118. Intelligence Information Cable Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency1
COUNTRY
- Afghanistan/Pakistan
SUBJECT
- Reaction of the Hezbe-i-Islami Afghanistan to the Soviet-Backed Government of Babrak Karmal [1 line not declassified]
SOURCE
- [2 lines not declassified]
1. 29 December 1979, the leader of the Hezbe-i-Islami Afghanistan (HI) Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, was making every effort to make known the HI’s opposition to the Soviet-backed government of Babrak Karmal and to emphasize that there are no changes in their policy of armed opposition to the new regime in Kabul. (Source comment: Other Peshawar based Afghan exile groups also appear to be following suit and the general feeling among exile leaders is that “Babrak is more cruel than Amin.”) To reinforce their determination, the HI clandestine radio station operated the entire day of 29 December broadcasting in [Page 331] Dari, Pushtu and Baluchi languages condemning the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan and calling for the overthrow of the Babrak regime.
2. According to reports reaching HI headquarters in Peshawar, by the evening of 28 December, there has been little military action in the southern and eastern parts of Afghanistan except for a report that a large convoy of tanks and armored vehicles was sighted heading from Kabul towards Jalalabad. (Source comment: The information on the convoy was imprecise and could not be confirmed.) In the countryside the HI describes the situation among the general populace as restive with anti-Soviet sentiment increasing to a new high.
3. On 30 December, HI leader Gulbuddin Hekmatyar along with a member of the HI’s political committee traveled from Peshawar to Islamabad where they intended to deliver communiqués to various foreign missions asking these governments to withhold diplomatic recognition of the Babrak regime and to ask for immediate material support.2 (Source comment: It is not known which missions will receive the communiqué nor how long Gulbuddin will stay in Islamabad; however, it is possible that he might be seeking meetings with Government of Pakistan (GOP) officials in addition to delivering the communiqués. It is the hope of the HI that the GOP will make a realistic appraisal of the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan and will rally to the HI with immediate material support.) There is definite concern within the HI leadership that as soon as it is practical for them to do so, Soviet ground troops will be introduced into the fighting on a large scale and they are concerned about their ability to defend against massive Soviet military action. However, at the present time the HI plans to keep their mujahiddin in the field and to defend the “liberated areas” wherever possible.
4. ACQ: [1 line not declassified]
5. [less than 1 line not declassified] Dissem: [3 lines not declassified]
- Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Cables File, Box 1, Afghanistan: 12/31/79. Secret; Immediate; Sensitive; [additional handling restriction not declassified]. Printed from a copy that was received in the White House Situation Room.↩
- Hekmatyar met with officials at the U.S. Embassy in Islamabad. No record of this meeting was found.↩