19. Memorandum I–25739/73 From the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Hill) to the Director of the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs (Weiss)1
SUBJECT
- U.S. Position on Chemical Weapons Limitation—NSSM 157 (U)
(S) We have reviewed the State initiative on chemical weapons limitations. Our concern is that we not leave ourselves vulnerable to a chemical attack. The Soviets have been modernizing their forces to a degree that their chemical capability exceeds ours both offensively and defensively. Anything we might do to further the gap, such as a declaratory statement or a chemical treaty that would freeze this [Page 41] imbalance—places the United States at a disadvantage. From a military viewpoint, this would be unacceptable.
(S) We are particularly concerned if actions that we take reduce or eliminate our capability to retaliate in kind to a chemical attack. Such action would withdraw an important option for the President and could require him to face a choice of using nuclear weapons in response to a chemical attack or not responding.
(S) While treaties are desirable, adequate verification provisions must be included to insure we are not placed in an unfavorable position. The verification problems of a chemical weapons treaty have not yet been resolved.
(S) For these reasons we would have trouble supporting your initiative particularly when we have an opportunity to make a quantum jump forward in modernizing our chemical weapons with binary munitions. DOD (OSD and JCS) supports option 1 of NSSM 157.
(C) Obviously we would favor any course of action that would show a willingness to negotiate and we would be willing to work closely with you on future proposals or initiatives in this area.
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Summary: Hill commented on the Department of State’s initiative on NSSM 157, concerning the U.S. position on chemical weapons limitations.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 27–10. Secret. The date on the memorandum is stamped.
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