Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XII, Afghanistan

233. Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency¹

Washington, March 14, 1980

SUBJECT

• Likely Soviet Reaction to Use of SA–7s by Afghan Insurgency [classification marking and handling restriction not declassified]

1. The Soviet reaction to the initiation of attacks against their aircraft in Afghanistan by SA–7s will depend on (1) their estimate of the level of military threat that they could anticipate from such attacks (if not terminated); (2) their estimate of the likelihood that the threat could be eliminated (or managed) by in-country military measures; (3) their estimate of the efficacy of threats or retaliatory military actions against Pakistan for terminating the activity; (4) their estimate of the consequences that such retaliatory actions against Pakistan might produce for US/Pakistan relations (e.g. driving Pakistan closer to US). [classification marking and handling restriction not declassified]

2. We assume that the availability of portable surface-to-air weapons to insurgent forces in Afghanistan will make itself known to the Soviets initially by random and intermittent attacks against its aircraft. We also assume that the Soviets will believe, or will proceed on the assumption that, those weapons were being fed into Afghanistan through Pakistan.² We believe they will proceed on this assumption even in the absence of hard evidence unless they believe they have hard evidence to the contrary (e.g. that the weapons were being introduced through another country). [classification marking and handling restriction not declassified]

3. A crucial consideration governing the initial Soviet response will be their estimate of the scope of the new threat posed to them. If they become persuaded that they are faced with what would at most amount to no more than a low-level nuisance threat capable of bringing down an occasional Soviet aircraft, or embarrassing the Soviets and marginally encouraging the insurgents, but not capable of materially affecting the course and outcome of the counterinsurgency campaign, they might be prepared to confine themselves to harsh threats and minor, or even ambiguous, retaliatory actions against Pakistan designed primarily to discourage an enlargement of the activity in Afghanistan.

a. A possible scenario in these circumstances might take the form of a sharp warning directed to the Paks after several incidents involving the firing of SA–7s in Afghanistan with a clear implication that if the activities were not quickly terminated, unspecified but unpleasant consequences would follow. The Soviets then might wait for a period of time (up to several weeks) to observe the effect of their warning on the level of activity on the assumption that the Pakistan government—even if sufficiently frightened—would probably not be able to control the use of rockets already in Afghanistan, but that it could take measures to prevent the introduction of additional weapons or missiles thereafter.

b. Should the scope and intensity of the use of these weapons against Soviet forces proceed at the same or similar levels beyond the stipulated time, the Soviets would probably take retaliatory actions against Pakistan, e.g. starting low and gradually escalating from more to less ambiguous forms, employing either Afghan ground forces or Soviet aircraft with Afghan markings. [classification marking and handling restriction not declassified]

4. Should the Soviets either conclude at the outset that they faced a substantial military threat from the rockets, or that the low level of attacks they initially faced was bound to be raised by the introduction of substantial numbers of weapons unless the Paks reversed course, we would not be surprised to see the Soviets deliver a virtual ultimatum to the Paks followed thereafter by strong, unambiguous retaliatory attacks against a variety of targets that could directly or indirectly be said to associate Pakistan and the Afghan insurgents (refugee camps, real or alleged training sites, military supply depots). If this did not suffice, the Soviets could step up the pressure by attacking Pakistan army encampments or airfields for the purpose of severely embarrassing if not destabilizing the Zia government, and demonstrating Pakistan’s impotence. [classification marking and handling restriction not declassified]

5. We would rate Soviet preference as follows:

a. The Soviets would prefer to threaten or coerce Pakistan into terminating the activity rather than engage in high-level retaliatory action against Pakistan because Moscow would not wish unnecessarily to accept the risk that the Paks would reconsider the desirability of a closer security relationship with the US.

b. The Soviets might even prefer to accept the low-level nuisance value of a fairly prolonged series of attacks to the risk of a high-level military attack on Pakistan with the attendant risk of driving the Paks back into the arms of the Americans.

c. However, if the Soviets were persuaded that the intensity of the supply activity from Pakistan could not be controlled by means short of severe retaliatory military actions, we believe they would, in the end, take such military actions and would prefer in that case to pose such a severe threat to the Paks so as to drive them to make demands for security guarantees and assistance from the US so far-reaching that the US would be unlikely to comply. [classification marking and handling restriction not declassified]

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, President’s Daily CIA Brief File, Box 26, 3/13/80–3/20/80. Secret; [handling restriction not declassified]. Attached but not printed is a March 17 covering memorandum from Turner to Brzezinski. Turner wrote that the CIA memorandum, per his conversation with Brzezinski the previous Friday, March 7 (see Document 229), examined “the most likely Soviet reactions to the use of SA–7s against their forces in Afghanistan. Clearly the existing pressures on Zia can be expected to increase significantly; however it should be noted that he is in control of when these weapons are introduced.” Carter initialed “C” in the upper right corner of Turner’s memorandum.
2. An article in the President’s Daily Brief, March 28, reported: “Soviet SA–7 antiaircraft missiles have reportedly fallen into insurgent hands. An Afghan commando battalion defected on Saturday and took along 24 of its Soviet-made missiles, [1 line not declassified]. The shoulder-fired SA–7 would be particularly effective against helicopters.” (Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 81B00401R: Subject Files of the Presidential Briefing Coordinator for DCI (1977–81), Box 8, Afghanistan Crisis—March 1980, PDBs)