298. Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, May 8, 1975.1 2
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
Participants:
- The Secretary, Henry A. Kissinger
- Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew of Singapore
- Prime Minister Lee’s Private Secretary
- Jerry Bremer, Notetaker
Date: May 8, 1975
Distribution: Memcon file, LPB Chron, Memcon Book, Peter Rodman-NSC
The Secretary: The President thought his meeting with you was the best he’s had since he’s been in office, and I’m not saying that to flatter you.
Lee Kuan Yew: Well, it’s important to see now how he can do to hold what’s left. It’s sort of like an aircraft which has lost one engine, you’ve got a lot of nervous passengers, and the pilot and the crew must keep everyone calm, if there’s to be a safe landing. It will never be the same but nevertheless, we must try.
The Secretary: It’s also like the pilot who said, “I have some bad news and some good news for you. The bad news is that we’re lost, but the good news is that we’re making good time.” (laughter)
I’d like to make one suggestion. I haven’t heard your public statements, but I think a little pep talk by someone other than me about the problems we face in Southeast Asia would be very good. If I’m the only one saying that Vietnam is serious and we need to pull up our socks, it doesn’t have the same impact.
Lee Kuan Yew: Well, Dean Rusk was right. The bill is not in yet. I’ll be on CBS this weekend.
The Secretary: Well, be tough; not critical. But we have no hope with Congress, I can tell you that. The only hope we have is with the public, which won’t listen unless we tell them.
Lee Kuan Yew: I don’t think the public will tell Congress strongly enough until the elections.
The Secretary: That’s not entirely true. Congress now is a poorly-based fluke of last year’s election.
Lee Kuan Yew: True, but people like Ryan in California fought in Vietnam and Korea — they’re tough men. I said what if the North invades South Korea. He said, I’d pull the troops out. What about the Japanese, I asked. He said, I’m talking to you, not to the Japanese and I said, it has to get to the Japanese if that’s the message.
The Secretary: I wouldn’t over-dramatize this attitude. I think we can turn public opinion around quite a lot before the elections, but it’s at a low point now. Vietnam collapsed at a very bad point, but we’re determined to try to turn public opinion around.
Lee Kuan Yew: Your mass media, as I watch it, the way they killed-off Southeast Asia, and coming in now with a three-star general and a gold-star and Ky, and they’re even now using him . . .
The Secretary: . . . yes, after he disappeared from view for seven years.
Lee Kuan Yew: It turns people first against Asia.
The Secretary: And eventually anywhere.
In Watergate, I was the great hero because people were trying to prove their legitimacy by using me. Now the isolationists are using NATO to show their credentials and when nothing is left but NATO, they’ll knock that off too.
What does Reston say?
Lee Kuan Yew: Reston is saying that now he knows which way we’re going after Paris. I think that’s nonsense.
The Secretary: Do you think Habib understands the problem? I’m asking you frankly. We can talk as friends now.
Lee Kuan Yew: Do you want the truth?
The Secretary: Yes.
Lee Kuan Yew: I spent three-and-a-half hours with him yesterday and Ingersoll was there, too.
The Secretary: I know he doesn’t understand, but what about Habib?
Lee Kuan Yew: I give him 65 - 70 marks.
The Secretary: Do you think a trip by him now to Asia would help or hurt?
Lee Kuan Yew: I think neither. It may help if he can give you a correct feeling of the situation.
The Secretary: He will report well, that I can say.
Lee Kuan Yew: He won’t be a pep pill or a tranquilizer for anybody.
The Secretary: Who would be? Indeed, what would be?
Lee Kuan Yew: To tell the truth, nobody. The situation now is that what the President says must go through Congress, since once it needs money, it must go to Congress.
The Secretary: You know what they’re doing to me now.
Lee Kuan Yew: Yes, I’ve seen.
The Secretary: Within a year the mood in the country will move Right, and therefore nothing we would do today can cost lots of money. Therefore, we have to keep our eyes on the long-term problem and prevent a disaster this year until next spring.
Lee Kuan Yew: Do you think the mood will change by next spring?
The Secretary: Yes.
Lee Kuan Yew: Well, I pray you’re right.
The Secretary: Not in the Congress, but in the country.
Lee Kuan Yew: Then it will have an effect on Congress. (Tea is served)
The Secretary: In the last normal election we had, Nixon, who was after all, not personally attractive, won enormously with a strong foreign policy and a conservative domestic policy.
Watergate was a catastrophe, but I had to maneuver instead of dominating the situation. When you have no authority, every successive move becomes more difficult. If the Israelis had had to deal with an elected President, they would never have dared to do in March what they did.
Lee Kuan Yew: I think I was helpful with Kennedy. I said if that comes unstuck, they all do.
The Secretary: Let’s discuss the American position in Asia. What should we do there? I know what we cannot do.
Lee Kuan Yew: You haven’t got the strength to convince the Thais that it is worth resisting the insurgents, nor Hanoi that if they continue, they will get met, at least not until you get an elected President. This Congress got away with blue murder.
I would divide the strategy: from now to October 1976, and after the Presidential elections. If Ford is elected and has a mandate and you have a different Congress, he cannot then be brushed aside.
The Secretary: Let us talk concretely. This is not such a long time span, because this year Hanoi will do no more than take Laos. They are fully occupied with absorbing what they have already conquered. They are very careful planners, and they will step up in Thailand and Malaysia next year.
Lee Kuan Yew: But the insurgents there are creatures in their own rights and they get inspired so that the governments get nervous.
The Secretary: What should we do next year?
Lee Kuan Yew: No one expects the Americans to be involved in guerrilla warfare anywhere. There’s no use pretending.
The Secretary: I agree.
Lee Kuan Yew: Therefore, you have to give some confidence so that the will to resist doesn’t disappear the way it did in the South.
The Secretary: What was that the result of?
Lee Kuan Yew: I think Watergate tried American credibility, then the Americans cut down supplies to the South. This led to rationing of shells and had a cumulative effect. Thieu’s order to withdraw broke that will. He must have been out of his mind to give that order.
The Secretary: He lost six divisions, that never fought, in a traffic jam.
Lee Kuan Yew: This was very frightening to the Malays and to the Thais. Unlike Cassandra, I’ve been slowly conditioning Razak and his ministers and now that they see that I’m not that far wrong, they’re asking what now. While you are relatively weak vis-a-vis the Congress, you should do all your planning, have technical aid, contingency planning, etc., you’ve learned a lot in that area. Razak and his boys fought a World War II-marque-type war. Now the Vietnamese will teach the insurgents new techniques and give them new weapons. They have American weapons now. It sends chills down my spine. My worst fears have come true. How do you tell this to the American public?
The Secretary: You have to say it. If you say it, I can say it too. You live there.
Lee Kuan Yew: I must be careful so as not to scare the Malays and the Thais that the situation is hopeless.
The Secretary: You must get across to the American people that there’s a price we will pay for Vietnam.
Lee Kuan Yew: They will leapfrog Thailand, fight 3 to 5 years and then come to terms.
The Secretary: What terms?
Lee Kuan Yew: Neutralism, pro-Communism.
The Secretary: What effect will that have in Malaysia?
Lee Kuan Yew: That’s where we come in with contingency plans. I can’t fight the same kind of war as the British. The Thais won’t let the Malays cross borders to clean it up, but they might let us clean it up, if they also pay the price of concessions to the Chinese, etc.
The Secretary: How soon can you do it?
Lee Kuan Yew: Given the right kind of help from you?
The Secretary: What kind of help?
Lee Kuan Yew: Insurgency training.
The Secretary: Weapons, too?
Lee Kuan Yew: The right kind of intelligence and weapons.
The Secretary: [text not declassified]
Lee Kuan Yew: [text not declassified]
The Secretary: [text not declassified]
Lee Kuan Yew: [text not declassified]
The Secretary: [text not declassified]
Lee Kuan Yew: [text not declassified]
The Secretary: (reading paper) Have you talked to Schlesinger yet?
Lee Kuan Yew: I will talk to him tomorrow.
The Secretary: Rawling did not discuss it with us, but I think he is not unsympathetic. Can I keep this paper?
Lee Kuan Yew: Keep it [text not declassified] If you want secure links, it should be closely held, really discreet and secure. Habib said to me last night if we can start sending men here now, they will need technicians and technical equipment to meet the VC-type tactics, which the Thais and Malays will face.
The Secretary: This sort of thing we can do now. [text not declassified]
Lee Kuan Yew: Otherwise it will blow and I’ll play it in the open. I have no motives here. I am trying to be helpful. I get nothing for saying it. I can’t go beyond a certain point or the mass media goes after me.
The Secretary: You can go close to that point, though. We must wake up the American people to the dangers of the next five to ten years.
Lee Kuan Yew: Your Congress has to be prepared to lose all of Southeast Asia except Japan and to declare all the seas open. They will tell their constituents that.
The Secretary: In a fight between them and me with the constituents, I may win. History now accelerates very quickly. They won’t like the consequences of the Vietnam loss. We were attacked at the Paris Accords for being too tough with them.
We intended to bomb in March or April 1973. It would have kept Hanoi quiet for two or three years.
Lee Kuan Yew: Well, it has happened, and we must deal with the consequences.
The Secretary: On counter-insurgency assistance, the training in Thailand is okay, what about Malaysia?
Lee Kuan Yew: [text not declassified]
The Secretary: Is this arranged?
Lee Kuan Yew: I discussed it with Schlesinger [text not declassified] You give them the idea that this is a good idea. [text not declassified] Their headquarters have been there for fifteen years. If they don’t know what we are hoping to do, we can chip them down before it spreads but we need to drain the swamp too.
The Secretary: What do you think the Chinese think now?
Lee Kuan Yew: They are probably astounded that North Vietnam got away with it. They can’t believe the Americans are so paralyzed and really fearful.
The Secretary: What will they do?
Lee Kuan Yew: They will try hard in Cambodia and will help the Thais a little.
The Secretary: What will they do towards us?
Lee Kuan Yew: Nothing, they’re just sulky and angry. They won’t move on Taiwan, I don’t think.
The Secretary: Why are they sulky?
Lee Kuan Yew: I think you disappointed them. You have not moved as fast on Shanghai as they had hoped.
The Secretary: Don’t you think it would be a mistake to do that now?
Lee Kuan Yew: Yes, I’m sure they’d think you’re running away and that that will whet the Russian appetite. The Chinese are deeply concerned with the speed with which events are taking place. They think it’s giving the Soviets more openings and they can’t keep up.
The Secretary: Is there anything we can do now to give them confidence?
Lee Kuan Yew: I don’t think you need to give them confidence. You should show that you have a tough group around the President who himself is robust.
(Kissinger is interrupted for a call to Scowcroft.)
Lee Kuan Yew: What in your view can this President do with this Congress to prevent large chunks being lost?
The Secretary: How can they be lost?
Lee Kuan Yew: Well, Laos and Cambodia are gone. If they sense weakness, they will send large numbers of Pathet Lao into Thailand.
The Secretary: How can we show strength and activity? If you give me an idea, then I’ll talk to you and see if we can do it.
Lee Kuan Yew: Get the highest common denominator between the White House and the Congress and make a declaration that external aggression will be met, even if it’s Pathet Lao.
The Secretary: We can’t get that. Well, I must tell the truth. I think it’s a mistake to try to get any approval now. I would be inclined to take our chances and do something and then see. Let them throw me out, if they want to.
Lee Kuan Yew: They will stop you in 60 days in Southeast Asia; maybe not in Korea. In Thailand they will certainly stop you.
The Secretary: It depends on what we’re going to do. If it hadn’t been for the Indochina Acts, if we’d only had the War Powers, we’d have bombed. Therefore, in Korea I think we can act.
Lee Kuan Yew: Not in Thailand though.
The Secretary: No.
Lee Kuan Yew: You can only bomb the border areas. What use is that, given the euphoric mood they must be in? They need only take the corner of Thailand, and they could for example take over the Mekong hydroelectric scheme. They would then have the entire Mekong delta. That is one step they may risk. Then they would have a basis for becoming an industrial power. They can get away with it, I think. They have the Pathet Lao, and the Lao tribesmen have never been treated as Thais.
The Secretary: If the only thing which will shape them up is a congressional decision that we will fight — that we cannot get.
Lee Kuan Yew: I spoke about this with Jackson and Church.
The Secretary: What is Jackson’s view?
Lee Kuan Yew: If you tell him this is a plus for Russia, which it is because it strengthens Hanoi, he will understand. Church wants to give everything away except Japan. He said the only thing there that’s important is trade. He really believes it.
The Secretary: Trade with whom?
Lee Kuan Yew: The whole damn world.
The Secretary: He’s a God damn fool.
Lee Kuan Yew: He believes it. He’s personable. I noticed he has a nice TV image.
The Secretary: Luckily, it’s not a good TV image.
Lee Kuan Yew: He believes it sincerely.
The Secretary: Anyone who wants to be President and who is foolish enough to tell a visitor this shows a reckless lack of comprehension.
These fellows in 1969 looked very tough, too, before Nixon appealed to the mass of people. They switched quickly. They have no guts for a fight. For a year the problem — I think next year it will change.
Lee Kuan Yew: You can lose large chunks of Thailand this year, though, and the Thais could come to terms with China for too high a premium.
The Secretary: What is too high?
Lee Kuan Yew: They might cut out Taiwan, give the Russians some kind of a position. The Maylai communists in the south, for example — the Russians will use that insurgency to get what they want — though publicly they will say they’re obliged to tell all the people to support revolutionary movements.
The Secretary: What will the Philippines do?
Lee Kuan Yew: Nothing. He is in lots of trouble in the south with the Moslems and all the support they are getting from Libya and the Saudis. Whatever lift Marcos got from sugar is going down now.
The Secretary: What would you do if you were in my shoes? I told the President that when I leave, you are my candidate to succeed me. I have no doubt that you could really work with 2 hundred million people.
Lee Kuan Yew: With this Congress and with a non-elected President?
The Secretary: I won’t leave until after the elections.
Lee Kuan Yew: I think if there are some kind of funds somewhere to finance some little projects — you know training and technical assistance . . .
The Secretary: There are funds though they’ve plugged most of the loopholes. In 1969, we could move massively between various parts of the funds. Now even if we can’t get big sums, we can do it.
Lee Kuan Yew: You don’t need big sums. These countries are not like Vietnam. Thailand has reserves and food and the 20 years of help you’ve given it has made it quite self-generatingly wealthy. Of course, they have to be less greedy. They now have weapons on the other side too and they must start spreading the butter a bit. Marcos has got to do the same thing and he can do it in the northern islands. The problem is the Moslem south which wants independence which he cannot concede. Therefore, he should just hold the key positions and at some time Libya will get a new leader and Khalid or Fahd will change their views.
The Secretary: One tragedy was that we had arranged for a substantial Saudi loan to South Vietnam to help just as it collapsed.
Lee Kuan Yew: Did Thieu know?
The Secretary: Yes.
Lee Kuan Yew: Why didn’t he stay and fight?
The Secretary: They were going to pay his oil bill. I think the Army cracked psychologically.
In my shoes, what would you do in Asia?
Lee Kuan Yew: Outwardly, I would keep everyone steady. I would send signals to Hanoi, Moscow, and Peking. But if there is open aggression, the congressional mood will change. If you don’t believe me, something will happen. Buy time until the next elections. It’s a new ball game then. The danger is now because you’re not credible.
The Secretary: What can you say on TV that would help us?
Lee Kuan Yew: Doesn’t that risk just pulling out more entrails?
The Secretary: No, it helps those of us who are trying to pursue a strong policy. Also, tonight at the dinner give a strong speech. It would do the President a great favor. The President told me he has not been so impressed with anyone since he’s been in office as he was with you.
Lee Kuan Yew: How does it help the President with both hands tied behind his back?
The Secretary: He doesn’t have both tied. My assessment of the country is that it is very uneasy. Something is wrong. Deep down we are not so secure. Therefore, we talk big. Our strategy has to be to shore them up a bit. Let the leadership opinion know. I say we face extremely difficult situations. I never say the past is over. I think if you, in that strong and elegant way of yours, say there is a massive problem and that the bill will have to be paid, it will have an impact. They know you’re a friend.
Lee Kuan Yew: But it will be taken out of context.
The Secretary: But at least 125 people in the room will hear you tonight.
Lee Kuan Yew: It could be obliquely phrased.
The Secretary: I disagree; it should be strongly phrased.
Lee Kuan Yew: I could do it with CBS on Sunday.
The Secretary: You should do both. It should not be hysterical but calm. I talk to you as a friend and not as a foreign leader. This idea that we can have the whole world communist and then trade with them is naive.
Lee Kuan Yew: I said so two years ago and they blacked it out.
The Secretary: I’m not sure and certainly not on Sunday. Tonight I wouldn’t be all that conciliatory and reassuring. Seriously, you could really help. You know my views and the President’s views are identical. He is not a weak man. The problem now is that the public is so brainwashed.
Lee Kuan Yew: Should I tell them what I discussed with Razak? That your reputation is tarnished in Asia?
The Secretary: Absolutely, don’t you think he should do this? Ask my friend here, Jerry, what do you think?
Bremer: I agree very strongly. We Americans are not born losers.
The Secretary: That’s right. The American people are not losers. You know what Joe Kennedy used to say — show me a good loser and I’ll show you a loser. The only way the media can sell this is by saying that nothing is happening.
Lee Kuan Yew: If I say tonight something then they will be prepared for me on Sunday. It’s a little different live tonight. Then on Sunday I wind up getting the blame,
The Secretary: Well, don’t be too pleasant.
Lee Kuan Yew: I’m not. In Jamaica I spoke three times. I can say tonight that your position today is so bad that I’m not sure whether it’s a plus to have dinner with you tonight, Mr. President.
The Secretary: That goes too far I think. Something like that but more elegantly.