45. Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, June 4, 1976, 3 p.m.1 2
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Memorandum of Conversation
DATE: June 4, 1976
SUBJECT: Secretary’s Meeting with Governor Scranton
DATE, TIME & PLACE: June 4, 1976, 3:00 P.M., Secretary’s Office
PARTICIPANTS:
The Secretary
Governor Scranton
Assistant
Secretary William E. Schaufe, Jr.
Assistant Secretary Samuel W. Lewis
Gerald B. Helman, IO/UNP (Notetaker)
Governor Scranton: There are two subjects I want to talk about. First, I am going to Africa, as you know. Do you have any suggestions or advice?
The Secretary: Where are you going?
Scranton: I will be going to most of the places you haven’t been, with the exception of Tanzania, Senegal and Zambia.
Secretary: Aren’t you going to Botswana? Why not? I am concerned that both you and I have skipped this. Can’t you see if you can make it?
Scranton: Okay, let’s try it.
Secretary: Fine.
Scranton: Do you have any special messages that you want me to deliver?
Secretary: I was told by Foreign Minister Wills this morning that it’s hard for Africans to understand how we conduct foreign policy. They think that just because the “super-chief” states a policy, it is automatically carried out. They don’t understand our political process. It would help if you could explain to them that this is a tough year in the United States because of the elections, and if you can tell them what is involved in piecing our policies together and in implementing them.
Scranton: Okay then, I will talk about the implementation of policy.
Secretary: Is Seelye going with you? I would like that.
Schaufele: Yes.
Secretary: I want you to know something, and Bill here understands what I mean. The African Bureau is populated by a bunch of zealots who felt ostracized for a long time and who felt that Africa was being ignored. This is combined with the fact that in our Embassies the officers thought their jobs consisted of holding the hands of the local leaders and telling them what a great role Africa can play. It is my impression that moving with a certain majesty impresses the African leadership. It is important that you appeal to them not on the basis of altruism or idealism but that what we will be doing we are undertaking in our own interest. You have to make clear to them that we will not do it their way, through intervention. They have to understand that we have to put the pieces together. Nyerere is a sophisticated person, he understands this and so does Kaunde. I told Nyerere privately that if Cuban troops appear that he can be assured we will find a way to stop them. You also don’t want to give the Africans the impression that you will try to split them. I told them that we would keep out ourselves but that we will expect others to stay out as well. To show you the wrong direction they can take, the fools defeated us in Nairobi. They got a parliamentary victory but instead of having progressed, there is a stalemate. In talking to the leaders, you can also tell them that in an OAU meeting it is in their interest not to come out with anti-American statements. This could lead to a bad reaction here. If they could possibly come out with some pro-American statement, it will have a tremendous impact here. Nyerere, Kaunda and Bongo will understand this.
Scranton: What should I say at ECOSOC?
Secretary: Give them hell about Nairobi. If you compare where we were and where we are now in development policy, we have made monumental progress. A year ago, if we mentioned a commodity agreement in this country, there would have been an explosion. If the IRB had passed it could have been reported as a compromise. But not with 90 of the potential beneficiaries abstaining. I think they have got to understand this. As far as the development process is concerned, I am personally in favor of Giscard’s scheme. The thing is, they float the idea but don’t follow up on it. So I would appreciate if you could talk to others, for example, Houphuet-Boigny, to support it and to see how it can be developed.
Scranton: Another point. The OAU is coming up soon. Then the non-aligned summit will take place in Sri Lanka. If we are to make a move on the question of Israeli suspension, now is the time.
Secretary: If Rabin has one more press conference [referring to Rabin’s statement regarding Syrians killing Palestinians], I will join them.
Scranton: Anyway, we will have to go all out now with the Africans.
Secretary: My problem is I don’t want to ask them to pay us on matters of importance to Israel rather than our own foreign policy.
Lewis: We should stress the effect Israeli expulsion would have on the UN as an institution.
Secretary: Why don’t you tell them about the kind of consequences it is bound to have in the United States during our election and its significance for the UN?
Scranton: Now about Namibia, what do you have planned?
Secretary: Where’s the paper on it?
Scranton: On Puerto Rico, I find the picture different than others. More and more I am concerned about the Puerto Rico thing in an election year. It could be dynamite. Maybe the President could say something when he goes to Puerto Rico.
Secretary: What is happening?
Scranton: Well, they are getting hot on the subject in the United Nations. For example, in Algiers they called for independence in Puerto Rico.
Lewis: If the Committee of 24 endorses the matter, it could come up in the General Assembly this fall.
Scranton: It could be one of the hottest political issues we have. If the President goes to Puerto Rico, can we say something about it?
Secretary: We will have to be brutal if it comes to the United Nations. It would be outrageous. On this basis, we can raise the Ukraine and Byelorussia.
Scranton: I bring it to you, because I feel it is a Presidential matter.
Lewis: What if the President were to reaffirm publicly what Eisenhower said in the 50s: that if the Puerto Rican people ever were to vote in favor of independence he would recommend it to the Congress.
Secretary: We have to tell the United Nations plainly that it will have the most grievous consequence for our position. Legally, its status is no different than Hawaii. They could then ask for Hawaiian independence and self-determination. But we should tell the non-aligned that we would consider it an unfriendly act and as interference in our domestic jurisdiction.
Scranton: I want to go beyond that to something which would be a plus for the campaign. A strong statement issued after the primaries but before the convention about outrageous interference in Puerto Rico would be a terrific asset in the campaign.
Secretary: I strongly favor it. I would write a letter to each one of the non-aligned, pointing out what is on the agenda and that supporting discussion of Puerto Rico would be an unfriendly act.
Lewis: Maybe we could have a letter to the non-aligned in July after the President’s statement.
Secretary: (Nodded his assent).
(The Secretary subsequently told Lewis that he did not want the President to issue a statement on PLO participation in the ILO. He said he would have no objection to the statement being issued by our ILO delegation.)
- Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, P820043–1943. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Helman on June 7. The meeting took place in Kissinger’s office. Scranton undertook a three-week trip to eleven African nations beginning June 12.↩
- Kissinger and Scranton discussed Scranton’s impending trip to African countries and issues likely to arise in U.N. meetings.↩