54. Paper Prepared in the Department of State1

OUTLINE—PRM 28 RESPONSE

I. Objectives:

A. The United States human rights policy must be consistent with existing international obligations, domestic law and our nation’s heritage. It must be reflected throughout the executive branch and be prem [Page 158] ised on an understanding of the task and the need for a long-term commitment to produce results. The overall goal is to promote the observance of internationally-accepted standards of human rights throughout the world.

1. Specific objectives (the time frame for the attainment of these objectives will depend greatly on individual country circumstances, and on the degree of coherence and persistence of U.S. human rights advocacy).

(a) Promotion of rights of the person in all countries. The initial objective should be focused on countries with whom we have the greatest degree of involvement. Failure to see human rights improvements ultimately will jeopardize those bilateral relations.

(b) Promotion of civil and political liberties. The encouragement of and identification of U.S. with democratic countries and those moving in that direction is a legitimate goal, and one which has direct relevance to the enhancement of rights of the person.

(c) Promotion of such basic needs as food, shelter, health care, and education. This objective can be sought most effectively through positive support and international action.

(d) Achievement of greater international awareness and concern in improving human rights conditions.

(e) Reduction in the level of U.S. association with regimes which engage in gross violations of human rights of their citizens. It will demonstrate our own commitment to human rights goals, maintain public confidence in the thrust of our foreign policy, and, hopefully, influence the nation involved and other states as well.

1—Lessening our identification could reach a halt to all assistance and support if a country rejects pleas for improvements and moves along a path of institutionalizing its repressive features.

2—Disassociation involving full cut-offs of assistance would occur where any country reached the threshold defined as being engaged in “a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights.” “Consistent pattern” would be defined in terms of period of time, regular nature and trend. “Gross violations” would focus on those rights of the person cited in current law—and derived from United Nations Resolution—“torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment, prolonged detention without charges and trial, and other flagrant denial of the right to life, liberty, or the security of person.”2

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3—In making that determination as well as in examining the conditions in countries which may not reach that level, similar questions would be asked in each case: the kind of violations or deprivations, the extent, the pattern, the trend, the degree of government control and responsibility and the willingness to submit to outside investigation.

(f) To demonstrate by the closeness of our relations, including special treatment in our assistance programs, our readiness to support those countries which preserve respect for human rights.

(g) Work toward the development and strengthening of international institutional protection of human rights through the ratification of relevant international covenants and treaties by the U.S. and other nations.

(h) Promote international humanitarian programs with the goal of easing conditions of political refugees.

(i) Develop public understanding and support for our policy through the involvement of non-governmental organizations and close collaboration with the Congress.

(j) Ensure that other nations know clearly our human rights policy and seek to obtain the broadest support for that policy from other democratic nations.

II. Strategies for pursuing policy objectives:

A. Available mechanisms to implement a human rights policy:

1. Symbolic acts such as public statements and personal visits represent an important declarative aspect of the policy, particularly as it relates to general goals.

2. Diplomatic actions should be an integral part of individual country strategy. These actions essentially are preliminary contacts setting the stage for an understanding by the host government of the implications of failing to improve human rights conditions. Later, such demarches can provide signals as to U.S. current sense of human rights conditions.

(a) Defining ahead of time the likely sanctions and incentives related to human rights objectives permits other governments an early opportunity to respond privately to our concerns.

(b) The existence of statutory restrictions on economic and security assistance on human rights should be communicated as an indication of broad support for overall human rights policy.

3. Foreign assistance as leverage:

(a) Security Assistance (including grant MAP, FMS sales, training, size of U.S. military personnel complement in country, and commercial arms license approval) generally should be the first area of aid to a government to be reduced. Such assistance is usually viewed as linking the [Page 160] U.S. most directly with a repressive regime. So far as possible, in light of 502B,3 the reduction of assistance should continue over a period of months during which the government is clearly placed on alert and aware of the linkage between human rights concerns and security assistance.

1—Interface between security assistance policy and human rights policy must be communicated fully to each government. Gradual action to reduce the level and kind of assistance is desirable.

2—Commercial arms licenses for repressive regimes should be used along with all other security assistance programs to communicate our human rights concerns.

(b) Economic Assistance:

1—Bilateral AID programs should be determined in light of human rights factors. At the same time, efforts should be made to respond positively to governments which act to improve human rights conditions. Additional efforts to ensure expansion of “New Initiatives”, furtherance of human rights, and establishment of women’s rights agenda.

2—Multilateral assistance:

a) Within the International Financial Institutions, the United States can promote its objectives by insuring a concern for human rights conditions, particularly as they relate to rights of the person, at every level of the IFI’s operations. Concern for these rights in the IFI’s is not only called for by the President’s policy, but it also is the likely outcome of the current IFI authorization legislative process and is consistent with the broad development purpose set forth in IFI charters.

(c) There is no other effective way to demonstrate U.S. willingness to risk costs in support of human rights objectives than to reduce or end its bilateral assistance to a consistent violator.

(d) It also is a way of inducing greatest pressure within a regime for change. The benefits of continued repression thus are outweighed by the negative consequences of reduced U.S. assistance, the possibility of similar action by other countries, and the criticism of international public opinion.

4. Greater use of overseas radio, television broadcast facilities and other educational and cultural exchange both to convey information on the human rights activities of the Administration and to report on international human rights developments.

(a) CSCE compliance with cultural, journalistic and educational exchange should be emphasized.

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(b) Expanding information in developing regions can both educate and promote greater human rights observance.

5. Initiatives to promote refugee relief:

(a) Improved access into the U.S. for refugees and dissidents by increasing conditional entry numbers and conforming definition of refugee to UN non-discriminatory language, both involving legislation.

(b) Additionally, we might submit legislation to remove any numerical limitation on refugees the President could admit under a parole where he is responding to a legitimate international appeal or where an emergent refugee situation is of special concern to the U.S.

6. Initiatives in international organizations:

(a) Coordinate effort to obtain a United Nations Commissioner for Human Rights.

(b) Promote human rights in U.N. specialized agencies.

(c) Strengthen independence and increase resources of United Nations and Inter-American Human Rights Commission.

(d) Promote creation of African Human Rights Commission.

III. Competing Interests: National Security Considerations:

A. The national security interests of the U.S. may be affected by decisions to promote human rights where the end result is less identification with a country engaged in human rights violations.

1. Close identification with a repressive regime during this period also may risk longer term alienation of U.S. from the people of that country and any following government identified with democratic principles and human rights.

B. US-Soviet détente:

1. The overriding importance of nuclear arms control to both the Soviet Union and the United States, as well as the human rights related goal of avoiding nuclear war would argue against linking this issue to specific human rights improvements.

2. A similar argument would not hold in relation to other aspects of détente, such as improved economic relations, expansion of trade and commerce, or non-contentious relations. Linkage in these areas, privately applied, could be feasible and fruitful.

C. Friendly states and allies:

1. Emphasizing human rights concerns with such states in few instances could produce significant impacts on U.S. national security concerns. In fact, the failure to demonstrate those concerns in the cases of Greece and Spain may have produced a threat to maintenance of U.S. military bases in those countries.

2. Emphasizing those concerns with friendly states and allies who are not human rights violators (Western Europe) could promote greater cooperation and joint action in this area.

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3. Emphasizing those concerns with Israel would complicate relations with that country. However, it also might produce some human rights improvements.

D. Korea: Failure to improve human rights situation would produce Congressionally mandated reductions in U.S. identification with the current regime. Current planned withdrawal of U.S. troops probably diminishes leverage available in influencing improvement. However, the converse also is true in that the removal of troops places greater importance on maintenance of remaining security assistance.

E. PRC: At least the initial stages of the normalization process probably are inappropriate to press for major human rights improvements. Any hope of achieving such improvements awaits further action in the normalization process.

IV. Internal Organization of Human Rights Efforts:

A. D/HA within the Department of State is charged by law with coordinating human rights activities for the Secretary of State.

B. Within the federal government, the Inter-Agency Committee on Human Rights and Foreign Assistance, chaired by the Deputy Secretary should continue to function, although expanded to involve all human rights considerations affecting U.S. foreign policy. In defining objectives, U.S. missions abroad are vital to help define the objectives and the tactics to achieve them. Initial action in this area already is underway.

C. Crucial is full Presidential support for policy implementation within executive agencies.

V. Congressional Relations:

A. Key strategy must be to demonstrate credibility of policy, to involve the Congress in helping to develop policy and involve the Congress in the review of implementation.

B. Early and thorough involvement in establishment of policy and implementation would avoid confrontation.

C. In-depth and frequent briefing of congressional staff also should be part of the strategy.

  1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Deputy Secretary: Records of Warren Christopher, 1977–1980, Lot 81D113, Box 23, Human Rights—PRM II. No classification marking. Drafted by Schneider and Vogelgesang. On June 8, Nimetz sent Christopher a memorandum containing ideas for the PRM outline, commenting that he had committed these ideas to paper without the benefit of the Schneider–Vogelgesang draft. (National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Secretary: Mr. Matthew Nimetz, Counselor of the Department of State, Under Secretary of State for Security Assistance, Science and Technology, Lot 81D85, Box 1, MN Chron—Official January–June 1977)
  2. Presumable reference to UN General Assembly Resolution 3452(XXX), adopted on December 9, 1975.
  3. Section 502(B) of the International Security Assistance and Arms Control Act of 1976.