Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XII, Afghanistan

91. Memorandum From Marshall Brement of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) and the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Aaron)¹

Washington, December 21, 1979

SUBJECT

• The Soviets and Afghanistan

It is hard to exaggerate the importance of what the Soviets are now poised to do in Afghanistan. Essentially, they seem to have made a decision to risk whatever is necessary, including major involvement in armed combat, to maintain a Communist government in Kabul. Given their military capabilities, the terrain and the division of the insurgents, they will almost certainly have considerable initial success if they pull out all stops (as we learned in Viet Nam, the helicopter gunship can be a very successful “pacification” tool). The real military question boils down to the staying power of the insurgents and the attitude of the Pakistanis, and we can play a key role on both counts.

This was not an easy decision for the Kremlin, which realizes that its own “counter-insurgency” effort will inevitably be compared to what we did in Viet Nam. As such, they will be doubly determined to succeed where we failed. They are also far more experienced in this area than we are, and their ruthlessness will not hurt them either. Equally important is the fact that this is the first time since World War II that the Soviets are using their own forces in a combat situation outside the borders of the USSR and Eastern Europe. This therefore seems to complete a chain of events which began in Angola in 1975, was continued in Ethiopia (where a Soviet General assumed command of the operation), and now culminates in Afghanistan. If the Soviets manage a successful counter-insurgency effort, it will lead almost inevitably to further “adventurism” in the years ahead.

What is to be done?

Given the current situation, we are not in a position to ignore what is happening in Afghanistan. It is necessary for us to develop both a public stance and a series of concrete actions in order to deal with this situation. I recommend that we consider taking at least some of the following specific steps:

1. Use all the means at our disposal to publicize what the Soviets are doing in Afghanistan. Major themes in this campaign should be as follows:

a. This is the first use by the Soviets of their armed forces in a combat situation outside the Soviet bloc since the Second World War.

b. Afghanistan has been a buffer state—in fact, the classic buffer state—for the past 150 years. The Soviets have no legitimate national interest in taking such action.

c. The United States has never made a commitment to the military defense of Afghanistan, which has been outside our defense perimeter for the past 25 years.

d. Nevertheless, we are extremely concerned at this unjustifiable Soviet action, especially in that it might become an unwelcome precedent in other areas. What are the limits to the Brezhnev Doctrine?²

e. We are also extremely concerned at the human toll which this Soviet-supported combat is taking. There are 300,000 refugees now in Pakistan, and we would not be surprised to see that number rise to half a million in the near future.

f. Thus, as in Cambodia and in so many other countries since World War II, the Soviets are creating another enormous refugee problem, this time in South Asia and among an overwhelmingly Muslim population.

g. The United States is prepared to do its utmost to assist the Afghan refugees with humanitarian aid.

h. The Soviet Union is atheistic by doctrine and has published enormous amounts of anti-religious and anti-Muslim literature. (The exhibition at the Museum of Religion and Atheism in Leningrad, for example, would strike any Muslim as the epitome of sacrilege.) The US, on the other hand, firmly believes in religious freedom, and enshrines it in our Constitution. Three million Muslims practice their religion freely in the US. In Soviet Azerbaijan, on the other hand, there are only 24 officially recognized Mosques now operating, whereas before the revolution of 1917 there were several thousand in operation.

i. In sum, the US deplores the Soviet action in Afghanistan, regards it as reckless adventurism, feels that superpowers should not behave in this manner, is deeply concerned at the human suffering among the Afghan population, and will do everything in its power to deal with this problem in a constructive, statesmanlike manner. It calls on all nations, and particularly nations with significant Muslim populations, to appeal to the Soviet Union to allow the Afghan people to settle its own problems in line with the principle of no interference in the internal affairs of other nations. Hands off Afghanistan!

2. Dispatch a mission to Pakistan to investigate conditions in the Afghan refugee camps there.

a. In line with the mission’s (undoubted) shock at the abysmal conditions within the refugee camp, issue a statement publicizing those conditions.

b. Turn loose our refugee apparatus on the problem and call for assistance both from the American public and from other countries and international organizations.

c. Place the blame for this human catastrophe on the Soviets, where it belongs.

3. Explore, directly or indirectly, with the Saudis, the Libyans, the Chinese, and other potential sympathizers with the Afghan Muslim cause, the possibility of stepping up covert assistance to the insurgents and the use of bases and refugee camps inside Pakistan to support the insurgency.

4. Call an SCC to examine our policy toward both Pakistan and Afghanistan. One aim of such an SCC should be to find the correct mix of incentives and guarantees that we would need to stiffen the spine of the Pakistanis to resist Moscow’s and Kabul’s pressure to help destroy the insurgency. This is an immediate goal and an important one, which might become more important to the President as the election period wears on. (As a Government, we must be in a position to defend ourselves against charges that we are sitting back and allowing the Soviets to add another country to the Communist camp without doing anything about it, as well as charges from the other direction that we are not doing enough to relieve the human misery caused by Soviet action in Afghanistan.)

In sum, major Soviet combat involvement in a long-term insurgency in Afghanistan is something which the US Government must respond to in a concrete way and with both a public position and a private action plan. We should be ready to move on this as soon as possible, but first we need clear-cut overall guidance.

RECOMMENDATION

That you convene an SCC to deal with Afghanistan and with US policy toward Pakistan in the light of events in Afghanistan.³

Unless you indicate otherwise, I would plan to work with Thornton, Henze, Sick and Gregg on this overall subject.

1. Source: National Security Council, Carter Administration Intelligence Files, Box I–047, Afghanistan: 11 Sep 1979–22 Jul 1980. Secret. Sent for action. Copies were sent to Gregg, Griffith, Henze, Oksenberg, Sick, Thornton, and Odom.
2. In a speech in November 1968, Brezhnev declared that a threat to socialist rule in any state constituted a theat to all and therefore “must engage the attention of all the socialist states,” including the use of military force.
3. Brzezinski and Aaron did not indicate their approval or disapproval on the memorandum. Brement’s desire to convene an SCC meeting was echoed in a memorandum from Claytor to Brzezinski, December 21. Claytor questioned whether the current level of U.S. support was sufficient in light of increased Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. Citing a need to “keep the Afghan insurgency going,” Claytor argued that the United States should “frustrate the Soviets” and demonstrate “U.S. resolve to Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and others in the area.” Claytor called for an SCC meeting because “the situation calls for more than just throwing more money at the problem.” (Memorandum from Claytor to Brzezinski, December 21; National Security Council, Carter Administration Intelligence Files, Box I–047, Afghanistan: 11 Sep 1979–22 Jul 1980) The SCC convened a meeting on Afghanistan on December 26; see Document 95.