Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–14, Part 1, Documents on the United Nations, 1973–1976

63. Telegram 161371/Tosec 69 From the Department of State to Secretary of State Kissinger in San Clemente, California, July 27, 1974, 0430Z.¹ ²

San Clemente, July 27, 1974, 0430Z

TELEGRAM
Department of State
161371

O 270430Z JUL 74 ZFF4

FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO WHITE HOUSE

STATE 161371

TOSEC 69

WHITE HOUSE PLEASE PASS SAN CLEMENTE FOR EAGLEBURGER FOR SECRETARY

FOLLOWING SENT STATE IAEA VIENNA JUL 27 RPT TO YOU QUOTE
STATE 161371
FOL RPEAT STATE 161371 SENT ACTION BONN LONDON PARIS USUN INFO PRETORIA JUL 25
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STATE 161371

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: SF, PFOR

SUBJECT: POSSIBLE EXCLUSION OF SOUTH AFRICA FROM UN
REF: A) USUN 2194; B) USUN 2300

1. SUMMARY: DURING PAST SEVERAL SESSIONS, GA HAS VOTED TO REJECT SOUTH AFRICA’S CREDENTIALS, BUT GA PRESIDENT HAS RULED ACTION TO BE CONDEMNATION WITHOUT PRACTICAL EFFECT. THERE ARE INDICATIONS THAT WITH ALGERIAN GA PRESIDENT, AFRICANS MAY TRY EXCLUDE OR EXPEL SOUTH AFRICA FROM UN.

2. BACKGROUND: SINCE 1970, UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY ANNUALLY HAS VOTED TO AMEND CREDENTIALS COMMITTEE’S REPORT SO AS TO REJECT SOUTH AFRICAN CREDENTIALS. EACH YEAR, GENERAL ASSEMBLY PRESIDENT HAS RULED THAT VOTE CONSTITUTED STRONG CONDEMNATION OF AND WARNING TO SOUTH AFRICA, BUT THAT AS CREDENTIALS CORRECTLY SUBMITTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH GENERAL ASSEMBLY’S RULES OF PROCEDURE, VOTE HAD NO EFFECT ON SOUTH AFRICAN DELEGATION’S RIGHT TO SIT AND PARTICIPATE IN ASSEMBLY.

3. THERE INDICATIONS THAT WITH ALGERIAN FOREIGN MINISTER BOUTEFLIKA AS THIS YEAR’S GA PRESIDENT, OAU MEMBERS MAY TRY TO GO BEYOND RITUALIZED CONDEMNATION OF SOUTH AFRICA OF LAST SEVERAL YEARS. THE AFRICANS COULD EITHER TAKE ACTION IN GENERAL ASSEMBLY TO REJECT SOUTH AFRICA’S CREDENTIALS AND EXCLUDE SOUTH AFRICA FROM 29TH UNGA SESSION, OR COULD ASK SECURITY COUNCIL TO EXPEL SOUTH AFRICA FROM UN BECAUSE OF ALLEGED DISREGARD OF CHARTER PRINCIPLES. IF AFRICANS ELECTED TO ACT IN GA, BOUTEFLIKA COULD DEVIATE FROM PAST PRACTICE AND RULE THAT GA’S VOTE TO REJECT CREDENTIALS HAD EFFECT THAT SOUTH AFRICA NO LONGER COULD PARTICIPATE IN ASSEMBLY. THIS MIGHT WELL CAUSE SOUTH AFRICA TO WITHDRAW FROM UN.

4. SHOULD AFRICANS DECIDE TO TAKE STEPS INVOLVING SC ACTION DESCRIBED REF B, THEY WOULD PROBABLY ACT UNDER ARTICLE 6 OF UN CHARTER WHICH PROVIDES THAT “A MEMBER OF THE UNITED NATIONS WHICH HAS PERSISTENTLY VIOLATED THE PRINCIPLES OF THE UNITED NATIONS CONTAINED IN THE PRESENT CHARTER MAY BE EXPELLED FROM THE ORGANIZATION BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY UPON THE RECOMMENDATION OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL.” WHILE PRINCIPLES PERTAIN TO INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, AFRICANS COULD ARGUE THAT SOUTH AFRICAN FORCES IN RHODESIA AND CAPRIVI STRIP ARE USED TO THREATEN ZAMBIA CONTRARY TO ARTICLE 2(4) OF THE CHARTER, OR THAT IN VIOLATION OF ITS OBLIGATIONS UNDER ARTICLES 2(2), 55, 56 AND 25 OF CHARTER, SOUTH AFRICA HAS NOT COMPLIED WITH CALL IN SC RESOLUTION 264 OF MARCH 20, 1969 TO WITHDRAW FROM NAMIBIA.

5. U.S. POLICY: FYI OUR STAND TOWARDS SOUTH AFRICA IN THE UN MUST BE VIEWED NOT ONLY IN LIGHT OF OUR BILATERAL RELATIONS WITH SOUTH AFRICA, BUT ALSO EVEN MORE AS FUNCTION OF OUR RELATIONS WITH LDC’S, WHO CLEARLY DOMINATE GENERAL ASSEMBLY WITH THEIR VOTES. SINCE INCEPTION OF UN AND PARTICULARLY IN LAST 15 YEARS, US HAS TAKEN STRONG LINE AGAINST APARTHEID AND HAS WORKED FOR RACIAL EQUALITY IN SOUTH AFRICA, OFTEN AT SOME POLITICAL RISK THERE. ON OTHER HAND WE HAVE CONSISTENTLY OPPOSED ACTION BY UN WHICH WE CONSIDERED OF DOUBTFUL LEGALITY OR BADLY ADVISED. WHEREAS IN 60’S U.S. WAS PART OF SIGNIFICANT IF STILL RELATIVELY SMALL GROUP OF MOSTLY WESTERN STATES WHICH OPPOSED SUCH MEASURES, MORE RECENTLY WE HAVE HAD LITTLE SUPPORT FROM OUR EUROPEAN ALLIES AND HAVE OFTEN STOOD ISOLATED IN OPPOSITION WITH ONLY SOUTH AFRICA AND PORTUGAL, AND OCCASIONALLY UK. RECENTLY WE HAVE BEEN TOLD THAT UK’S LABOR GOVERNMENT HAS NO STOMACH FOR ACTIONS WHICH COULD BE INTERPRETED AS ESPOUSING SOUTH AFRICA’S CAUSE. IT ALSO SEEMS LIKELY THAT PORTUGAL WILL ALSO BEGIN TO PULL BACK FROM ITS PREVIOUS DEFENSE OF SOUTH AFRICA, LEAVING U.S. IN VERY EXPOSED POSITION. ON OTHER HAND IT NOT IN U.S. INTEREST TO SUPPORT EXTREME GA FORMULATIONS WHICH WE NOT PREPARED TO SUPPORT IN SC. ONE SUCH TYPE OF ACTION IS EXPULSION FROM UN OF STATES WITH WHOSE ACTIONS MAJORITY DISAGREES. END FYI.

6. EXCLUSION OR EXPULSION OF SOUTH AFRICA. WE BELIEVE THAT ACQUIESCENCE IN EXCLUSION OF SOUTH AFRICA FROM GA COULD PROVE DAMAGING TO US. IT COULD ALSO PREJUDICE OUR POSITION IN THE SC, SHOULD AFRICANS BRING MATTER TO COUNCIL. AS ALREADY INDICATED, SOUTH AFRICA’S EXCLUSION WOULD ESTABLISH PRECEDENT OF ACTING AGAINST (AS OPPOSED TO CONDEMNING) ISRAEL OR ANY OTHER UNPOPULAR NATION BECAUSE OF DISAGREEMENT WITH ITS INTERNAL OR EXTERNAL POLICIES. IN ADDITION, WE CONTINUE TO BELIEVE THERE IS BENEFIT IN KEEPING SOUTH AFRICA EXPOSED TO CRITICISM TO ITS POLICIES AND HELD RESPONSIBLE IN ORGANIZATION FOR HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS WITHIN SOUTH AFRICA. IF NOT REPRESENTED IN ASSEMBLY, SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT WOULD BE ABLE MORE EASILY TO DISREGARD INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC OPINION.

7. WE WISH TO KNOW LONDON’S, PARIS’ AND BONN’S VIEWS SOONEST OF HOW THEY WOULD PLAN TO HANDLE SUCH CHALLENGES TO SOUTH AFRICA IN NEXT GA, BOTH POLITICALLY AND LEGALLY. (USUN SIMILARLY SHOULD DISCUSS MATTER WITH BRITISH, FRENCH AND GERMAN DELEGATIONS.) YOU SHOULD ASK WHETHER BRITISH, FRENCH GERMANS CONCUR WITH OUR APPRAISAL THAT AFRICANS SERIOUSLY INTEND TO ACT AGAINST SOUTH AFRICA EARLY IN GA SESSION. IF SO, QUESTIONS WHICH OCCUR TO US INCLUDE: DO THEY SEE HOW WE MIGHT DISSUADE AFRICANS FROM SEEKING EXCLUSION OR EXPULSION OF SOUTH AFRICA? WOULD SUCH APPROACHES TO AFS BE PRODUCTIVE EITHER IN DISSUADING THE AFRICANS OR, WOULD IT SERVE TO REDUCE POSSIBLE POLITICAL REPERCUSSIONS? WHAT COUNTRIES MIGHT BE USEFULLY APPROACHED? ARE AFRICANS LIKELY TO CONFINE ACTION TO GA OR WILL THEY AS RECENT RUMORS INDICATE, RAISE MATTER IN SC? WE WOULD PARTICULARLY APPRECIATE RECEIVING FRENCH ESTIMATE ON HOW BOUTEFLIKA LIKELY TO ACT ON SOUTH AFRICAN QUESTION AS GA PRESIDENT AND HOW OPEN HE WOULD BE TO ARGUMENTS IN PARA 6 AGAINST TRYING TO FORCE SOUTH AFRICA OUT OF UN.

8. SHOULD BRITISH, FRENCH, GERMANS AGREE WITH US THAT ATTEMPT TO EXCLUDE OR EXPEL SOUTH AFRICA WOULD BE DAMAGING TO WESTERN INTERESTS AND UN, YOU SHOULD DETERMINE WHETHER THEY WILLING ACTIVELY TRY TO PREVENT SUCH MOVE, AND IF SO, HOW AND WHETHER THEY BELIEVE WE SHOULD ACT IN CONCERT. WE HAVE NOT MADE UP OUR MINDS ON PRECISE TACTICS TO FOLLOW. KISSINGER
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INGERSOLL

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files. Confidential. Drafted and approved by Eltz. The electronic archival copy indicates it was sent to Eagleburger for Kissinger. Telegram 1613171 was sent to Bonn, London, Paris, Pretoria, and USUN, and repeated to the Representative to the IAEA in Vienna on July 25.
2. Ingersoll forwarded to Kissinger information sent to key European posts concerning possible attempts to deny the Republic of South Africa representation at the 29th United Nations General Assembly.