Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E-15, Part 2, Documents on Western Europe, 1973–1976, Second, Revised Edition

93. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft) to President Ford¹

Washington, May 20, 1976.

Secretary Kissinger asked me to pass the following review to you of his opening remarks to the NATO Foreign Ministers at the opening restricted session of the NATO Ministerial meeting in Oslo, May 20.

“At Secretary General Luns’ invitation, I opened the restricted session of NATO Ministerial meeting with an overview statement of East-West relations, Soviet policies and objectives, the challenge to the NATO Alliance, our policy toward Eastern Europe and the position of the United States on communist participation in the governments of Western Europe. In introducing my extemporaneous remarks, I stressed to the Ministers that while East-West relations and US policy toward the USSR are currently the subject of intensive domestic debate in the United States, there should be no apprehension about fundamental shifts in US policy as a result of the 1976 election.

“US–USSR relations: In describing Soviet policy, power and motivation, I drew a distinction between two trends: (1) those generally inherent in the growth of industrial strength of the USSR; and (2) trends which flowed from the process of Soviet political decision-making. As for the first trend, it would produce military strength and could not be basically influenced. Our appropriate response would be to build up our own strength to ensure preservation of the military balance. The second trend, however, could be influenced by us. The conclusions drawn by the Soviets were based on ideological considerations, bureaucratic considerations, Soviet power, the party structure, and a combination of all these factors. The ideological factor was a basic ingredient of communist external conduct and was generally felt in the West as an assault on what we consider free institutions. Therefore, there was always tension around the world between the objectives of the party machinery and, for example, defense machinery which was more concerned with security. The relationship of these factors depended on many considerations, above all the balance of forces. The US and its allies would not permit ideological aggression to take place side by side with political coexistence.

“Turning to Angola as an example of Soviet decision-making, I said that Soviet policy had been made by a combination of factors—a perception of Western political weakness, the collapse of Indo-China and the passage of the trade act for example. I noted that Brezhnev may not have been completely in control. In general, I said that the Soviet decision-making process seemed to be cumbersome. They had no long-range conceptions which were being carried out in a systematic way. I warned, however, that we could take little comfort from this fact. The cumbersome bureaucratic process led to competition with each element seeking to get what it wanted. Political progress could not influence the military, but military strength could have an impact on political progress. I felt that the Soviets moved by inertia rather than by concept.

“Turning to the issue of military power, I noted there was no question that Soviet strength had increased. Soviet forces were becoming more modern, the qualitative gap was narrowing. Secondly, the Soviets were also closing the gap in strategic power. If the present Soviet leadership were to be able to exploit the weakness of the West they could then derive advantages from their strength. I observed that the configuration of present Soviet military power was decided five to ten years ago. The military forces they now have reflect decisions taken in the late 60’s. The case was the same with us. Therefore, present strategic forces did not reflect current American decision-making. It was a long-term process. The lesson for the West was that it should engage in its own long-term programs. Nothing could be done today that would affect matters in the 70’s. Our decisions today were for the 80’s. I cautioned that if the wrong decisions were taken, it would affect circumstances in the 80’s—adding that what was needed was not pious or sentimental phrases or tough rhetoric, but realistic decision-making. It was a fact of life that the Soviets would increase their military strength. This was unavoidable; however, we had the capability to maintain a balance.

“Turning to strategic forces, I said that we could not prevent strategic nuclear forces being in some balance. While noting that the gap in deliverable warheads was greater than ever in our favor, larger even than in the mid-60’s, I observed that the effectiveness of this gap would decline. The level of destructiveness was bound to tend in the direction of strategic equality. While I stated how I did not wish to enter into the debate of strategic strike scenarios, I stressed the importance of maintaining strong European conventional forces and tactical nuclear forces.

“Having completed this analysis of the framework for policy, I discussed US policy which had been variously characterized of late, and only in deference to our French friends, I would use the word ‘détente’ instead of the preferable term ‘peace through strength.’ I stressed that no one in our government had ever assumed that conflict or tension with the Soviets had or would disappear. Détente was a policy not required for friends but for opponents. It was designed to prevent the transformation of military power into political gain. Its aim was to prevent Soviet expansionism, but also, if the Soviets indicated that they were prepared for accommodations, we should also be prepared to explore this possibility on the basis of strict reciprocity. Our policy took place in the unprecedented conditions of the threat of nuclear war, I stressed this as the basic reality which had to be dealt with, and I pointed to the complex problem of continuing to support defense efforts while also maintaining security. This was a two-pronged policy and necessitated very careful handling.

“Turning to the relationship between Western Europe and Eastern Europe, I stated flatly that the United States does not accept that the Soviet Union would not intervene in Western Europe or that we would not be active in Eastern Europe. I said we favored any reasonable steps which would encourage the independence of Eastern Europe. Underscoring the work of your Administration, I noted that we have exchanged visits with Eastern European leaders on a scale that could not be missed for its political significance, and I added that criticism of our policy was unjustified by members of the Alliance since they had not done anything in the 50’s or 60’s to counter Soviet military interventions. I said our policy was one of encouraging independence, but to pursue these ends in the context of the attainable. I cautioned against grandiloquent declaration as in the ‘period of liberation’ which were not backed up. I invited my colleagues to put forward more daring options and we would back them. None did so.

“Turning to a more specific analysis of Soviet policy, I stated that in my view it was: 1) always heavy-handed; 2) geared to the maximization of military power; 3) that it could not resist, by ideology or inertia, seeking to redress the balance of forces in its favor; and 4) that it also should be kept in mind that with one exception the Soviets had never acted up to their military capacity. For example, in the Middle East, the capacity of Soviet military force to determine events had been greater than what they actually used. Therefore, the Soviets could be restrained by Western firmness, by dynamic policies, and by their own inhibitions. The one exception to this general description of Soviet conduct was Angola. There the Soviets had pursued an active intervention far from an area of Soviet interest. Their use of a large number of Cuban forces was especially disquieting since this could serve as a precedent. North Vietnamese or North Korean forces, for example, could be called upon in action in future interventions if this principle were established. I said that the prevention by Congress of our ability to oppose the Soviet move the first time it occurred had serious consequences. There was no question but the Soviet action transgressed any reasonable interpretation of peaceful coexistence. An argument had been made that Angola was not important, that the Soviets would inevitably be expelled as had happened historically in other places. However, I noted that the comparison, for example, with Egypt was misplaced. The landscape was different. The circumstances were not the same in 1954 when the Soviets went into the Middle East. Furthermore, the Soviets remained in the Middle East despite their setback in Egypt. Noting that there was not unanimous support for our policy in Angola in the United States, I said the Administration took the gravest view of Soviet military adventurism, whatever the cause.

“Turning to the issue of communist participation in Western Europe, I noted that while NATO could not properly express a view on this as an instrument of policy, we were not reconciled to complete silence on the question and felt we should state what we considered would be the consequences which would evolve during this historical period. This was appropriate in considering East-West relations among colleagues. It was not a threat or a policy decision, simply our judgment that the reaction, especially the public reaction, in the United States, would be significant if communists were to enter Western governments. I stressed that we were not asking that anything be done by NATO, adding that I hoped there would be no statements made to the press on the subject. I reminded the Ministers that this had been a footnote to my broader remarks, not the central theme.

“I summed up by saying that we faced serious military problems. However, they could be managed and contained. The Soviets were becoming more globally oriented and were gaining a greater capability to influence events. It was important to recognize that these are tendencies, and that these tendencies will be there regardless of our policies, but that our policies could influence and inhibit these tendencies. On the question of optimism versus pessimism, I said the US view was that the West had all the assets to meet these challenges. Ten years ago we appeared to be in competition with the Soviets for the Third World. Now we realize that we have won the economic competition in the Third World; that the Soviet Union is irrelevant to development. The only advantage the Soviets have in the Third World is that they could make use of raw military power. This we must do our utmost to stop. In Europe, I said, we could match Soviet military strength. A recent blue book study published in the United States showed that the Soviets are spending more than we are. But this study also showed that the Soviets are being forced to pay more and more to maintain the levels of their forces. Like them, we can also maintain our strength—in fact more easily. Finally, I said that it was important to make it clear that we are not the obstacle to accommodation. We should not be swayed from this course by excesses of sentimentality that equated peace with good intentions, or toughness that emphasized power without conception.”

1. Summary: Scowcroft forwarded a report from Kissinger on his remarks at the first restricted session of the NATO Ministerial meeting in Oslo.

   Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 404, Alliances, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Meetings, Ministerial 20–21 May 1976. Secret; Sensitive. Ford initialed the memorandum. Kissinger was in Oslo to attend the NATO Ministerial meeting from May 20 to 22.