151. Memorandum of Conversation, New York, August 14, 1972, 3:30-4:10 p.m.1 2

PARTICIPANTS:

  • Ambassador Huang Hua
  • Mrs. Shih, Interpreter
  • Mr. Kuo
  • Cdr. Jonathan T. Howe, NSC Staff

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

DATE, TIME & PLACE: August 14, 1972, 3:30-4:10 p.m., New York

After a brief exchange of pleasantries, Ambassador Huang remarked that just as Commander Howe was calling Mrs. Shih for an appointment he was thinking of calling Dr. Kissinger for a meeting. Commander Howe stated that Dr. Kissinger hoped to meet with the Ambassador in the near future and the reason why he could not do it this week would become more obvious when the Ambassador had been made aware of the contents of the U.S. note. The Ambassador probably realized that Dr. Kissinger was in Paris today. Commander Howe then read the note at Tab A remarking that although he knew it was not necessary he wanted to point out that not only the first item but the second item was also sensitive. Dr. Kissinger’s travel would of course be announced at the appropriate time. When Commander Howe had handed over the note at Tab A, the Ambassador responded the he would convey the information to Prime Minister Chou En-lai.

The Ambassador them remarked that he knew Dr. Kissinger had been busy recently and he wished to convey a message to Dr. Kissinger. He indicated that there were three items in the message and then conveyed the following, reading from prepared notes.

1. First, in his message of August 4 the Chinese side gave its own analysis of the Soviet proposal that the Soviet Union and the United States sign a treaty on mutual nuclear nonaggression with no intention to ascribe Soviet motivation to the United. States. We furthermore [Page 2] express the hope that the United States will value the principle jointly affirmed by China and the United States (in the Shanghai communique) and reject the Soviet proposal. Dr. Kissinger said that you did not accept the proposal. Based on its understanding, the Chinese side cannot agree to the formula the U.S. is considering and doubts whether it can avoid being exploited by the Soviet Union because the Soviet Union can exactly use the pretext of “creating a condition” to dish up all kinds of proposals to serve nuclear monopoly and nuclear superiority.

We wish to say frankly that the Chinese side is not so worried about the Soviet attempt to isolate China. On the contrary, there are signs indicating that the Soviet Union is trying to create through its anti-China propaganda a false sense of security in Europe. This is worthy of attention and has probably long been noticed by Dr. Kissinger.

2. Mr. Gerhard Schroeder came to China as Chairman of the Foreign Political Committee of the Bundestag. His main interest lay in the discussion of establishing diplomatic relations but he was not commissioned to negotiate. Mr.. Schroeder maintained that a question of establishing diplomatic relations between China and West Germany should be above parties in West Germany and he used the German word “uber parteilich.” The Chinese side expressed appreciation of this.

The Chinese and West Germany governments have initially contacted each other. Both sides believe that it would be desirable to establish diplomatic relations as early as possible and that there should be no obstacles. The two sides will soon enter into negotiations. If Dr. Kissinger wishes to promote this, he should naturally be welcome.

3. Following formation of his Cabinet, Prime Minister Tanaka of Japan expressed the desire to increase efforts to realize the normalization of diplomatic relations between China and Japan. Proceeding from its consistent stand the Chinese side responded positively. The Chinese side has stated that Prime Minister Tanaka [Page 3] is welcome to visit China. The Chinese side understands the importance of Japanese/U.S. relations to both Japan and the United States, and it will not embarrass the United States government in the process of negotiating the restoration of diplomatic relations between China and Japan.

Without referring to his notes the Ambassador then commented that Premier Chou En-lai had received the original copy of the letter of thanks sent on June 28 by President Nixon. The Prime Minister considers this a friendly gesture and wishes to convey his greetings to the President.

Commander Howe indicated that the Prime Minister’s greetings would indeed be conveyed to the President who undoubtedly would be most appreciative. The three substantive matters which the Ambassador had conveyed would be brought to Dr. Kissinger’s attention. When Dr. Kissinger returned from his trip we would be in touch to arrange a mutually convenient time to get together.

In the closing pleasantries it was noted that Mr. Kuo would be accompanying the Ambassador and Mrs. Shih to all future meetings. Mr. Kuo indicated that he had been present during both the July and October 1971 American visits, but had been at the UN since the Chinese delegation first arrived.

[Page 4]
1.
The U.S. side has considered carefully the Chinese comments, conveyed on August 4, 1972, concerning the Soviet proposal for an agreement on nuclear weapons. Enclosed for the confidential information of the Chinese side is a copy of the text of the recent Soviet proposal. The U.S. side will not accept this proposal. It will fully inform the Chinese side of the U.S. response which will certainly reflect all the considerations raised by the Chinese.
2.
The U.S. side wishes to inform the Chinese side that Dr. Kissinger will travel to Saigon following his August 14, 1972 secret meeting with the North Vietnamese in Paris. The purpose of this trip is to review once more the negotiating positions in an effort to make rapid progress toward a just settlement of the Vietnam war. The U.S. side wishes to reaffirm its view that a prolongation of the conflict serves the interest of no country.
3.
On his return trip from Saigon, Dr. Kissinger is considering stopping briefly in Japan. His talks in Tokyo would be related solely to the upcoming meeting in Hawaii between Prime Minister Tanaka and the President and would not concern other matters. Dr. Kissinger wants the Prime Minister to know that the U.S. has no objection to the normalization of relations between Japan and the People’s Republic of China and will interpose no obstacles or delays.
[Page 5]

TREATY between the USSR and the USA on the non-use of nuclear weapons

Guided by the aims of strengthening world peace and international security, Being aware that a nuclear war would have devastating consequences for all mankind, Proceeding from the desire to create conditions in which the danger of an outbreak of nuclear war would be reduced and ultimately eliminated, The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America have agreed as follows:

Article I

The Soviet Union and the United States of America undertake not to use nuclear weapons against each other.

Accordingly the Soviet Union and the United States will build their relations so that they should not contradict the obligation assumed by the sides under this Article.

Article II

The Soviet Union and the United States shall prevent such a situation when, as a result of actions by third states, they would find themselves involved in a collision with the use of nuclear weapons.

In case of a military conflict involving states—not parties to this Treaty, the Soviet Union and the United States shall apply all efforts to prevent an outbreak of nuclear war.

Article III

Nothing contained in this Treaty shall affect the obligations undertaken by the sides before other states, or any obligations under the United Nations Charter. The Treaty shall not affect the right of individual or collective self-defense.

[Page 6]

Article IV

This Treaty is of unlimited duration.

Article V

The Treaty is subject to ratification in conformity with the constitutional procedures of each of the sides, and shall enter into force on the date of exchange of instruments of ratification.

The Treaty shall be registered in conformity with Article 102 of the United Nations Charter.

Done at the city of—————- —————— 1972, in two copies, each in the Russian and the English languages, which are equally authentic.

For the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

For the United States of America

  1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 850, President’s File-China Trip, China Exchanges, June 25, 1972-Oct 17, 1972. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. The precise location of the meeting is not indicated. Attached at Tab A are the U.S. note and a copy of the Soviet-proposed treaty on the non-use of nuclear weapons.
  2. Chinese Ambassador to the UN Huang Hua reiterated to NSC staff member Howe China’s opposition to the Soviet nuclear non-aggression proposal, described a recent visit to China by Gerhard Schroeder of the West German Bundestag, and expressed optimism about a rapprochement between China and Japan. Howe also read the text of a note, outlining U.S. opposition to a Soviet treaty on the non-use of nuclear weapons, informing the Chinese of President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger’s planned trip to Saigon following a secret meeting with North Vietnamese negotiators in Paris, and noting that Kissinger might consider stopping briefly in Japan on his return trip from Saigon.