134. Memorandum of Conversation1
PARTICIPANTS
-
ISRAELI SIDE
- Menachem Begin, Prime Minister
- Moshe Dayan, Foreign Minister
- Ezer Weizman, Defense Minister
- Simcha Ehrlich, Finance Minister
- Yitzhak Modai, Petroleum and Infrastructure Minister
- Aharon Barak, Justice, Israeli Supreme Court
- Meir Rosenne, Legal Advisor, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
- Simcha Dinitz, Israeli Ambassador to the United States
- General Ephrain Poran, Military Secretary to the Prime Minister
- Colonel Shatila, Aide to Minister Weizman
-
AMERICAN SIDE
- Cyrus Vance, Secretary of State
- Alfred L. Atherton, Jr., Ambassador at Large
- Harold H. Saunders, Assistant Secretary, NEA
SUBJECT
- Egyptian-Israeli Peace Negotiations
Prime Minister Begin opened the discussion by suggesting that the agenda should include the draft exchange of letters on the West Bank/Gaza, financial issues and the draft peace treaty. Noting that certain drafts were discussed between the Secretary and Dayan the previous night, he asked what are the latest Egyptian demands.
Secretary Vance summarized the status of negotiations as follows:
—Treaty text—each side still had some questions; we believe it should be considered complete.
—Annex I and its Appendix—complete except for the question of the sub-phasing of withdrawal.
—Annex III—complete.
—Maps—complete.
—West Bank/Gaza letter—unresolved.
Begin interrupted to ask if Egypt had rejected the letter. The Secretary said the Egyptians were studying it; Sadat had not yet seen it but we had given the text to the Egyptian Delegation this afternoon.
[Page 461]The Secretary continued his status report as follows:
—U.S. commitments letter—okay.
—Airfields letter—complete.
—Interpretive minute—Egyptians still have a question about the second paragraph.
—The minute to Annex I—okay.
—Letter on unilateral Israeli steps in the West Bank/Gaza—discussed among the parties but not resolved.
—Oil—discussed between the parties but not resolved.
The Prime Minister then turned to financial issues. He had originally spoken of a U.S. loan,2 for which he had almost been stoned in Israel. He had subsequently corrected his mistake. Israel’s needs should have been clearer from Camp David, although the discussion there had singled out the issue of the airfields. The Minister of Finance has a memorandum on this subject. Israel’s problem is that, if it is to evacuate Sinai in three years, moving army installations and civilian settlements will involve great costs which Israel has no way of covering.
Begin recalled that the Secretary had told him at the Regency Hotel (November 2)3 that he would discuss this question with the President who would consult Congress. Begin said he had read our letter on the airfields which also hints at other financial issues. It is so general that Israel still knows nothing. The letter contains no pledge. Israel does not want peace with bankruptcy. Israel needs to know before the next Cabinet meeting—today or tomorrow—what the President will suggest to Congress. The Finance Minister had wanted to see high U.S. Treasury officials; he had been told he would be welcome but could not discuss this subject. The Finance Minister will see Blumenthal on Tuesday, and the Prime Minister wanted to know if he could now discuss the question of financial assistance.
The Secretary said we are studying Israel’s request as part of our regular budgetary process covering economic assistance for FY ’80. We must proceed in a constitutional way. We need to complete the budget by December. In arriving at a figure, we always take into account Israeli security requirements.
There are two new items, the Secretary said:
1. The airfields on which Secretary Brown had written what we were prepared to do.4 We need information in order to decide what we [Page 462] can do. We have sent a team to Israel which will report the facts.5 Then we can make a decision.
2. In New York the Prime Minister had raised a new issue, namely, the loan request. We need to study this, the President needs to make a decision and then we need to consult Congress before informing Israel of our decision. We do not yet have the facts and cannot give an answer at this time. We must follow the regular budgetary process as does Israel. We are far along on the FY ’80 military and economic assistance question. We need time to give answers on these new items.
The Prime Minister said he understood U.S. procedures but what would he tell his people. He hoped the treaty would be signed; then Israel would start to withdraw. He wanted to know tomorrow what the President would suggest. The Secretary said he could not promise a reply by a given date, but we would be glad to receive the memorandum from the Finance Minister. Dinitz interjected that it covers the airfields, special assistance, and regular FY ’80 assistance.
The Secretary said we would need to study it to see if it contains sufficient facts for us to make a basic judgment. He could not give a decision now on whether we would provide further assistance or how much. The President has talked to Congress but needs more information about what is involved. The Prime Minister said there will obviously be additional expenses for Israel, and it is strange that the U.S. cannot say it will view Israel’s request favorably. The Secretary replied that we do not have the necessary information.
Weizman suggested that the “second mission” be expedited to look at the other parts of the problem. The Secretary responded that he had not understood Israel expected a second mission. (Comment: Weizman’s reference was apparently to the postponed McGiffert trip.)6
The Secretary said we are awaiting data from Israel. Begin said this was logical. The Finance Minister would discuss the matter with Blumenthal, who would need instructions from the President. The Secretary responded that, if Finance Minister Ehrlich has the figures, he would ask Blumenthal to listen to them. We could not now, however, make a commitment on a grant or loan in any given amount. Begin con [Page 463] cluded this subject by saying at least we were agreed there should be a meeting between Ehrlich and Blumenthal.
Turning to the treaty text, Begin said he understood we considered it closed, but this could not be the case until it was initialed. Israel did not reject Egyptian proposals. Israel, however, has objected from the beginning to the “noting” paragraph in the preamble and to the language on Gaza. Israel wants to solve these two issues but the Israeli Government had taken the position that the present language is not satisfactory.
Barak then read proposed Israeli compromise language on the preamble and Gaza. The Secretary replied that these suggestions had been considered and opposed by Egypt. Egypt had made proposals on Articles IV and VI which Israel opposed. If we opened up any of these issues, we would open up all kinds of issues. In our best judgment, the present draft is fair for both sides.
Begin said he had instructions from the Cabinet. This does not mean re-opening the treaty but making another attempt to find a solution. The Prime Minister said he understood that the Secretary said he could not accept opening the text, but the Israeli Cabinet had not accepted this. He had suggested an idea for balancing the language in the preamble but Atherton had said it was a non-starter. Why did the U.S. say this and yet consider Egyptian proposals. The Secretary said the latter were also non-starters. We think it would be a mistake to open the treaty; it would then begin to unravel.
Rosenne interjected that the interpretive note on the treaty had been agreed, yet now the Egyptians want to reconsider it. The Secretary said the Egyptians could not do this and he would speak to them.
Begin said the Israeli Delegation and he could not do anything in view of the Cabinet decision. The Secretary replied that he hoped the Cabinet would reconsider in light of the present situation.
Begin asked whether it was premature to discuss the exchange of letters on the West Bank and Gaza. In response to Dayan’s query, the Secretary said we expected an Egyptian reply Tuesday at the earliest but could not be certain. Begin said should we discuss it or wait. Dayan said he preferred to wait; if the Egyptians turned it down, there was no use discussing it.
The Secretary commented that he thought his discussions with Dayan the previous night on the letter had led to a constructive result.7 President Carter had approved it and agreed to recommend it. Dayan then said it was perhaps better for the Prime Minister to give his views to the Secretary.
[Page 464]Begin said he would try, noting that he had strong message from the Cabinet to the contrary. He then asked if the idea was that President Carter would send this letter to him and Sadat.
The Secretary said the suggestion had been made that it would be better for President Carter to write the letter if this would be easier than a joint letter or an exchange of notes. The President was prepared to do this if it would help the parties, but he preferred an exchange of letters between them. Begin said he agreed with President Carter. He asked what is the rationale for a third country to write about the views of two other countries. The Secretary said the idea would be to record views we had heard from those countries, if this would help. Barak interjected that this had been the Israeli Delegation’s idea. Begin reiterated his question: why should the President of the United States write his views about elections in a third country? The Secretary recalled that at Camp David it had sometimes been easier and moved things forward when the President wrote on behalf of the other two. Begin said there was a difference. At Camp David they had dealt with specific issues—e.g., Jerusalem, Palestinian people or Palestinian Arabs of Judea and Samaria. Those were concrete problems different from the present issue.
Begin said he had heard the first draft8 of the letter included a clause saying the treaty would be carried out independently of the West Bank/Gaza negotiations, but this had been deleted. The Secretary responded that this point was already in the treaty. Begin said that the “noting” paragraph in the preamble was already in the Camp David Framework but had not been deleted; therefore why delete the “independently” phrase. The Secretary replied that this was President Carter’s letter, and he preferred simpler language. But the parties must accept it, Begin said. The Secretary replied that he agreed it was up to the parties. Begin commented that he understood that Israel should change things when Egypt demanded it. The Secretary responded that the language deleted from the letter had never been seen by the Egyptians. Begin responded that he had never said that; he had made a general comment that, when Egypt demands something be taken out, it is taken out.
- Source: National Archives, RG 59, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Files of Alfred L. Atherton, Lot 80D166, Box 5, L Papers Camp David. Secret; Nodis. The meeting took place in the El-Al Lounge at Kennedy Airport. Begin was in transit from Canada to Israel.↩
- See Document 123.↩
- Ibid.↩
- Reference is to Brown’s September 28 Camp David side letter to Weizman. See Document 57.↩
- Reference is to the Department of Defense team tasked with surveying potential sites in the Negev for the relocation of the Israeli airbases in Sinai due to be closed upon Israeli withdrawal. The leaders of the group met with Weizman on October 17 to discuss four possible locations for the new bases. (Telegram 263281 to Tel Aviv, October 17; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780425–0818) Surveys of these sites were undertaken November 4–18 and a final report was drafted and forwarded by Brown to Carter on December 16. See footnote 3, Document 159.↩
- A planned visit to Egypt and Israel by McGiffert, October 30–November 5, was postponed “indefinitely” on October 30. (Telegram 275500 to Tel Aviv and Cairo, October 30; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780446–0655)↩
- See Document 131.↩
- See footnote 2, Document 83.↩