Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–14, Part 1, Documents on the United Nations, 1973–1976

52. Telegram 313877 From the Department of State to All Diplomatic Posts, December 30, 1976, 2258Z.¹ ²

December 30, 1976, 2258Z

TELEGRAM
Department of State
313877

R 302258Z DEC 76

FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO ALL DIPLOMATIC POSTS
AMEMBASSY BANGUI BY POUCH
AMEMBASSY BANJUL BY POUCH
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT BY POUCH
AMEMBASSY BISSAU BY POUCH
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS BY POUCH
AMEMBASSY GABORONE BY POUCH
AMEMBASSY KIGALI BY POUCH
AMEMBASSY LOME BY POUCH
AMEMBASSY MBABANE BY POUCH
AMEMBASSY MAPUTO BY POUCH
AMEMBASSY MASERU BY POUCH
AMEMBASSY LILONGWE BY POUCH
AMEMBASSY OUAGADOUGOU BY POUCH
AMEMBASSY SUVA BY POUCH
AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE BY POUCH
XMT AMEMBASSY BANGUI
AMEMBASSY BANJUL
AMEMBASSY BISSAU
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
AMEMBASSY GABORONE
AMEMBASSY KIGALI
AMEMBASSY LOME
AMEMBASSY MBABANE
AMEMBASSY MAPUTO
AMEMBASSY MASERU
AMEMBASSY LILONGWE
AMEMBASSY OUAGADOUGOU
AMEMBASSY SUVA
AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE

STATE 313877

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, UNGA

SUBJECT: MULTILATERAL AFFAIRS: ASSESSMENT OF 31ST UNGA

REF: STATE 220772

1. BEGIN SUMMARY:

THIS CABLE IS THE FIRST OF SEVERAL ON MULTILATERAL AFFAIRS IN 1976 AND 1977. IT DESCRIBES SESSION’S ATMOSPHERE, REVIEWS PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS AND ASSESSES THEIR SIGNIFICANCE FOR USG AS BACKGROUND INFORMATION FOR AMBASSADOR AND EMBASSY OFFICERS. TALKING POINTS FOR USE WITH HOST GOVERNMENTS WILL FOLLOW SHORTLY. END SUMMARY.

2. BACKGROUND. A. 31ST UNGA CULMINATED A YEAR OF INTENSE MULTILATERAL ACTIVITY ACROSS VIRTUALLY FULL RANGE OF ISSUES UNGA NORMALLY CONSIDERS. UNCTAD IV, CIEC, ECOSOC, AND MANY OTHER INTERNATIONAL MEETINGS WITHIN AND OUTSIDE UN SYSTEM STRENUOUSLY ADDRESSED AGENDA OF ECONOMIC ISSUES ESTABLISHED BY THE 1975 UNGA SEVENTH SPECIAL SESSION. POSITIONS OF THE LDC MAJORITY IN THE UNGA ON THESE ISSUES WERE FURTHER DEFINED AT G-77 MANILA AND MEXICO CITY MEETINGS AND NON-ALIGNED ALGIERS AND COLOMBO CONFERENCES.

B. POLITICAL ISSUES AT 31ST GA HAD ALSO BEEN EXTENSIVELY NEGOTIATED AT PRECEDING INTERNATIONAL MEETINGS. AT OAU SUMMIT AND ELSEWHERE, AFRICANS DEMONSTRATED THAT THEY DEFINITELY WOULD NOT NOW SUPPORT ISRAEL’S EXCLUSION FROM GA, AND WERE INCREASINGLY RELUCTANT TO REAFFIRM ZIONISM/RACISM WHEN THIS WOULD REDUCE SUPPORT FOR ACTIONS ON APARTHEID. SIMILARLY, CONSIDERABLE NUMBER OF LDCS, TO WHOM WE HAD MADE REGULAR REPRESENTATIONS, RECOGNIZED IRRELEVANCE OF KOREA AND PUERTO RICO ISSUES TO THEIR OWN INTERESTS IN THE GA. RESULT, ASSISTED BY INEPTITUDE AND ARROGANCE OF CUBA AND NORTH KOREA AT COLOMBO, WAS THAT THESE TWO ISSUES LOST MUCH SUPPORT AND BOTH COUNTRIES DECIDED NOT TO PUSH THEM AT THE 31ST UNGA.

3. DYNAMICS OF THE 31ST GA. A. RELATIVE ABSENCE OF POLITICAL STRIFE PROVIDED UNUSUALLY CLEAR VIEW OF USES OR MISUSES OF GA BY ITS MEMBERS AND THEIR PURPOSES IN IT. THUS, 31ST UNGA SHOWED THAT MOST OF THE UNGA’S LDC MAJORITY REGARD IT SERIOUSLY AS A WAY TO BE HEARD EFFECTIVELY, AND TO FURTHER IMPORTANT FOREIGN POLICY OBJECTIVES. HOWEVER, WE SEE TOO MUCH LDC BEHAVIOR AS STILL NOT SERVING THESE SERIOUS PURPOSES. UNGA’S LEGITIMATE FUNCTION AS A SAFETY-VALVE FOR EMOTION AND FRUSTRATION IS GROSSLY OVERUSED TO DISPLAY FERVOR AND SOLIDARITY AND TO PUNISH WITH WORDS.

B. AUTOMATIC ADOPTION OF PRE-DECIDED, (QUOTE) NON-NEGOTIABLE (UNQUOTE) RESOLUTIONS BY BLOC VOTES, AS IN 29TH AND 30TH UNGAS, AND SIXTH SPECIAL SESSION, DID NOT RECUR. ALTHOUGH LDCS ORGANIZED AS THE GROUP OF 77 OFTEN BECAME IMPATIENT WITH PROTRACTED NEGOTIATIONS ON G-77-SPONSORED RESOLUTIONS OPPOSED BY ONLY A SMALL MINORITY OF DEVELOPED COUNTRIES, G-77 NORMALLY CONTINUED NEGOTIATIONS WHEN NECESSARY TO AVOID NUMEROUS DEVELOPED COUNTRY ABSTENTIONS OR NEGATIVE VOTES. UN MEMBERS ALSO INCREASINGLY RECOGNIZED THAT CERTAIN RESOLUTIONS (E.G., CONVENING A SPECIAL SESSION ON DISARMAMENT) REQUIRE AS NEARLY UNIVERSAL SUPPORT AS POSSIBLE. DESIRE TO ADOPT SUCH RESOLUTIONS BY CONSENSUS SUSTAINED NEGOTIATIONS ON THEM.

C. DEVELOPED COUNTRIES WERE ACTIVE IN THIS GA, FINDING MORE SUCCESS ON THEIR INITIATIVES THAN IN RECENT PAST. THESE TENDED TO AVOID MAIN POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC AREAS OF CONTENTION. FOR EXAMPLE, THE FRG SUCCESSFULLY OBTAINED CONSENSUS ADOPTION OF ITS RESOLUTION ON AN INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION AGAINST TAKING OF HOSTAGES. BY CONTRAST, JAPAN HAD TO ABANDON ITS RESOLUTION ON CONVENTIONAL ARMS FOR LACK OF SUPPORT. THESE AND OTHER EXPERIENCES EMPHASIZED VALUE OF DEVELOPED COUNTRIES’ INITIATIVES IN THE UN ON COMPLEX OR SENSITIVE SUBJECTS.

4. GROUPS AND CAUCUSES.

A. THESE WERE PARTICULARLY ACTIVE THIS YEAR. AMONG DEVELOPED COUNTRIES THE WESTERN EUROPEAN AND OTHERS GROUP (WEO) WAS USEFUL FOR EXCHANGING INFORMATION AND COMPARING VIEWS. HOWEVER, SMALLER IMPROVISED GROUPS HANDLED COORDINATION AND NEGOTIATION OF SPECIFIC POSITIONS. OF THESE, KOREA CORE GROUP COORDINATED STRATEGY, AND REPRESENTATIONS IN NEW YORK AND CAPITALS, BETWEEN 30TH AND 31ST UNGAS AND WOULD HAVE HANDLED THE KOREA ISSUE AT THE 31ST GA HAD IT NOT BEEN WITHDRAWN.

B. EC-9 SHOWED IMPRESSIVE DETERMINATION TO ACHIEVE COORDINATED POSITIONS. THESE EFFORTS AT CO-ORDINATION WERE OFTEN PROTRACTED, PRODUCING INFLEXIBLE AND MINIMAL COMMON POSITIONS. WE THUS FREQUENTLY HAD DIFFICULTIES IN ACHIEVING EC-9 SUPPORT FOR OUR USUALLY MORE DEMANDING POSITIONS, PARTICULARLY ON ECONOMIC ISSUES. HOWEVER, WE BELIEVE WE NOW HAVE A SOLID BASE FOR INCREASING CONSULTATIONS WITH EC-9 COUNTRIES IN NEW YORK, CAPITALS AND EC-9’S OWN FORUMS ON A WIDE RANGE OF ISSUES.

C. AMONG LDCS, MOST IMPORTANT FORMAL CAUCUSES WERE REGIONAL GROUPS, NAM, AND G-77. AFRICAN GROUP WAS PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT BECAUSE OF ITS NUMBERS AND ENERGY WHICH GAVE IT CONTROL OVER ISSUES MOST IMPORTANT TO IT. THE NAM, ENERGIZED BY COLOMBO, WAS EXTREMELY ACTIVE AND SPONSORED RESOLUTIONS WHICH WERE ADOPTED ON WIDE RANGE OF ECONOMIC, POLITICAL AND DISARMAMENT ISSUES. MANY OF THESE RESOLUTIONS WERE COLOMBO POSITIONS AND WERE MANAGED BY THE COORDINATING COUNTRIES ASSIGNED TO THEM THERE. THE NON-ALIGNED COORDINATING COMMITTEE (NACC) MET REGULARLY TO CONSIDER PROGRESS REPORTS AND PROVIDE GENERAL GUIDANCE.

D. THE G-77 HAD A SEMI-FORMAL COORDINATING STRUCTURE UNDER A COMMITTEE CHAIRED BY PAKISTAN TO WHICH GROUPS COVERING EACH ISSUE AND GA COMMITTEE REPORTED. THE SPECIFICS OF BASICALLY AGREED POSITIONS WERE OFTEN INTENSIVELY NEGOTIATED WITHIN G-77. G-77’S BASIC PURPOSE WAS TO DEMONSTRATE LDC DISSATISFACTION WITH INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC NEGOTIATIONS ON KEY ISSUES (DEBT, COMMODITIES), AND TO FURTHER INTERNATIONAL ACCEPTANCE OF THE NIEO.

E. USSR APPEARED TO BE TRYING THROUGH DISARMAMENT INITIATIVES AND OTHERWISE TO GAIN MORE VISIBILITY IN THE UNGA. THE GENERAL FEELING THAT GENEVA CONFERENCE ON THE MIDDLE EAST (OF WHICH USSR IS A CO-CHAIRMAN) SHOULD NOW BE REVIVED HELPED THIS EFFORT. HOWEVER, LDCS’ RECOGNITION OF SOVIET IRRELEVANCE TO MOST OF THEIR ECONOMIC OBJECTIVES, AND ABSENCE OF A SOVIET ROLE IN POLITICAL ISSUES SUCH AS CYPRUS, ONCE AGAIN KEPT USSR FROM FINDING A PLACE IN THE 31ST UNGA PROPORTIONATE TO ITS SUPERPOWER STATUS.

5. SECURITY COUNCIL. SECURITY COUNCIL WAS IN ALMOST CONTINUOUS SESSION DURING THE 31ST UNGA. NON-ALIGNED COUNTRIES, TO EXPRESS THEIR OPPOSITION TO PERMANENT MEMBERS’ USE OF THE VETO, TRIED TO PRESSURE SC MEMBERS (PARTICULARLY USG) THROUGH GA RESOLUTIONS ON ISSUES LIKE ADMISSION OF VIET NAM. EGYPT ATTEMPTED TO USE THE CONCURRENT SESSIONS OF THE SC AND THE GA TO KEEP ATTENTION FOCUSED ON ITS (QUOTE) PEACE OFFENSIVE (UNQUOTE), IN PARTICULAR BY CONVERTING ME ACTIONS OF THE SC, ESPECIALLY CONSENSUS STATEMENT ON OCCUPIED TERRITORIES, INTO GA RESOLUTIONS. WE OBJECTED NOT ONLY TO GRATUITOUSNESS OF THIS MANEUVER, BUT ALSO TO CONSEQUENT BLURRING OF THE GA’S AND SC’S SEPARATE ROLES BY IMPLYING THAT SC ACTIONS ARE NOT DEFINITIVE THEMSELVES WITHOUT FURTHER ACTION BY THE GA. IN CONTRAST, SC AND GA COLLABORATED APPROPRIATELY AND SMOOTHLY ON CYPRUS/UNFICYP RENEWAL, WALDHEIM’S RE-ELECTION, UNDOF RENEWAL/REFINANCING, AND ADMISSION OF ANGOLA AND WESTERN SAMOA.

6. ECONOMIC QUESTIONS.

A. THE ABSENCE OF BITTERLY CONTESTED POLITICAL ISSUES THIS YEAR MADE EVIDENT IMMENSE AMOUNT OF TIME AND EFFORT GA NORMALLY DEVOTES TO ECONOMIC ISSUES. AS USUAL, SESSION CONSIDERED A WIDE VARIETY OF ECONOMIC ISSUES, INCLUDING: INSTITUTIONAL OR ORGANIZATIONAL MATTERS (E.G., UNIDO, IFAD), PROGRAMS (E.G., UNDP, WFP), AND APPEALS FOR SPECIAL ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE TO INDIVIDUAL AND GROUPS OF COUNTRIES (E.G., LANDLOCKED AND ISLAND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES). SOME OF THESE WILL HAVE DIRECT PRACTICAL RESULTS, OTHERS WERE LARGELY HORTATORY. MOST REACHED A TRUE CONSENSUS. A FEW, BECAUSE OF MAJOR DIFFERENCES, WENT TO VOTE. MAJOR NORTH/SOUTH ISSUES PRODUCED MOST DIFFICULT RESOLUTIONS. THE GA’S RESPONSES TO THESE WERE MIXED. ALTHOUGH G-77 PRESSED SWEEPING DEMANDS AND CRITICIZED ALLEGED LACK OF RESPONSE BY DEVELOPED COUNTRIES, TONE OF THE SESSION EVEN ON THESE DIFFICULT QUESTIONS WAS RELATIVELY FREE OF RANCOR. IN GENERAL, THERE WAS REASONABLE WEO SOLIDARITY ON THESE ISSUES, BUT IN SEVERAL CASES IT WAS FIRMNESS OF US POSITION THAT HELD WEO WAVERERS IN LINE.

IT IS TOO EARLY TO JUDGE THE NET RESULTS OF 31ST UNGA ON NORTH/SOUTH ISSUES. OVERALL, IT PROBABLY DID NOT ADVANCE OR RETARD ONGOING DIALOGUE ON THESE ISSUES, BUT IT DID UNDERSCORE DIFFICULTIES AHEAD. G-77 HAS CLEARLY NOT RELENTED IN ITS DEMANDS, ALTHOUGH SOME MODERATE LEADERS DISLIKED THE EXTREMISM OF OTHER LEADERS SUCH AS PAKISTAN. MOREOVER, DESPITE CRITICISMS IN SOME OF THESE RESOLUTIONS, IMPORTANT G-77 COUNTRIES SEEMED WILLING TO WAIT UNTIL THE NEW US ADMINISTRATION CAN INDICATE ITS POSITIONS. ALL OF FOLLOWING ISSUES WILL BE BEFORE VARIOUS FORUMS IN 1977. AMONG THESE MAY WELL BE A RESUMED 31ST UNGA SESSION ON ECONOMIC ISSUES IN LATE SPRING.

B. CIEC. THE SECRETARY’S UNGA ADDRESS CALLED FOR RENEWED IMPETUS FOR PARIS CONFERENCE ON INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC COOPERATION (CIEC). G-77 CIEC RESOLUTION BY PAKISTAN SAID MOST DEVELOPED COUNTRIES HAD YET TO DEMONSTRATE IN CIEC POLITICAL WILL NECESSARY FOR CONCRETE RESULTS. IT URGED THEM TO RESPOND POSITIVELY TO LDC PROPOSALS (THUS IGNORING DEVELOPED COUNTRY PROPOSALS ACTUALLY MADE IN CIEC). AFTER INTENSIVE NEGOTIATIONS FAILED, PAKISTAN’S ORIGINAL DRAFT WAS ADOPTED BY 99-0-30 (VIRTUALLY ALL WEO’S PLUS SOVIET BLOC EXCEPT ROMANIA). THE US EMPHASIZED OUR COMMITMENT TO CONTINUING DIALOGUE AND ACTIVE PARTICIPATION IN CIEC, BUT CALLED RESOLUTION ONE-SIDED AND PREJUDICIAL TO CIEC. EC-9, JAPAN, CANADA, AUSTRALIA AND OTHER WEOS MADE SIMILAR STATEMENTS. SOVIET BLOC MEMBERS SAID THEY ABSTAINED AS NON-PARTICIPANTS IN CIEC. THE RESOLUTION AND ITS NEGOTIATION WERE UNFORTUNATE, BUT WE WERE GRATIFIED BY WEO SOLIDARITY, EVEN INCLUDING SUCH SOFT-LINERS AS SWEDEN. MOREOVER, A NUMBER OF MORE MODERATE MEMBERS OF THE G-77 WERE DISSATISFIED BY PAKISTAN’S HARD LINE. SINCE CIEC’S MINISTERIAL SESSION WAS LATER POSTPONED (PROBABLY TO NEXT SPRING), THE NEGATIVE EFFECT OF CIEC RESOLUTION MAY BE MINIMAL.

C. NIEO. PAKISTAN’S (G-77) RESOLUTION ON IMPLEMENTING NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER (NIEO) WAS COMPLETELY UNACCEPTABLE TO US. IT CLAIMED A 6TH SPECIAL SESSION COMMITMENT TO NIEO BY ALL COUNTRIES; CRITICIZED DEVELOPED COUNTRIES’ LACK OF POLITICAL WILL, URGED THEM TO PROMOTE NIEO, AND EXPRESSED DISAPPOINTMENT AT SLOW PROGRESS IN CIEC AND IN IMPLEMENTING RESOLUTIONS OF 6TH AND 7TH SPECIAL SESSION AND UNCTAD IV. IT CALLED FOR 32ND GA ASSESSMENT OF THESE RESOLUTIONS, INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY (IDS--SUB-PARA G BELOW), NIEO, AND CHARTER OF ECONOMIC RIGHTS AND DUTIES (CERDS). THE US DID NOT PARTICIPATE IN NEGOTIATIONS. NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN OTHER WEOS AND CO-SPONSORS PRODUCED ONLY LIMITED IMPROVEMENTS. THE RESOLUTION WAS ADOPTED BY 128-1(US)-8(OECD COUNTRIES). US STATEMENT WAS ESSENTIALLY SAME AS ON CIEC RESOLUTION. WE CAN EXPECT THE NIEO TO BE FREQUENT STANDARD PROBLEM IN G-77 RESOLUTIONS ON NORTH/SOUTH ISSUES.

D. DEBT. THE SECRETARY’S UNGA SPEECH NOTED US PROPOSALS FOR DEALING WITH LDC DEBT. ETHIOPIA, PAKISTAN, PHILIPPINES, AND SUDAN CO-SPONSORED RESOLUTION CONTAINING THE LDCS’ CIEC DEBT POSITION. DESPITE US, EC-9 AND SWEDISH EFFORT TO SUBSTITUTE PROCEDURAL RESOLUTION NOT PREJUDICING WEOS’ DEBT POSITION IN CIEC, SUDANESE REVISION OF ORIGINAL RESOLUTION PASSED BY 99-1(US)-31 (ALL WEO’S AND SOVIET BLOC, EXCEPT ROMANIA). US NOTED RESOLUTION’S INAPPROPRIATENESS SINCE CIEC CONTINUING, AND REITERATED US POSITIONS INCLUDING US CONCERN FOR FINANCIAL PROBLEMS OF OIL IMPORTING LDCS. NETHERLANDS (FOR EC), SWEDEN, JAPAN AND AUSTRALIA ALSO EXPRESSED CONCERN THAT THE RESOLUTION WOULD PREJUDICE CIEC.

E. TRANSFER OF REAL RESOURCES. PHILIPPINE RESOLUTION URGING DEVELOPED COUNTRIES TO MEET 0.7 PERCENT OF GNP TARGET FOR OFFICIAL DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE (ODA) AND RECOMMENDING SPECIFIC MEASURES FOR ATTAINING TARGET, PASSED BY 117(WEOS)-1(US)-18(9 SOVIET BLOC; EC-9, MINUS NETHERLANDS AND DENMARK WHO VOTED YES, JAPAN, SPAIN). US STATED ITS COMMITMENT TO INCREASE ODA EFFECTIVELY WHILE RE-EMPHASIZING THAT US DOES NOT ACCEPT 0.7 PERCENT TARGET. SOVIET BLOC EXPLAINED IT ABSTAINED AS NOT RESPONSIBLE FOR LDCS’ ECONOMIC PLIGHT. THE ODA TARGET ON WHICH WEO UNITY IS WEAK WILL CONTINUE TO BE AN IMPORTANT LDC POSITION IN CIEC AND IN UNCTAD TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT BOARD (TDB) MINISTERIAL.

F. UNCTAD IV. US JOINED A CONSENSUS ON UNCTAD IV OMNIBUS RESOLUTION. RESOLUTION WITH 23 OPERATIVE PARAS NOTED AND INTERPRETED UNCTAD IV’S RESOLUTIONS. IN NEGOTIATIONS, MOST DIFFICULT ISSUES WERE DEBT AND COMMODITIES. THE ORIGINAL DRAFT GAVE UNCTAD TDB AN UNWARRANTED ROLE ON DEBT, PROMOTED G-77 INTEGRATED PROGRAM FOR COMMODITIES AND COMMON FUND, AND EFFECTIVELY PREJUDGED WHETHER THE CODE OF CONDUCT FOR TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER SHOULD BE VOLUNTARY OR BINDING. EVENTUAL G-77 MODIFICATIONS ENABLED THE US, OTHER WEOS, AND EES TO JOIN THE CONSENSUS. IN LENGTHY STATEMENT OF RESERVATIONS AND INTERPRETATIONS, US RECALLED THAT UNCTAD PREVIOUSLY LIMITED TDB MINISTERIAL IN 1977 TO REVIEWING ACTION ON THE UNCTAD IV DEBT RESOLUTION, AND REJECTED ANY ADVANCE US COMMITMENT TO ANY PARTICULAR OUTCOME TO THE INTEGRATED COMMODITY PROGRAM NEGOTIATIONS.

G. IDS. UNITED STATES AGREED TO CONSENSUS ON SEPARATE G-77 IDS RESOLUTION. THIS AUTHORIZES COLLECTION OF DATA ON THIRD INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT DECADE. NUMBER OF NEGOTIATED IMPROVEMENTS IN RESOLUTION INCLUDES ITS TAKING INTO ACCOUNT ONLY NIEO OBJECTIVES RATHER THAN ORIGINAL LANGUAGE EXPLICITLY MAKING IDS AN INSTRUMENT TO ACHIEVE NIEO. WE HOPE THAT 32ND GA WILL ACCORDINGLY BE ABLE TO ASSESS THIRD DEVELOPMENT DECADE RELATIVELY OBJECTIVELY DESPITE THE INDIRECT ENDORSEMENT OF NIEO AND INCLUSION OF IDS IN RESOLUTION SUB-PARA C.

H. IBRD/IDA. THE SECRETARY’S UNGA SPEECH NOTED OUR ACTION ON REPLENISHMENT FOR WORLD BANK. G-77 RESOLUTION CALLING FOR PROMPT REPLENISHMENT OF IDA AND FOR INCREASE IN IBRD CAPITAL PASSED WITHOUT VOTE FOLLOWING EXTENDED NEGOTIATIONS. PRIMARY POINT OF CONTENTION WAS OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH WHICH URGES IBRD MEMBER COUNTRY SUPPORT FOR SUBSTANTIAL INCREASE IN BANK CAPITAL. US SAID RESOLUTION CAN BE APPLIED ONLY TO THE 8.3 BILLION DOLLAR SELECTIVE CAPITAL INCREASE CURRENTLY IN PROCESS. FRG, FRANCE AND JAPAN MADE SAME POINT. HOWEVER, G-77 SEE RESOLUTION AS CALLING FOR A LARGER GENERAL INCREASE. WE ANTICIPATE FURTHER G-77 PRESSURE IN BANK AND ELSEWHERE TO THIS END.

I. RESOLUTION ON 1979 UN CONFERENCE ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY FOR DEVELOPMENT. THE SECRETARY’S SPEECH OFFERED US AS CONFERENCE SITE. WE CO-SPONSORED RESOLUTION ENDORSING 61ST ECOSOC’S RECOMMENDATIONS ON CONFERENCE’S FRAMEWORK, OBJECTIVES, AGENDA AND PRELIMINARY ACTIVITIES. RESOLUTION GIVES FINAL SITE DECISION TO 32ND GA. GA ALSO REQUESTED UNSYG TO APPOINT ASAP A CONFERENCE SYG, AND DECIDED THAT COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY FOR DEVELOPMENT (CSTD) SHOULD MEET AS PREPCON OF CONFERENCE IN EARLY FEBRUARY 1977 TO APPROVE GUIDELINES FOR NATIONAL ASSESSMENTS OF SOCIO-ECONOMIC PROBLEMS SOLVABLE BY SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY. IN PREPCON, US DEL WILL EXPLAIN US HOSTSHIP OFFER AND SEEK PARTICIPANTS’ SUPPORT.

J. UNIDO. UNGA ADOPTED RESOLUTION (104-1(US)-27) REQUESTING INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT BOARD TO CONSIDER, AND UN INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT ORGANIZATION (UNIDO) SECRETARIAT TO STUDY, MEASURES TO INCREASE LDCS’ SHARE OF GLOBAL INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION. WEOS AMENDED RESOLUTION TO INCLUDE UNGA 7TH SS RESOLUTION LIMITATIONS ON GOVERNMENTS’ COMMITMENTS TO INTERFERE IN PRIVATE SECTOR. USG WILL BE ALERT TO MAINTAIN THESE LIMITATIONS IN TERMS OF REFERENCE OF UNIDO CONSULTATIONS ON FERTILIZERS (JANUARY 17-21, 1977) AND IRON AND STEEL (FEBRUARY 7-11, 1977). UNGA ALSO ADOPTED CONSENSUS RESOLUTION RENEWING MANDATE OF COMMITTEE DRAFTING CONSTITUTION (WILL MEET VIENNA, MARCH 7 - APRIL 2) AND CALLED FOR PLENIPOTENTIARY MEETING TO APPROVE CONSTITUTION IN SECOND HALF OF 1977.

K. THE INTERNATIONAL FUND FOR AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT (IFAD), PROPOSED BY OPEC MEMBERS AT WORLD FOOD CONFERENCE AND GIVEN MAJOR SUPPORT BY SECRETARY AT UNGA 7TH SS ATTAINED DURING THIS SESSION ITS FULL 1 BILLION DOLLAR FUNDING(OECD MEMBERS-56 PERCENT, OPEC MEMBERS-43 PERCENT, LDCS-1 PERCENT). THE G-77 WERE DEEPLY DIVIDED OVER NORWEGIAN/VENEZUELA PROPOSAL TO TRANSFER THEIR $19.89 MILLION CONTRIBUTIONS FROM THE FUND FOR MOST SERIOUSLY AFFECTED NATIONS TO IFAD WHICH WAS ADOPTED BY 52(US)-11-57.

7. POLITICAL ISSUES. THE MOST DIFFICULT OF THESE WERE MIDDLE EAST AND SOUTHERN AFRICA. DEVELOPING COUNTRIES GAVE GREAT IMPORTANCE TO THESE AND MAINTAINED CLOSE SOLIDARITY ON THEM. ON OTHER POLITICAL ISSUES LDCS WERE CONSIDERABLY MORE OPEN TO ARGUMENT AND IN CONFLICT WITH ONE ANOTHER. THIS WAS ESPECIALLY TRUE OF DISARMAMENT AND OUTER SPACE ISSUES.

A. GUAM. A RESOLUTION CONDEMNING US BASES ON GUAM WAS ADOPTED 60-21-42 WITH 23 ABSENCES, MANY OF THEM DELIBERATE, RESULTING IN A MINORITY RESOLUTION. VIGOROUS LOBBYING SIGNIFICANTLY REDUCED THE NUMBER OF AFFIRMATIVE VOTES FROM LAST YEAR AND INCREASED THE NUMBER OF ABSTENTIONS.

B. SOUTHERN AFRICAN ISSUES. 31ST UNGA REFLECTED LAST SIX MONTHS’ INTENSE DIPLOMATIC ACTIVITY IN SOUTHERN AFRICA. TO EMPHASIZE INCREASED INTERNATIONAL AWARENESS, AFRICAN GROUP REQUESTED THAT THE ITEM ON APARTHEID BE CONSIDERED ONLY IN PLENARY. THE GA LATER PERMITTED REPRESENTATIVES OF TWO SOUTH AFRICAN LIBERATION MOVEMENTS TO ADDRESS PLENARY, A PRIVILEGE USUALLY RESERVED FOR MEMBER NATIONS.

-- SOUTH AFRICA: ELEVEN RESOLUTIONS WERE ADOPTED: US OPPOSED FIVE, ABSTAINED ON FOUR, AND JOINED CONSENSUS ON TWO. THE MOST IMPORTANT RESOLUTIONS CONDEMNED RELATIONS BETWEEN ISRAEL AND SOUTH AFRICA, CONDEMNED CREATION OF TRANSKEI, AND ENDORSED ARMED STRUGGLE TO LIBERATE SOUTH AFRICA. ONE OF THESE, OPPOSED BY THE US, CALLED ON SECURITY COUNCIL TO IMPOSE ARMS EMBARGO AGAINST SOUTH AFRICA. WE NOW EXPECT THE SC TO MEET EARLY NEXT YEAR TO CONSIDER BOTH A MANDATORY ARMS EMBARGO AND THE PROHIBITION OF FURTHER INVESTMENT IN SOUTH AFRICA.

-- NAMIBIA: OF EIGHT RESOLUTIONS THE US OPPOSED ONE, ABSTAINED ON FIVE, AND JOINED A CONSENSUS ON TWO. MOST OF THESE, AND THE DEBATE, ENDORSED SWAPO AS ONLY TRUE REPRESENTATIVE OF NAMIBIA PEOPLE AND IMPLICITLY AS ONLY NAMIBIAN GROUP QUALIFIED TO NEGOTIATE WITH SOUTH AFRICA. THE DEBATE REPEATEDLY CONDEMNED THE TRUNHALLE CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE. THE FOURTH COMMITTEE REFUSED TO HEAR THE REPRESENTATIVE OF NAMIBIAN CHIEF KAPUUO.

-- RHODESIA: AFTER WAITING FOR DEVELOPMENTS IN THE GENEVA CONFERENCE, THE UNGA FINALLY ADOPTED TWO RESOLUTIONS, ONE WHICH EXPRESSED HOPE GENEVA CONFERENCE WOULD SUCCEED, AND A SANCTIONS RESOLUTION CONDEMNING THE US FOR BYRD AMENDMENT IMPORTS. THE OMNIBUS RESOLUTION WAS ADOPTED BY CONSENSUS DESPITE HARD RADICAL AFRICAN FIGHT TO REMOVE ANY POSITIVE MENTION OF GENEVA CONFERENCE. THE SANCTIONS RESOLUTION WAS ADOPTED 121-0-7(US). IN EXPLANATION OF VOTE US OBJECTED TO BEING SINGLED OUT FOR CRITICISM WHILE OTHERS WITH MORE EXTENSIVE RHODESIA TRADE WERE IGNORED.

C. ARAB-ISRAEL ISSUES. THE CURRENT ARAB PEACE OFFENSIVE DOMINATED 31ST UNGA’S MIDDLE EAST DELIBERATIONS, AND HEAVILY INFLUENCED CONCURRENT SECURITY COUNCIL DEBATES. IN NOVEMBER, A COUNCIL CONSENSUS STATEMENT ON THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES, INTER ALIA, EXPRESSED CONCERN OVER ISRAEL’S CONTINUED OCCUPATION, ASKED ISRAEL TO FACILITATE RETURN OF THE REFUGEES, REAFFIRMED APPLICABILITY OF THE FOURTH GENEVA CONVENTION, AND DECLARED INVALID ISRAELI CHANGES IN STATUS OF JERUSALEM. THE US SUPPORTED THE CONSENSUS STATEMENT WHICH DID NOT GO BEYOND POSITIONS WE HAD TAKEN IN THE PAST. THE GA ADOPTED IN DECEMBER A RESOLUTION CALLING FOR EARLY RECONVENING OF THE GENEVA CONFERENCE AND FOR SYG TO REPORT ON THIS. THE US (WITH ISRAEL) OPPOSED BECAUSE OF TIMETABLES RESOLUTION IMPOSED ON THE NEW US ADMINISTRATION. IN BOTH CASES, THE ARABS ATTEMPTED TO FORCE THE PACE OF NEGOTIATIONS ON TERMS FAVORABLE TO THEMSELVES, WHILE FURTHER ISOLATING ISRAEL.

OUR OVERALL OBJECTIVES IN THE ARAB-ISRAEL CONFLICT DICTATED DAMAGE-LIMITING STRATEGY IN 31ST UNGA. WE RECOGNIZED THAT THE UN HAS ROLE BOTH IN MIDDLE EAST PEACEKEEPING, AND IN SECURITY COUNCIL RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE FRAMEWORK OF NEGOTIATIONS. HOWEVER, WE BELIEVE THAT ONE-SIDED UNGA EFFORTS TO PRESCRIBE NATURE AND TIME-TABLE OF A SETTLEMENT MAINLY HARDEN PARTIES’ POSITIONS AND DEFLECT SERIOUS EFFORTS TO NEGOTIATE SETTLEMENT. THUS 31ST UNGA’S CONSIDERATION OF MIDDLE EAST WAS IN OUR VIEW NEGATIVE; HOWEVER, DAMAGE DONE WAS MUCH LESS THAN RESULTED FROM THE PLO SPECTACULARS AND ZIONISM/RACISM BATTLES OF PAST ASSEMBLIES.

D. ZIONISM/RACISM. THE ZIONISM/RACISM ISSUE, WHICH CAUSED SUCH NOTORIETY WHEN ADOPTED AS 30TH GA’S RESOLUTION 3379 IN CONNECTION WITH THE DECADE TO COMBAT RACISM, WAS GENERALLY MUTED THIS YEAR. RESOLUTION 3379 STILL STANDS. HOWEVER, BEGINNING AT THE SPRING SESSION OF ECOSOC, SOME MODERATE AFRICANS LED BY ECOSOC PRESIDENT AKE OF IVORY COAST, SOUGHT SUCCESSFULLY TO DEFUSE THE ISSUE IN ECOSOC AND THE GA BY AVOIDING EXPLICIT CITATION OF RESOLUTION 3379 IN ACTIONS ON THE DECADE.

TWO RESOLUTIONS ON THE DECADE CONTAINING NO DIRECT REFERENCES TO ZIONISM/RACISM WERE ADOPTED IN THE GA. A NUMBER OF WESTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES, AND SOME OTHERS, ABSTAINED. THE US HAS A CONSISTENT POLICY OF NOT PARTICIPATING IN VOTES ON DECADE RESOLUTIONS UNTIL THE LINK BETWEEN THE DECADE AND RESOLUTION 3379 IS BROKEN BY A RESOLUTION WHICH ESTABLISHES AS RELEVANT TO THE DECADE ONLY THOSE GA RESOLUTIONS ADOPTED BY CONSENSUS. ACCORDINGLY US DID NOT VOTE ON THE TWO 31ST UNGA DECADE RESOLUTIONS, BUT STATED ITS REGRET THAT THE DECADE’S ORIGINAL CONSENSUS HAD BEEN BROKEN BY RESOLUTION 3379, AND ITS HOPE THAT DECADE’S ORIGINAL OBJECTIVES COULD BE RESTORED.

E. CYPRUS. UNGA CONSIDERATION OF CYPRUS WAS GENERALLY AS IN PREVIOUS SESSIONS. A NON-ALIGNED RESOLUTION WAS ADOPTED BY 94(GREECE, CYPRUS)-1(TURKEY)-27(US). IT WAS SUBSTANTIVELY SIMILAR TO, AND CALLED FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF, PREVIOUS GA AND SC CYPRUS RESOLUTIONS. TURKISH CYPRIOT REPRESENTATIVES DID NOT PARTICIPATE IN PRELIMINARY SPECIAL POLITICAL COMMITTEE (SPC) DEBATE ON CYPRUS AS A PROTEST OF GA’S REJECTION OF TURKEY’S REQUEST THAT ENTIRE DEBATE BE HELD EITHER IN PLENARY OR SPC. TURKEY UNDERSCORED IMPORTANCE IT GAVE TO EQUAL STATUS FOR TURK AND GREEK CYPRIOTS BY MOVING GENERAL COMMITTEE RECONSIDER ALLOCATION OF CYPRUS DEBATE. MOTION LOST 23(US)-70-23.

GA TREATMENT OF CYPRUS GENERALLY SERVED US OBJECTIVE OF AVOIDING BOTH HARDENING OF POSITIONS, AND ADDITIONAL OBSTACLES TO SUBSTANTIVE NEGOTIATIONS.

F. DISARMAMENT. THE 31ST UNGA ADOPTED 21 DISARMAMENT RELATED RESOLUTIONS. MOST REITERATED PREVIOUS UNGA ACTIONS. ELEVEN DEALT WITH NUCLEAR ISSUES SUCH AS NUCLEAR TESTING, NUCLEAR-WEAPON-FREE ZONES, NON-PROLIFERATION, AND NUCLEAR NON-USE ASSURANCES. OF THESE, US OPPOSED A RESOLUTION ON SALT, AND ABSTAINED ON TWO COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN RESOLUTIONS (SPONSORED BY USSR AND NEW ZEALAND, RESPECTIVELY), USSR RESOLUTION ON WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION, SRI LANKA’S INDIAN OCEAN PEACE ZONE RESOLUTION, AND PAKISTANI RESOLUTIONS ON SOUTH ASIAN NUCLEAR-WEAPON-FREE ZONE AND SECURITY ASSURANCES.

THE TWO MOST SIGNIFICANT DISARMAMENT RESOLUTIONS WERE US-SOVIET-FINNISH RESOLUTION OPENING ENVIRONMENTAL MODIFICATION CONVENTION (ENMOD) FOR SIGNATURE AND RATIFICATION, AND YUGOSLAV RESOLUTION CALLING FOR UNGA SPECIAL SESSION ON DISARMAMENT (SSOD) IN 1978. THERE WILL BE A PREPARATORY CONFERENCE FOR SSOD DURING 1977. THE ENMOD RESOLUTION REQUIRED CLOSE CO-ORDINATION BETWEEN US AND USSR COUNTRIES IN SUPPORT OF EXTENSIVE LOBBYING OF OTHER DELEGATIONS. THIS COLLABORATION REVIVED COMPLAINTS BY NON-ALIGNED AND OTHER LDCS THAT SUPERPOWERS DOMINATE AND PREEMPT GA’S WORK ON MOST IMPORTANT DISARMAMENT ISSUES. THEY ACCORDINGLY STRONGLY SUPPORTED SSOD IN WHICH THEY WILL BE IN EQUALITY WITH SUPERPOWERS. OTHERWISE, DISARMAMENT DEBATE AT THE 1976 UNGA MET BASIC US INTERESTS: DEBATE WAS RESTRAINED, SOVIET PROPAGANDA-ORIENTED EFFORTS SUCH AS THE WORLD DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE WERE REJECTED, COORDINATION WITH OUR ALLIES INCREASED, AND RESOLUTIONS IN WHICH WE HAD PARTICULAR INTEREST, SUCH AS ENMOD, NPT, CHEMICAL WARFARE AND MILITARY EXPENDITURE LIMITATIONS, RECEIVED BROAD SUPPORT.

8. ADMINISTRATIVE AND BUDGETARY ISSUES. A. IN LINE WITH US OBJECTIVES, JOINT INSPECTION UNIT WAS CONTINUED WITH AUTHORIZATION FOR IT TO ASSIST EXTERNAL EVALUATION OF UN SYSTEM ACTIVITIES. (THIS IS IMPORTANT ADVANCE TOWARD ESTABLISHMENT OF EFFECTIVE, INDEPENDENT UN EXTERNAL EVALUATION IN WHICH CONGRESS HAS CONSIDERABLE INTEREST.) ALSO IMPORTANT TO US INTERESTS WAS RELATIVELY NONCONTROVERSIAL EXTENSION OF FUNDING FOR MIDDLE EAST PEACEKEEPING FORCES. ASSEMBLY ENDORSEMENT OF RECOMMENDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION WAS GOOD START TOWARD RATIONALIZING UN SYSTEM SALARY STRUCTURE, ALTHOUGH WE REMAIN CONCERNED ABOUT HIGH SALARY LEVELS. ALSO POSITIVE WAS SOME PROGRESS TOWARD ESTABLISHMENT OF VIENNA AS A THIRD UN CITY WHICH US SUPPORTS.

B. MAJOR ITEM ON NEGATIVE SIDE, WAS SIZEABLE ADDITION TO BUDGET LEVEL SUPPOSEDLY ADOPTED LAST YEAR FOR FULL 1976-77 BIENNIUM. WE GENERALLY FAILED TO COMPENSATE FOR NEW OR EXPANDED PROGRAMS BY REDUCING OR ABOLISHING CURRENT LOWER PRIORITY PROGRAMS. DEVELOPING COUNTRIES PRESSED GENERALLY TO MAXIMIZE UN FUNDING FOR EXCLUSIVELY LDC ACTIVITIES. ON LATTER, WE DID PREVENT PROVISION ENCOURAGING UN REGULAR BUDGET FUNDING OF UN CONFERENCES IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES AWAY FROM UN SITES. HOWEVER, WE FAILED PREVENT UNCTAD SECRETARIAT FROM ASSISTING MEETINGS SOLELY OPEN AND OF INTEREST TO LDCS. TRAVEL AND SUBSISTENCE EXPENSES OF GOVERNMENT REPRESENTATIVES ON ECOSOC’S COMMITTEE FOR PROGRAM AND CO-ORDINATION WERE ALSO FUNDED OVER US OPPOSITION. THESE SETBACKS FORESHADOW FURTHER LDC EFFORTS TO INCREASE FUTURE UN REGULAR BUDGET FUNDING OF ACTIVITIES DESIGNED FOR LDCS EXCLUSIVELY.

C. GREAT CONTROVERSY RESULTED WHEN OPEC MEMBERS RESISTED INCREASES IN THEIR CONTRIBUTIONS REQUIRED BY A PROPOSED NEW SCALE OF ASSESSMENT FOR THE NEXT THREE YEARS (THERE WAS NO CHALLENGE TO 25 PERCENT CEILING WHICH IS US ASSESSMENT RATE). ULTIMATELY, GA ADOPTED PROPOSED ASSESSMENT SCALE FOR 1977 ONLY AND REMANDED THE DISPUTES OVER CRITERIA TO SPRING SESSION OF ENLARGED COMMITTEE ON CONTRIBUTIONS. EXTENSION FOR ANOTHER YEAR OF AD HOC COMMITTEE ON RESTRUCTURING OF UN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL SECTORS DELAYED, BUT LEFT OPEN, ACHIEVEMENT OF A US OBJECTIVE HIGHLIGHTED IN SECRETARY’S 7TH SPECIAL SESSION ADDRESS.

9. HUMAN RIGHTS. A. EXTENSIVE DEBATE ON HUMAN RIGHTS WAS IN MANY RESPECTS DISAPPOINTING. IT PROVIDED NO NEW PRACTICAL AND EVENHANDED STEPS FOR PARTICULAR HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATIONS OR IMPROVING UN’S HUMAN RIGHTS MACHINERY. GOVERNOR SCRANTON MADE A HARD-HITTING, DETAILED SPEECH DISCUSSING THESE FAILURES.

B. A RESOLUTION CRITICIZING HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION IN CHILE WAS ADOPTED BY A LARGE MAJORITY. THE US ABSTAINED BECAUSE RESOLUTION IGNORED, EXCEPT FOR VERY OBSCURE PREAMBLE REFERENCE, RECENT RELEASE OF POLITICAL PRISONERS THERE, AND BECAUSE IT THREATENED FUTURE ECONOMIC SANCTIONS. OF NUMEROUS RESOLUTIONS ON SOUTHERN AFRICA, MANY INVOLVED HUMAN RIGHTS QUESTIONS. THE ONLY FOLLOW-UP TO LAST YEAR’S DECLARATION CONDEMNING TORTURE WAS PROCEDURAL RESOLUTION ENDORSING WORK UNDERWAY TO IMPLEMENT IT. US SUPPORTED SWEDISH PROPOSAL TO SAFEGUARD HUMAN RIGHTS OF POLITICAL PRISONERS WHICH WAS SIDETRACKED BY BYELORUSSIAN COUNTER PROPOSAL. BOTH WERE DEFERRED TO 1977.

C. THE US CONSIDERED A NUMBER OF HUMAN RIGHTS INITIATIVES. SUCH AS IMPROVEMENT IN PROCEDURES FOR HANDLING PRIVATE COMPLAINTS OF VIOLATIONS AND A GA SPECIAL COMMITTEE TO STUDY NATURE AND EXTENT OF TORTURE. WE CONSULTED CLOSELY WITH FRIENDLY COUNTRIES TO OBTAIN SUPPORT. THE REACTION WAS UNENTHUSIASTIC AND WE CONCLUDE IT WOULD BE USELESS, OR WORSE, TO PUSH SUCH PROPOSALS WITHOUT WIDE AND ENTHUSIASTIC BACKING. WE MAY SEEK SUCH SUPPORT BEFORE 32ND UNGA.

10. INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM. THE GA PROGRESSED HERE IN ADOPTING BY CONSENSUS AN FRG RESOLUTION ESTABLISHING A 35-NATION COMMITTEE TO DRAFT AN INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION AGAINST THE TAKING OF HOSTAGES. THE RESOLUTION IS LESS EXPLICIT IN CONDEMNING HOSTAGE-TAKING THAN WE, THE FRG, AND CO-SPONSORS, WOULD LIKE. IN NEGOTIATIONS THE FRG DID SUCCESSFULLY AVOID A DISTORTING AMENDMENT BY LIBYA LIMITING DRAFT CONVENTION TO (QUOTE) INNOCENT (UNQUOTE) HOSTAGES. HOWEVER, SOME ARAB AND OTHER STATES (E.G., CZECHOSLOVAKIA, KENYA, NIGERIA, TANZANIA) DID NOT RESPECT EFFORTS IN DEBATE ON FRG RESOLUTION TO KEEP HOSTAGE ISSUE SEPARATE FROM BROADER ISSUE OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM AND ITS UNDERLYING POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC CAUSES.

11. ASSESSMENT. A. OVERALL, 31ST UNGA SHOWED UNUSUAL REALISM, PRAGMATISM, AND CONSTRUCTIVE EFFORTS TO DEAL WITH ISSUES IN RESOLUTIONS. UNTIL ANOTHER SESSION, HOWEVER, WE WILL NOT KNOW WHETHER THIS ONE WAS A TURNING POINT OR A LULL. CYNICAL OR IMPATIENT MISUSE OF THE GA FOR RHETORICAL POSTURING AND PROCLAIMING OF NON-NEGOTIABLE STATEMENTS OF PRINCIPLE, RATHER THAN AS A FORUM CONSTRUCTIVELY ADDRESSING ISSUES THAT REQUIRE SERIOUS ATTENTION, IS STILL FAR TOO PREVALENT. THIS MISUSE MAY WELL AGAIN BECOME PREEMINENT IF KOREA AND OTHER DIVISIVE POLITICAL ISSUES RETURN TO JOIN MIDDLE EAST QUESTION AND SOUTHERN AFRICAN ISSUES IN THE GA, OR IF DISSATISFACTION WITH PROGRESS ON INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ISSUES CONTINUES TO MOUNT.

B. WE BALANCE THIS CONTINUING CONCERN WITH SOME MODEST HOPE. WALDHEIM’S RE-ELECTION FOR A FULL FIVE YEARS PROVIDES CONTINUITY WITH A SYG WITH WHOM WE KNOW WE CAN WORK, AND STRENGTHENS HIM IN HIS ROLE IN IMPORTANT INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATIONS (E.G., CYPRUS) AHEAD. THE RELATIONS OF OTHER DELEGATIONS WITH OUR OWN TESTIFIED TO THE EFFECTIVE LEADERSHIP ROLE OF THE US; INDEED, DEVELOPED COUNTRIES IN PARTICULAR CONTINUED TO PRESS US TO EXERCISE THIS ROLE MORE FREELY. WE WERE IN A SMALL MINORITY IN OPPOSITION ON A NUMBER OF ISSUES. NONETHELESS, THE GA, AS A FORUM FOR THE COLLECTIVE OPINION OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY, WAS CLEARLY TELLING US AGAIN THAT IT EXPECTS US TO BE A LEADER WITHIN AND OUTSIDE THE UN ON ECONOMIC ISSUES, ON SOUTHERN AFRICA, AND ON THE MIDDLE EAST. FINALLY, THIS UNUSUALLY SOBER AND BUSINESSLIKE GA SESSION HAS UNDERLINED FOR US THAT AS A LEADER AND INDISPENSABLE PARTICIPANT IN INTERNATIONAL EVENTS, WE MUST CAREFULLY DISTINGUISH LEGITIMATE EFFORTS IN THE GA TO PERSUADE AND PRESSURE US, HOWEVER UNPLEASANT, FROM DESTRUCTIVE REFUSALS TO NEGOTIATE.

ROBINSON

NOTE BY OC/T: POUCHED TO ADDRESSEES.

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files. Confidential. Drafted by Washburn; cleared in draft by Luers, Martens, and Perry, and in AF and EUR; and approved by Lewis. For Kissinger’s September 30 address to the U.N. General Assembly, see Department of State Bulletin, October 25, 1976, pp. 497–510. Simeon Ake of Cote d’Ivoire was ECOSOC President in 1976.
2. The Department reviewed the principal accomplishments of the 31st United Nations General Assembly.