266. Paper Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency1
AFGHAN FIGHTERS DESTROY SOVIET EQUIPMENT WITH SOVIET EQUIPMENT
The Soviet Army is being destroyed by Soviet weaponry in Afghanistan. For many years the Soviet Union provided military aid to the Afghan Army. Although there can be political benefit in providing military equipment to a border state, the sudden change of circumstances in Afghanistan has proved that this can also bear bitter consequences.
After the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan last December, the Afghan Army began to dissolve. Rather than fight their fellow Muslims and assist the Soviet invaders, Afghan soldiers, and in many cases full units, began to rally to the tribal forces. When these units changed sides they took with them critical Soviet anti-aircraft and anti-armor equipment, particularly anti-tank rockets which can be fired by one soldier.
Reliable reports reaching Afghan exile leaders indicate that Soviet armor and vehicle losses have begun to mount dramatically as a result of the insurgent use of these Soviet weapons. Sources with access to the rebel forces report, for example, that Soviet units in the Herat area of western Afghanistan in April lost several armored vehicles due to attacks by anti-tank rockets. One rebel source described a particularly successful but simple technique used by the Afghans as they become accustomed to the anti-tank weapons. Some Soviet armored vehicles have rubber tires. The rebel soldiers fire on the tires thereby immobilizing the vehicle. Once immobilized, the vehicle is destroyed by the rebels with their new rocket ability. Soviet vehicle losses have reached rates which reportedly are beginning to alarm Soviet leaders.
Rebel sources also report that the Afghan fighters are beginning to enjoy increased success against the once feared Soviet MI–24 helicopter [Page 715] gunship. When first introduced into the fighting, the weapon apparently was very successful in intimidating many of the tribal forces. However, as the more experienced Afghan Army defectors swell the tribal ranks, the fighters have learned the helicopters’ vulnerability to anti-aircraft ground fire. Refugee reports increasingly tell of gunships being downed by the simple expedient of the rebels firing down on the helicopters’ vulnerable tail rotor from gun implacements high in the mountains. The rebels have discovered, thanks to their newly acquired army allies, that while the helicopter is effective firing at the ground, it is vulnerable to fire from relatively immune positions above the aircraft. Rebel sources indicate that at least nine Soviet helicopters have been lost in the past 60 days.
One of the many dilemmas confronting the Soviets in Afghanistan is what to do with the remainder of the Afghan Army. If the Soviets hope to conclude their Afghan adventure successfully, they will eventually need a reliable Afghan force. To build this force, they will have to equip it with weapons which could continue to get into the hands of the rebels.
- Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 82M00501R: 1980 Subject Files, Box 12, C–367, 1 Jan–30 Jun 80, Afghanistan. In a May 9 covering letter to Komer, attached but not printed, Carlucci wrote: “Dear Bob: Try this one on for size.” In a routing sheet addressed to Carlucci, May 8, also attached but not printed, [text not declassified] Deputy Chief of the Near East Division, Central Intelligence Agency, wrote: “Per your request this morning, suggest the attached might be of use. We can live with the substance of something like attached which contains the guts of the Spot Report (insurgents’ effective use of anti-armor and anti-aircraft weapons) but protects our equities (no appearance of government leak and protection of the sensitive ultimate source). Our only suggested caveat is that no US source be identified.” The Spot Report is printed as Document 260.↩