?

MR. INGERSOLL: Thailand, the Philippines and so on?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Yes — or whatever other countries would it have an impact upon?

MR. HUMMEL: Well I think one might divide this — divide our answers, and I think you probably want to hear from our Country Directors rather than from the people here. But let me just say this:

We might divide our description of the consequences into the perceptions of the Great Powers, the larger players, on the one hand — and the perceptions of the smaller countries on the other.

I think for me, the former, our ability to deal with China and the Soviet Union, and Japan would — perhaps the consequences in our ability to deal would be more important, even, than the direct impact on the smaller countries.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Supposing Indochina collapses over the next two years — how will that affect our relations with Japan?

MR. HUMMEL: I think that — well, let’s get some other people speaking here.

Bill Sherman.

MR. SHERMAN: My impression would be that it would concern Japan.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: It would not?

MR. SHERMAN: It would. It would concern Japan.

But I don’t think it would concern it dramatically they would think that as a matter of policy we would allow it to collapse.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: That we “had?”

MR. SHERMAN: Yes, sir.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Yes, but what conclusion would they draw from that?

MR. SHERMAN: I don’t think that they would consider that — they would consider that we believed it to be outside of the maintaining of a stable security situation in the Far East — that had we ‘allowed’ it to collapse and unified the Peninsula under a North Viet-Namese regime or something like that, that we had justification — we had just changed the immediate balance of power that had not affected our major security of the southeast Asia.

They would not presume to make a judgment on whether we were right or wrong, but they would assume that it had been a direct policy decision on the part of the U.S. Government.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Yes, but the fact that they consider it a direct policy decision, doesn’t necessarily mean that they couldn’t draw bad conclusions from that. I mean, the mere fact that it wasn’t an accident or an oversight is not necessarily an assurance no reassurance. In fact, it would be quite the opposite.

MR. SHERMAN: Well, bad conclusions — I do not — I believe that they identify themselves so closely with us and our policy that they would not fear that they would be endangered by this kind of decision or policy that they would feel, perhaps, even relieved at the point of tension and the possibility of a hot war again.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Would somebody else down there like to —

Did you have a point?

MR. RANARD: My understanding is that I think, so far as Korea is concerned, it would probably heighten their perception of monolithic communist threat, which they draw to extremes, anyway. I don’t think they would see that in terms of a military aggression or that they would be threatened by what happened. But I think it would heighten this perception.

And I think it would make our problem, in terms of trying to resolve the North/South differences, all the keener. I think we’d reach real difficulties on that assuming that is to say, in the two year time span that you will have the same government in Korea.

MR. HUMMEL: I am, frankly, surprised at these answers, sir.

What would it do to the perceptions of other countries, including Japan and Korea, of the American will and purpose for the future? And what we might acquiesce in later on, that would be to their detriment?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: That’s what I would have thought — Yes.

MR. CUTHELL: The Philippines also, here too, for a great many years they have accustomed themselves to the idea that we keep 25,000 armed forces in the Philippines big bases, we are sustaining these big bases —

I think they would worry very much about their own security; the loss of Indochina, itself, would mean nothing to my knowledge. It’s a question of the American connection with the Mainland which they worry about—

And I think it’s quite possible that at that point they would go more heavily than they have — though they are already starting on this — with the notion that the Philippines should be an independent sanctuary.

MR. SNEIDER: I might say, Mr. Secretary, that I would think that our credibility would be badly damaged and that in almost everyplace in the region, as a result of the collapse of Viet-Nam, that the question, however, is:

Would it be damage to the point that they would decide that they had to cast us aside completely — or would they fall into their normal insular pattern and think:

“Well, the Americans aren’t going to give us up, they are going to give the other guys up.”

This, I think, is one of the problems in the region from Japan on down — there’s a sense of insularity, and a lack of common interest in each other’s security. And for that reason, the reaction may be moderated.

MR. HEAVNER: I don’t think there would be any insularly in the adjoining countries.

The Asian powers particularly, react very strongly and they already see the North Viet-Nam as becoming a major power in that part of the world, and they feel the need to contest that role, obviously.

If they succeeded in what they are trying to do in China, it would be hard to see them in any other light.

Because in my mind, there is even a sense of desperation, and something approaching panic, in some of the things they are saying now. . . . is clearly worried that something might happen, like this and —

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Do you think something like that might happen?

MR. HEAVNER: Do I think so?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Yes.

MR. HEAVNER: Yes, I think it might.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: In what time frame?

MR. HEAVNER: Well, that’s the important question to us. If it happened quickly, it might be very bad for us and our interests there. If it stretches out over a sufficiently long period of time so that they can digest it and learn to live with the North Vietnamese, it might have a different impact — it might be a different situation. But if it happens in the next couple of years, I think we are in pretty bad shape.

I think the ASEAN neutralization proposals over there are a part of their fears — something like this may happen.

MR. MARTENS: I have been back from East Asia only a week and a half and —

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Where did you come from?

MR. MARTENS: Eastern Europe.

It seems to me that a fundamental question, maybe “the” fundamental question, is how it would affect the Soviet Union and China — and particularly their attitudes toward developments in the world and in Southeast Asia. Would this give a new sort of “revolutionary” impulse which would cause them to move away from the kind of stabilizing or conservative bent that they have been on — if it did influence them to get a new sense of optimism about the revolutionary track — then I think the other powers in the area would perceive this, and they would be very worried about the future.

And I think, in general, what you had in the mid-60s, when Indonesia almost collapsed and where it was threatened and Indonesia almost fell — that you had a tremendous sense of optimism on the part of the Chinese — which caused a revolutionary bent on their part — and I think the Soviets still had remnants of that, hoping that they could push the Chinese out and get back in, and take advantage of —

SECRETARY KISSINGER: They still have this now?

MR. MARTENS: Well, I think they still have it, but it’s diminished over time, as far as the optimism goes. They don’t think their current prospects are so great.

So it seems to me that it would — you would have to get back to almost that kind of situation again where you have the feeling that the whole tide of history was turning in their favor — and then you would get everybody making the appropriate judgments.

MR. ARMSTRONG: I think this is a point that is particularly true of Peking, because I think their policy is still evolving and you do have the obvious uncertainties of the post-Mao — Chou period — of the question of their orientation of their policies will, to some extent, be up for grabs again — and development such as you posited, I think, would make it more difficult for them — just for internal reasons — it might even make it impossible for them to adopt, say, a range of policies which we would find —

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Would make it more difficult?

MR. ARMSTRONG: Would make it more difficult.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: As long as I’m here, do you attach any importance to Chou’s public appearance yesterday the day before, I think it was?

MR. ARMSTRONG: Yes, obviously, he’s back on — the obvious importance is that he’s back on his feet, and they are trying to show that he’s back on his feet.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Do you think it shows that he is back in control?

MR. ARMSTRONG: I haven’t felt that he lost control. I thought that he shared some of his burdens.

MR. WENZEL: I would like to take issue with my colleague, here, who thinks it might happen in a couple of years — over in Viet-Nam.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Then you do not think it will happen in that —

MR. WENZEL: I have listened to our Ambassador Martin testify for six hours, up on the Hill in the last week.

My own optimism is in the sort of 60/40 range but not much beyond that — there’s a damn good chance of staying with it.

What worries me, as I’m sure worries you and all of us, is the resource problem. We are certainly not going to get what we are asking for. Which leaves me to look for other instruments and approaches for achieving our objectives.

It almost has to be dialogue with the Soviets and the Chinese, I think. This has been important in the past and certainly is instrumental in leading to the peaceful agreement.

Things will be more important certainly, in the next three or four years.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: But what, exactly, can we offer either of them? What do we want from them?

MR. WENZEL: I think that we want what they want — I think we all want more or less the same thing — the stabilization of the situation.

We want restraints, certainly, of arms supply.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: But they’ll want that only if there’s some consequences for not having this.

I mean not for — not because of the theoretical desirability of restraint.

MR. WENZEL: Well I think the consequences of a lack of restraint are certainly something that will affect the super power relationship. I think I am more concerned abut that than the relationship which I had—

SECRETARY KISSINGER: My experience with the Soviets and the Chinese has been that unless there is some sort of a quid pro quo, abstract stability is of no concern to them. This has been my experience.

I think the Chinese would probably prefer no vacuum in Indochina.

But I don’t think they are going to pay the price for the effort — unless we can structure a balance which makes it look plausible — and unless we can plausibly threaten that we will escalate whatever we are doing if the North Vietnamese don’t restrain themselves — that is an argument which I think they would understand.

MR. HUMMEL: The plausibility of that, sir, is being diminished now, all the time.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: That’s right, and that’s why I think because we’re considering the Soviet-Chinese cooperation —

MR. INGERSOLL: Is it to the Chinese interests not to have North Viet-Nam cover all of Indochina?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Yes, but they wouldn’t know how to bring that about unless we do it.

MR. INGERSOLL: They could restrain the supply, couldn’t they?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I think they need some argument they can sell where the diplomatic is making progress rather than a unilateral decision to restrain supply.

And as long as our Congress is cutting us off anyway we haven’t got many—

Up to ’72 we could always show them that they could plausibly tell Hanoi that if Hanoi didn’t moderate, the consequences would be worse — and we could always carry out our promise we always made it worse for North Viet-Nam. So we made our senior Communist countries look good. Anything your Communist countries would warn the North Vietnamese about the consequences of, was proved right.

But that isn’t necessarily true today, as far as I can see.

Let’s talk for a bit about your second question here, which is Japan.

MR. SHERMAN: Japan has for, well, for most of the post war period, based its policies on the conception of the United States — on a continuation of the cold war type polarization in the face of continuing rapid economic growth, and on a security relationship with the United States — to the end of — with the beginning of detente and the end of the normal situation of China, and the end of the Viet-Nam war — and a lot of their own economic vulnerabilities demonstrated in a series of crises — a rapid inflation and then a slow down of the growth rate — all of these things came under a certain amount of challenge, except the security relationship, and they are now faced with moving into a multilateral world dealing with multilateran problems and not so much depending upon the bilateral protection of the United States.

As of now there are virtually no serious bilateral issues — the return of Okinawa and the end of the Viet-Nam war have converted what used to be very bothersome security treaty issues involving base problems and things of that nature — these have now converted themselves from disputes between governments, to things involving local mayors and local governors, and not engaging the attention of highest officials on our side or on the Japanese side.

On the other hand, I have been struck by a line from Win Lord’s memorandum in our recent planning talks on Japan, pointing out that if the great powers tend to maximize their objectives and the small powers tend to minimize their risks, Japan still has to be considered a small power — the great power role is not an attractive one.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Yes, where is that memorandum?

I’m trying to find out on what distribution list [Laughter.] But it is very restricted.

MR. INGERSOLL: Must have a good filter.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: That, I certainly would —

MR. SHERMAN: In any case, there is no question that Japan does not yet consider itself a great power. Its lack of any kind of military power, coupled with its sense of economic vulnerability, does not lead it into any kind of conception of its role which would be played on the international stage without great help from its friends.

And as far as its friends are concerned, Japan still considers the United States as its only true friend. Bilateral relationships in the whole post war period have been so close and so intense as to inhibit any opportunity for or any intention of Japan to move outside of the direct bilateral relationship.

I think this is the way they approach the tri-regional concept of dealing with Europe, that they are suspicious about European protection and they have reason for suspicions about European rejection of the meaningful relationship with Japan — and they are looking to us to provide the kind of psychological assist, trailblazing, way-making that they need.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Yes, you know what you are saying is what people are always saying, and it’s true in personal relations.

But where, completely are they tying their policy so closely to us?

MR. SHERMAN: Where?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Yes. I mean, in practice those areas that interest them — in China they are not tying themselves closely to us.

Indochina they are not tying closely to us.

MR. HERMAN: They consider themselves close in China — in the sense that they have followed our lead, that they have waited until we made the move — and then they made the move (although there was considerable pressure beforehand front their Left.)

SECRETARY KISSINGER: They didn’t have any option before we made it.

MR. SHERMAN: I think that probably in that sense they consider themselves still as not having any options outside of —

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I know, but what I mean is they had no real options in China before we made them.

MR. SHERMAN Yes.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: But they were sending their usual advance troops down to Indochina and they weren’t received very —

At least, we don’t know what the Japanese would have done if the reception had been more favorable in China.

MR. RANARD: Well would you say that there is a similar policy toward Korea?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Yes, but that is overwhelming in their interest, and we are defending them in Korea. I mean, I just don’ t see the enormous correspondence in China and my impression is they are trying to get — we are not competing with them and we are not suffering any pain — but with their perception of this, they think they are getting ahead of us.

MR. HERMAN: I don’t really understand that — I don’t perceive that that was —

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Well they are certainly not following us.

If they followed us, in time, because our going in their made it possible for them but —

MR. SHERMAN: Seems to me their policies with regard to China are almost all economic and very, very slightly political — that they still are depending on us to carry the lead in the political emergence of China to a non-isolated world, and that certainly they are out to make as much trade with the Mainland as possible, because that was the primary interest anyway.

But they don’t have any — they barely were able to conclude the simple aviation agreement and that was under the most intense kind of political consequences — and there is no real progress toward a real treaty.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Toward a real treaty on what?

MR. SHERMAN: Well, a real peace treaty that would establish other areas, formalizing relationship — as, for instance, with the Soviet Union. But they have not. I think they are almost as far away from China, in concluding a finalized peace treaty, as they are —

SECRETARY KISSINGER: But is this lack of intention on their part? Is it waiting for us? Or is it because the Chinese don’t want to get any closer?

MR. SHERMAN: I think it’s lack of more - more a lack of intention on their part — lack of a national consensus on their part.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: in Japan?

MR. SNEIDER: I think they are, Mr. Secretary, this is a problem of risk, and the Japanese continually look over their shoulder to count the cost and the risk involved and are very cautious.

If I might just wedge one word about the China relationship — I think it is true the late 60s and 70s that essentially we were in a better position to move ahead with China than the Japanese were — but there is at least with the Japanese context — a myth, or perspective, whatever you might call it — that in the 50s we were the ones that held Japan back from recognizing Communist China — and that they would have preferred to do it then, in that time frame.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: How could they have done it then, given their relationship with Taiwan?

We certainly wouldn’t have held them back if they had —

MR. SNEIDER: Well, we did hold them back. We held their feet to the fire at peace treaty time.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: But how would they have managed their relationship with Taiwan?

MR. SNEIDER: I think that at that time they were prepared to cut them off —

[That was pretty shrewd.]

SECRETARY KISSINGER: It’s certainly true that —

MR. SNEIDER: Yes, this is why, at least as the myth goes, that Japan feels we were the ones who were the barriers, and that they had to wait for us.

MR. GEBER: Yes, I have the feeling that the Japanese, as far as their entire foreign policy and political relations with the outside world are concerned, they are rather uncertain of themselves.

They would like to have the U.S. friendship umbrella where ever they can have it — both bilaterally and in the multilateral framework — but at the same time they are trying to find ways and means whereby they don’t have to seem too closely associated with us — where ever they think that they might be better off bilaterally.

I would like to raise another question in connection with Japan, and that is: I think that the Japanese economy is moving in the direction toward which it is going to be quite different than it has been in the past, and we feel that it would be normal, or more normal, in the sense that it will be more similar to our own and those of the Western European countries that those will be smaller and they will have all sorts of complaints on environmental grounds and balance of payments grounds, constitution infringes —

I would like to raise the question of what this is likely to mean in terms of domestic Japanese political developments.

I think that the stability that we have known is not likely to be the same, that they will literally be competition for the favor of the voters and this may have in turn, all sorts of repercussions.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Greater competition than before? It seems to be pretty intense now.

MR. GEBER: Well I thought that the DLP was fairly a reflection of the majority

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Oh, I see in that sense —

MR. GEBER: Yes, and that will, in turn, have repercussions on the relationship of Japan with the outside world.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: So what sort of complications?

MR. GEBER: Our dealings with them will be less easy than they have been in the past, more uncertain. They, themselves, will be more uncertain in the duality of their dealing of interdependence with the outside world on going it alone —

And they — one of their main preoccupations will be the security of their raw material and basic material supplies —

And there, again, they will try every avenue and approach that they think over the short range and in the long run, will satisfy their requirements.

It’s a little difficult for me to paint exactly how its going to work out, but I think that our relations will be somewhat more difficult and I think that we ought to move toward whatever happens — items we have multilateral particularly — of trying to build a structure where they will gain more self assurance and feel safer.

MR. HERMAN: I would take issue with the questions regarding political stability. I don’t think that they have current political problems in Japan — I mean the current political problems in Japan are not problems of conservative vs left opposition.

They are more practical problems within the party and occasioned by the logical political process in Japan which is one of conservative split, rather than the passing or transition of power to the opposition.

That is to say that the popular resonance, or popular sentiment toward conservative support will continue to be the level of 50 percent — and I don’t see any short term change in that, brought about by economic pressures or political pressures within Japan.

The discipline of the Japanese people to accept financial, economic control, to go in and go ahead with tight economic policy, or slow down rates of flow or growth, is very well known, we know in the past they have been able to engage in that kind of self-sacrifice of their own personal aims and goals to the national ones.

But in considering the national goals, Mr. Fukada has made it quite clear all the time he was Minister of Finance, that it is necessary to slow down the growth rates to those approximating the average of the Common Market. And I think that is what is going to come out of the current government policy.

The longer range competition of raw materials — this is the problem that will still depend upon the outside world for raw materials of every kind.

But on the other hand, it seems to me that their action with the oil prices, and their continuing desire to talk with us and talk with the OACD about other matters, is their response to our new global agenda topics which dealt with these multilateral problems such as food, the law of the sea etc — in all this kind of thing they tend to respond very well, to take the format of individual cooperation and sharing.

And I think that that’s about —

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I must say, I haven’t found them all that eager to share things of their own. They are willing to participate in sharing —

MR. SHERMAN: They don’t have things of their own.

MR. KISSINGER: Yes, but there’s no great test of their ability to cooperate, if they are willing to receive or to share somebody else’s —

I didn’t find them at the Energy Conference, all that eager to take any risks.

MR. SHERMAN: Well, I think that in the post-Energy Conference period, they have been more and more willing during that particular period they were at the height of their insecurity.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Would they agree, do you think, to a concerted strategy to bring our prices down — or would they use that as an opportunity to move in from there on?

MR. SHERMAN: I don’t think they would use it as an opportunity to move in.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Would they be willing, do you think, to have a confrontation on oil prices?

MR. SHERMAN: With the producers?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: With the producers — that’s the only ones with whom you can have it.

MR. SHERMAN: They would obviously have a tendency, at all costs, to avoid a confrontation. But I think if they saw enough unity among the consuming countries —

MR. SNEIDER: I think — if they get hungry enough they would agree to it.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: To a confrontation?

MR. SNEIDER: Yes, because the energy prices — it would be a very tight decision, but I think they would probably go along, with the balance of payments position so bad. But it wouldn’t be for any interest of cooperation —

MR. BLEHA: I am not sure. Seems to me the main point here is the seriousness to Japan.

They look on this in terms of survival — when you’re there with a 42-day oil supply, it takes on elements of seriousness well beyond that of this country, or in Europe.

But similarly, with our Security Treaty, it is also a matter of survival with them — vulnerable as they are to nuclear attack.

It’s a question they have always had to balance these things and in the case of the oil crisis, they felt compelled to follow their survival interests on the economic side rather than letting the security interest take precedence, it had to take second place.

But it is always going to be a question of their feeling very vulnerable and trying to balance these two things that they think are matters of life and death for them.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Let me get five minutes on Thailand before I have to go —

MR. DEXTER: I think one aspect of the situation in Thailand is that they have already gone for an adjustment to the proposition that you put in the beginning, i.e. to a change in the situation of Viet-Nam.

They have gone well along to adapting to the withdrawal of U.S. power and will to intervene in the area, which means that they are working very hard to accommodate to China.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: But I can never tell to what extent it is their policy, in various countries, and to what extent we generate it through the Political Science Division of the State Department.

MR. DEXTER: I can see no evidence of that at all, sir. It certainly has been appearing in that pattern for a number of years, and certainly since the change of government in October, we have had a very articulate Political Science Department in Bangkok, in the Foreign Minister, of Foreign Affairs, and I think they are speaking for a fairly authentic deep rooted Thai sense of nationalism, felt by the students, felt by the editors of the country — not so much by the senior military that we have come to know so well over the past years - but these are the voices of the Thai people and the traditional Thai people who, I think accommodate to the outside world in their own way — who are uncomfortable in the kind of dependence the Thai have had over the past several years, on the United states. They are coming out of that, and it’s not so much that the State Department is reading things into the Thai scene, or imposing themselves on the Thai scene, as being aware that the Thai, themselves, have changed.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Where do you think they will be going?

MR. DEXTER: In what time frame?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: In the next three to five years.

MR. DEXTER: I would expect them to continue much the way they are doing now.

How far they can go will depend upon how much, for example, the Chinese or the Vietnamese will allow them to go. The Chinese are being quite hospitable and Hanoi is quite the opposite — but they will, I think, seek their security in good relations with the Communist powers who are able to threaten.

They will try to keep a good tie with the United States, but this is going to be of a different character than in the past. They will try to make relations or create relations with us, which are not antithetical to good relations with the other powers.

I think they will continue perhaps to intensify their efforts to work with these countries in a neutralized framework, trying by the way to develop a sense of regional self-confidence.

But in essence, I think the Thai are, and will continue to strive toward accord and accommodation.

MR. SNEIDER: If I may make a comment, Mr. Secretary, I think in this region we have a number of “spoiled brats” who are used to being taken care of by the United States.

We have made a number of commitments — we’ve made commitments to every one of these countries and they get very unhappy when we don’t live up to our commitments.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Like who?

MR. SNEIDER: Like Thailand, Indonesia, Korea, Japan, Philippines, — just go right down the roster here.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Are they wrong in getting annoyed if we don’t live up to our commitments?

MR. SNEIDER: They are partially wrong because in a sense that they have the “ledger” psychology in that they count every dollar and they don’t look at our commitments in the broader sense, they look at it in the narrow sense of how many dollars we doled out this year, and they are behaving like spoiled brats and are saying, “Well you know, you guys haven’t been taking care of us very well, so we’ll go someplace else.”

This is without any real sense of where they are going, and whether they do have a —

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Do you think that is true of Thailand?

MR. SNEIDER: I’m not an expert on Thailand, but even the Thais don’t — they are thinking about some sort of past historic “neutralism” that was great in the 19th Century.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: But they’ve got a problem. We have had our bases there, they can see what is happening in Congress.

MR. SNEIDER: Yes.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I don’t think it’s an unreasonable conclusion for them to come to.

MR. HUMMEL: Dick, I agree with you right up to the point where you said they are threatening us without any clear idea of where they are going to go.

I’ve got a feeling that — I think the same deep social forces we are talking about in Thailand, also include a very strong measure of caution. They are not going to leap into the arms of the North Vietnamese.

The same is true of the other countries. I don’t think this is a question of will, and purpose — we don’t have any demagogues left, thank God, in the area and they are going to keep their own national interest very closely in mind — they are not going to be in our national interests arid we are going to have a lot of problems — like if we have in the Law of the Sea, and a lot of other formats.

But I feel there is a pretty good chance that, particularly in Thailand, and with these other soreheads, crybabies, I agree with your description — still and all they will keep their own national interests pretty firmly in mind and there — this is one of the fruits of maturity of the post war era where they can now make their own decisions and look at the world through their own eyes.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: And the problem becomes: how well does their conception of the world square with ours.

MR. SNEIDER: That is right.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Well, I appreciate this very much, and now that I’ve found my way down here I shall repeat it.

Thank you very much.

[The proceedings terminated at 12:00 noon]

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Transcripts of Secretary of State Kissinger’s Staff Meetings, 1973–1977, E5177, Box 4. Secret. The papers to which Sneider and Hummel refer were not further identified.
2. Kissinger met with the leadership of the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs.