119. Telegram From the Embassy in Honduras to the Department of State1
5094. Subject: Demarche RE New Sandinista Attacks. Ref: State 264042.2
1. I met privately with General Paz evening October 20 briefed him on [less than 1 line not declassified] reports and urged that Honduras prevent that its territory be used for FSLN attacks. Paz gave me categoric assurances that Honduras will not intervene militarily in Nicaragua but will control Sandinistas on Honduran soil, capturing them and deporting them.
2. I opened conversation by telling Paz that my government had instructed me to communicate with him urgently and that given nature of my information, I wanted to carefully make a number of points to him.
3. I then made following points:
—My government is very concerned that violence might break out in Nicaragua again.
—Our concern is based on information obtained in several Latin American capitals indicating that FSLN may use Honduran and Costa Rican territory to initiate new offensive simultaneously against Somoza at end this month.
—We understand that senior Costa Rican official said in mid-October that he had information indicating that a strong FSLN attack was expected from Honduran and Costa Rican territory, simultaneously on October 29. He added that FSLN was planning to cause uprisings in seven Nicaraguan cities simultaneously. We also understand that an FSLN/Terciario member said in mid-October that Panamanian troops had reached Costa Rica, and that the offensive was to include attacks on Nicaragua originating from Honduras and Costa Rica coinciding with FSLN actions within Nicaragua, aimed at capturing several cities in Nicaragua, including Managua. The same FSLN member said that a high ranking leader of the FSLN/Terciarios had already arrived [Page 317] within Honduras in order to receive a shipment of arms for the offensive, and that this leader had been named Commander of the Tercerista forces on the frontier with Honduras.
—In mid-October we understand that an FSLN member in Nicaragua said that within three weeks there would be a strong attack to secure territory within Nicaragua which would permit the establishment of a provisional government. The FSLN/Terciarios wants to take action in order to obligate the mediators and Nicaraguan Government to include FSLN as part of the new government. In addition, the various FSLN factions are discussing the possibility of joint actions.
—A renewed outbreak of violence would imperil the mediation process and increase the likelihood for an eventual radical outcome in Nicaragua.
—My government urges and hopes that the Honduran Government will continue its efforts to prevent its territory from being used for FSLN attacks. At the same time, we urge and hope that the Government of Honduras will continue its announced policy of scrupulously avoiding any activity by Honduran military or police forces on Nicaraguan territory.
4. After I had made my full presentation, Paz said very soberly that, “this is very serious. The Terceristas are very strong. We have a very tough situation.” Paz admitted that he was aware of several rumors on possible FSLN action early in November but he felt my report was the most concrete one he had received to date. He said, “we have many Sandinistas here. We have to get rid of them. They may put us in a very difficult situation. If we send them to Venezuela or Panama, they return. They are able to work in Honduras (as migrant workers during current harvest season) and we have little control over them.” He then assured me firmly, “we will not go to fight in Nicaragua. We will control them here in Honduras.”
5. Paz proceeded to talk at length about his frustrations with the Sandinistas who shield themselves behind “human rights” as soon as they are detained. He insisted that no Sandinista would be mistreated and that they all would be treated humanely. Paz did not want to send the Sandinistas to Costa Rica because they are able to return to fighting almost at once. He said it is better that they go to Panama. Paz felt that it would be even better if the Sandinistas could be sent far away but said that only Venezuela, Panama and Costa Rica are willing to accept them. He reported that Panama was to have sent two planes to pick up 100 Sandinistas that Honduras is ready to send away but that the aircraft did not come as expected. Overall, he stated that there are 150 Sandinistas. Paz observed that twelve of these had been captured in the remote Mosquitia area.
6. He reviewed the refugee situation in Honduras, noting that the overwhelming majority are not a real problem and are being cared for [Page 318] by the Red Cross. He described the migrant labor situation, commenting that Nicaraguan workers are employed throughout the country to harvest coffee and sugar. Much of this work was done formerly by Salvadorans.
7. Paz expressed his frustration over the way the FSLN is able to secure assistance and documentation at the University of Honduras, further complicating any effective control over them.
8. He said that he planned to review the matter I raised with his advisors and would advise us soon of his plans.
9. In taking his leave, he asked me to inform my government that Honduras will not intervene militarily in Nicaragua.
- Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Records, Tegucigalpa 1963–1979. Secret; Niact Immediate; Roger Channel; Wnintel; Noforn; Nocontract; Orcon. Sent for information Immediate to Caracas, Panama City, San José, and Managua.↩
- Telegram 264042 to Caracas, Panama City, San José, and Tegucigalpa, October 18, noted intelligence reports about FSLN planning and instructed the Ambassadors to issue a démarche warning of the “serious consequences” if FSLN attacked in Nicaragua or “from Costa Rica and Honduras into Nicaragua.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Cables File, Nicaragua, Box 36, 10/16–21/78)↩