231. Intelligence Assessment Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency1

[assessment number not declassified]

[Omitted here are a title page, security information page, and cover page.]

Alleged Soviet Use of Chemical Warfare in Afghanistan ([classification marking not declassified])

Overview

We believe the evidence is sufficient to conclude that Soviet forces have used nonlethal chemicals against insurgents in a number of areas of Afghanistan. The chemicals employed almost certainly have included irritants such as riot-control agents, probably mixed with smoke. Continuing allegations of deaths resulting from chemical attacks lead us to conclude that the chances are about even that lethal agents, such as nerve gas, also have been used.2 ([classification marking and handling restriction not declassified])

The bulk of the reporting on chemical agent attacks has come from Afghan refugees in Pakistan and from insurgent leaders. [3 lines, classification marking, codeword, and handling restriction not declassified]

The Soviets have deployed chemical defense battalions with the three motorized rifle divisions in Afghanistan, and Soviet troops in the Kabul area have been seen carrying what appear to be gas masks in canvas cases, suggesting that Soviet forces in the country are prepared to operate in terrain contaminated by chemical agents. These units and the chemical defense equipment seen in Afghanistan, however, are standard in all Soviet divisions, and we do not consider it unusual that [Page 627] these units moved into Afghanistan with their parent divisions.3 In any event, if the Soviets were planning fairly widespread use of persistent chemical weapons and operations in contaminated areas, additional chemical defense units probably would be required. ([classification marking and codeword not declassified])

Soviet ground and air units operating against Afghan insurgent forces have weapon systems capable of delivering chemical agents. There is no direct evidence, however, that lethal chemical munitions have been issued to Soviet forces.4 ([classification marking, codeword, and handling restriction not declassified])

[Omitted here is the body of the assessment.]

  1. Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 81B00401R: Subject Files of the Presidential Briefing Coordinator for DCI (1977–81), Box 23, folder 9. Top Secret; [codeword and handling restriction not declassified]. A statement on the cover page reads: “The authors of this paper are [name not declassified] Science and Technology Division, Office of Scientific Weapons Research, and [name not declassified] Theater Forces Division, Office of Strategic Research. This report has been coordinated with the Office of Political Analysis, the Office of Imagery Analysis, the Afghan Task Force, the National Intelligence Officer for General Purpose Forces, and the Directorate of Operations.”
  2. The Soviet Union signed and ratified the 1925 Geneva Protocol prohibiting the first use of chemical warfare but took a reservation under which the protocol would be binding on the USSR only with regard to other signatories. Because Afghanistan is not a signatory, the USSR would not be in violation of the protocol if it used CW agents in Afghanistan. [classification marking not declassified] [Footnote is in the original.]
  3. [text not declassified] “A large, well-equipped and well-trained chemical-biological-radiological (CBR) organization is organic to the USSR Joint Service Structure. Each combat unit down to the regiment level has a sizeable contingent for CBR defense and chemical specialists are assigned down to company level.” Noting that the Soviet military was “known to have developed a variety of modern agents, multiple delivery systems, and the tactical doctrine necessary for large-scale use,” the cable continued: “According to a former Afghan Army officer who is now a member of the insurgent movement, Soviet forces first used lethal chemical agents on 27 December 1979 against insurgents in Badakhshan and the Northern Hindu Kush area. During the week of 13–19 January additional lethal attacks were reported near Faizabad, Jalalabad, and in Bamian and Takhar provinces. More recently, attacks on 3 and 11 February took place in Badakhshan and Nuristan provinces. Aircraft dropped bombs filled with chemical agents that were dispersed in airbursts. The CW agent was described as a vapor which felt damp against the skin. Inhalation of the vapor resulted in difficulty in breathing, excretion, vomiting, blindness, paralysis, and death.” (Department of Defense, Afghan War Collection, Box 5, JCS Support Request 80–81)
  4. Attached but not printed is a memorandum from Zellmer to Turner, March 26, that reported on [text not declassified] study, entitled “Evidence Bearing on the Alleged Use of Chemical and Biological Warfare Agents by Soviet and Afghan Forces, May 1979–March 1980.” Zellmer summarized the study, also attached but not printed: “We have advised [less than 1 line not declassified] of the intelligence community’s increased concern over the Soviet use of toxic substances in Afghanistan. To date, there is no [less than 1 line not declassified] evidence to conclude that the chemical, microbe, or other toxic substances the Soviets employed have been lethal.” (Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 81B00401R: Subject Files of the Presidential Briefing Coordinator for DCI (1977–81), Box 23, folder 9)