Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XII, Afghanistan

300. Intelligence Assessment Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency¹

[assessment number not declassified]

Washington, July 1980

[Omitted here are a title page and cover page.]

The Soviet Military Position in Afghanistan: Problems and Prospects ([classification marking not declassified])

Key Judgments

After six months of fighting, the Soviets have not achieved any lasting military success against the Afghan insurgency. A review of operations to date shows that the 80,000 Soviet troops in Afghanistan are no more able to control the countryside than the Afghan Army was in 1979. ([classification marking not declassified])

The first major Soviet counterinsurgency campaign, which ran through mid-March and employed conventional march tactics and area sweeps, failed to trap or destroy any large insurgent bands. The insurgents, who easily eluded these operations, sabotaged roads and struck government outposts to the rear and on the flanks of the road-bound Soviets. Furthermore, they reinfiltrated after the Soviets withdrew from operational areas. This forced the Soviets to garrison many disaffected areas. As a result, their forces became thinly spread, making them more vulnerable to ambushes, reducing their ability to mount operations without regrouping, and creating logistics problems. ([classification marking, codeword, and handling restriction not declassified])

By early April 1980, senior Soviet military officers in Afghanistan had become pessimistic about their situation and short-term military prospects. [2½ lines not declassified] tactical and organizational adjustments were begun. For example, the Soviets organized hybrid brigades that combine airborne, infantry, and helicopter units. They also created regiment-sized task forces composed of motorized rifle units heavily reinforced with area-saturation artillery, such as multiple rocket launchers. In addition, they formed small airborne detachments able to respond quickly to targets of opportunity. ([classification marking, codeword, and handling restriction not declassified])

Although it is too early to judge the effect of these changes, results have been limited so far. The new brigades have been used in several recent operations, one of which resulted in large Soviet losses, suggesting that the Soviets have not yet mastered airmobile tactics. Nor have the Soviets trapped any large insurgent groups in decisive battles despite several sweep operations. The infantry-artillery task forces have not suffered any setbacks, but the Soviets have not yet demonstrated that such organizations will be mobile and flexible enough for counterinsurgency operations in difficult terrain. Soviet patrols may be achieving some modest success in slowing border infiltration from Pakistan, and their sweeps may have some effect on the ability of insurgent forces to concentrate for operations against Soviet and Afghan units. The Soviets probably will continue to emphasize and improve their airmobile and infantry-artillery task force tactics this summer. ([classification marking, codeword, and handling restriction not declassified])

There are several persistent impediments to responsive counterinsurgency operations which the Soviets so far apparently have not resolved. [3½ lines not declassified] In addition, the slow pace of Soviet tactical adjustments in Afghanistan suggests that approval for operations must be obtained from Moscow. ([classification marking, codeword, and handling restriction not declassified])

The Soviet forces now in Afghanistan appear to have little prospect of substantially reducing the insurgency unless the Afghan Army can be turned into an effective force that can clear and maintain security in major areas of the countryside. The Soviets attribute their inability to rebuild the Afghan Army to the failure of the Babrak regime to develop political support. ([classification marking, codeword, and handling restriction not declassified])

In planning the size and structure of their initial intervention force in Afghanistan, the Soviets probably assumed that the Afghan Army would be both willing and able to bear the brunt of counterinsurgency operations. For their part, the Soviet forces were to secure a few key cities and supply routes and to provide forces for limited counterinsurgency operations in the countryside in support of the Afghan Army. Soviet leaders also probably expected the introduction of Soviet combat troops to stiffen the resolve of the Afghan Army and intimidate the insurgents. Instead the opposite has occurred. The insurgency has grown while the Afghan Army has deteriorated at an increasing rate. As a consequence, Soviet forces in Afghanistan have had to shoulder responsibilities that had not been anticipated. ([classification marking not declassified])

It is unlikely that the performance of either the Afghan Government or the Afghan Army can quickly be improved. Discord between the political factions making up the Afghan regime is preventing effective administration, and the prospects of resolving the contention are poor. Efforts to recruit new men for the Afghan Army are having poor results and currently cannot even make up the continuing losses through desertion. It probably will be impossible to find the men to create the several additional Afghan divisions that the Soviets want until there is considerably more administrative control over the population. Moreover, Afghanistan’s borders cannot be sealed by the Soviet and Afghan forces now available. ([classification marking not declassified])

Despite the difficulties they have encountered, the Soviet field command in Afghanistan now appears to be optimistic about the results of their recent operations. At least some commanders apparently believe that the insurgents have suffered serious setbacks and are now on the defensive. Large insurgent bands are reportedly dispersing into groups of 50 men or less and seeking refuge among the population. [1 line not declassified] The Soviet command in Afghanistan apparently believes that it may be possible to establish the Afghan Government’s authority in some contested areas and that the Afghan Army may be able to defeat the smaller insurgent bands. ([classification marking, codeword, and handling restriction not declassified])

This optimism clashes with earlier Soviet views and contradicts recent information available to us as well as views expressed by independent Soviet observers. [4 lines not declassified] There is no evidence that the Afghan Government is able to take hold in the countryside—even after Soviet sweeps. Moreover, the Afghan Army continues to deteriorate and to perform poorly. The Soviets reportedly have lost confidence in it and do not trust it to perform security duties. ([classification marking, codeword, and handling restriction not declassified])

We do not know what pressures, if any, might be responsible for the apparent optimism of at least some Soviet commanders in Afghanistan. Nor do we know how Moscow might view it, especially in light of less sanguine reports and other conflicting evidence. Nevertheless, any Soviet perception that military prospects may be improving could affect the choice of options the Soviets see ahead in Afghanistan. ([classification marking, codeword, and handling restriction not declassified])

Through the fall of 1980, the Soviet forces now committed to operations in Afghanistan are unlikely to reduce the rebellion permanently. They probably will become more adept in the operational environment of Afghanistan, but the insurgents are improving their arms, apparently increasing their numbers, and adopting small-unit guerrilla tactics that will make them more elusive and difficult to counter. Furthermore, the insurgents’ zeal for the fight so far apparently remains high despite the casualties and hardships they have endured. ([classification marking not declassified])

[Omitted here is the body of the assessment]

1. Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 82M00501R: 1980 Subject Files, Box 12, C–367, 09 Jul–27 Aug 80, Afghanistan. Top Secret; [codeword and handling restriction not declassified]. A statement on the cover page reads: “This assessment was prepared by the Office of Strategic Research.” In a memorandum to Turner, August 1, Brzezinski observed that the Soviets could escalate military operations in Afghanistan after the Olympics and requested an analysis of Soviet troops both in Afghanistan and those either supporting the campaign or poised to enter it. (Ibid.) Clarke forwarded this assessment to Carlucci, August 5, noting that it satisfied Brzezinski’s request. (Ibid.) Carlucci responded to Brzezinski on August 6, attaching the assessment and noting that since publication, the Soviets planned to send in an additional 550-man airborne unit. (Ibid.) Brzezinski wrote to Turner, August 11, calling the assessment a “first-rate analysis.” (Ibid.)