Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XII, Afghanistan

295. Intelligence Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency¹

[memorandum number not declassified]

Washington, July 1980

Afghanistan: Iran’s Role in the Crisis ([classification marking not declassified])

Summary

Iran has become increasingly involved in the Afghanistan crisis in the last few months. Tehran has provided important diplomatic support to the insurgents fighting the Soviets. The central government has apparently not lived up to its promises to provide material aid, but Tehran continues to assert its willingness to do so if the Soviets do not withdraw from Afghanistan. The Afghan insurgents have received material aid, however, from the Iranian clergy, elements of the Revolutionary Guard, and local officials—aid that reflects the general consensus in Iran in support of the rebel cause. ([classification marking not declassified])

The Afghans have established a significant presence in Iran. The insurgents train fighters in camps along the border that house more than 100,000 refugees and have offices in Tehran, Qom, and Mashhad. We have reports of training in all three cities, and some Revolutionary Guard units apparently are providing support for cross-border operations. ([classification marking not declassified])

Iranian involvement with the insurgents seems certain to increase. Domestic pressures will incline the government toward more active support of the rebels. For their part, the insurgents will probably continue to find Iran an attractive base of operations, especially given the small number of Soviet forces located in the border area. ([classification marking not declassified])

Since early June the Soviets have become increasingly alarmed by Iran’s role in Afghanistan. They have taken a tougher line toward Iranians who have taken outspoken public positions favoring the insurgents. Foreign Minister Ghotbzadeh has, for example, been characterized as an agent of the United States and China, and local authorities in Mashhad have been accused of cooperating with the CIA. But Moscow has avoided direct criticism of the Khomeini government. ([classification marking not declassified])

The tougher Soviet posture is not likely to dissuade Tehran, and the Soviets may be forced to step up their pressure. They could do so—but only at the cost of a significant deterioration in ties with Tehran. ([classification marking not declassified])

[Omitted here is the body of the memorandum.]

1. Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 09–00438R, Box 1, Afghanistan: Iran’s Role in the Crisis; An Intelligence Memorandum [memorandum number not declassified]. Top Secret; [codeword and handling restriction not declassified]. A typed note at the bottom of the page reads in part: “The author of this memorandum is [less than 1 line not declassified] Office of Political Analysis. It was coordinated with the National Intelligence Officer for Near East/South Asia. Research for this memorandum was completed on 27 June 1980.”