Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–14, Part 2, Documents on Arms Control and Nonproliferation, 1973–1976

30. National Security Study Memorandum 195¹

Washington, February 20, 1974.

TO

• The Secretary of Defense
• The Deputy Secretary of State
• The Director of Central Intelligence
• The Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
• The Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission

SUBJECT

• Nuclear Test Ban Policy

The President has directed a review of United States policy on nuclear testing. The study should take into account recent and prospective arms control agreements, national needs, new technology, and political developments.

In examining and evaluating the various policy options, the study should both review the current Limited Test Ban and evaluate further possible limitations, including a Comprehensive Test Ban, Threshold Test Bans at various yield/magnitude levels, Quota Test Bans, and moratoria. For each of the policy options, the study should at a minimum address the following:

—The broad national security impact over time on: (a) the strategic balance, assuming various SALT II outcomes; (b) U.S. and Soviet nuclear weapons laboratories; (c) the U.S. and Soviet lead over the PRC in nuclear weaponry; (d) efforts to prevent the further proliferation of nuclear weapons; and (e) employment options in NATO-Europe and other theaters in the event of constraints on tactical nuclear weapon modernization.

—Possible non-prohibited weapon activities and developments open to the U.S. and USSR.

—Verification, including developments in seismic and other means of verification, assessment of the value of unmanned seismic observatories and of on-site inspection procedures, and examination of possible means of evasion.

—Weapon activities and developments that could occur if the Soviets tested clandestinely in various magnitude/yield ranges where detection may be uncertain or difficult, and the potential impact of such activities and developments on national security.

—U.S. alternatives for responding to detected or suspected violations by the Soviets or others.

—Impact of U.S. and Soviet peaceful nuclear explosion programs, analysis of how any adverse impact might be alleviated, feasibility of using such programs for evasion, and ways of preventing such use.

—Considerations of likely negotiability and adherence on the part of key states, including the USSR, PRC, France, U.K., Israel and India, and implications for U.S. policy.

—International political implications.

This study is to be conducted by an NSC Ad Hoc Group composed of a representative of each addressee and of the NSC staff and chaired by a representative of the Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. The study should be submitted by May 1, 1974, for review by the Verification Panel prior to its consideration by the President.

In view of the sensitive nature of this subject, access to the memorandum and to the information developed by the study should be strictly limited to those persons necessary for the completion of the study.

Henry A. Kissinger

1. Summary: President Nixon directed that an ad hoc group, comprised of representatives from the Department of Defense, Department of State, Central Intelligence Agency, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Atomic Energy Commission, and National Security Council Staff, conduct a study of U.S. policy on nuclear testing.

   Source: Central Intelligence Agency, OPI 29 (Office of Deputy Director of Intelligence), Job 82M00587R, Box 5, Folder NSSM 195. Secret; Sensitive. A copy was sent to Moorer.