124. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Tarnoff) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)1
SUBJECT
- Nicaragua
The Nicaraguan mediation effort has reached a critical point. It is clear that no negotiated solution which will achieve reconciliation or bring peace and democracy to that country will be possible without Somoza’s early departure from power. None of the opposition will accept less. The moderate and responsible opposition have taken a leading role under the mediators’ sponsorship. They have presented for negotiation a realistic proposal for a political transition to a provisional government and to eventual elections, but based upon the prompt departure from power of Somoza and his family. They have placed great faith in the mediation process—and in us.
[Page 331]If the mediation process fails, the moderates will be discredited, extremism and a strategy of violence to achieve political change will be legitimized, and the polarization which we have sought to avoid will occur with the accompanying danger of a Marxist takeover.
Somoza for his part has made clear he will not give up power voluntarily. He apparently intends to string out the negotiation, expecting the opposition to break up and split, which it has already shown signs of doing. He may actually seek the polarization we are trying to avoid on the premise that if he can cast the situation in terms of Somoza vs. Marxists, we will have no choice but to support him. From his point of view therefore delay, even violence, will help him achieve his objective of holding on to power for himself and his family.
Overhanging this situation is the threat of an early renewal of widespread violence by the Sandinista guerillas which intelligence indicates may come as early as next weekend or even before. They too want to discredit a peaceful mediated solution because within the mediation they cannot dominate the moderates and control events. Polarization therefore suits them too. Our mediator, Ambassador William Bowdler, believes that we will have to move quickly now if we are to avoid violence—and even civil war—and a discrediting of both the moderates and the process of negotiating a national reconciliation. (See Managua 5430.)2 We had hoped that the process of negotiation would in itself have a leavening effect on Somoza, but we no longer have the luxury of waiting for that to occur.
The only way that Somoza will agree to negotiate a transition promptly is if he believes that he has no alternative. In the last analysis, whether he comes to that conclusion is likely to depend on what the U.S. says. He counts on and needs our support to legitimize himself and stay in power. Up to now, our public posture vis-a-vis Somoza and Nicaragua has been neutral. We have suspended bilateral assistance to the Government of Nicaragua in order to underscore our neutrality. Nevertheless, the opposition in Nicaragua and hemispheric opinion generally view our position as ambiguous, with many believing we quietly back Somoza. The extremists in Nicaragua have played on that fear, charging that the mediation process is a trap designed only to give Somoza time to weaken his opposition. Certainly as far as Somoza [Page 332] himself is concerned, we have never clearly told him what he can expect from us if he tries to hang on to power.
Hence we are now at the point where, if the mediation is to succeed, we must speak frankly to Somoza to make clear that the Government of Nicaragua cannot expect continued support from the U.S. if he does not promptly accept a transition formula and relinquish power. Attached at Tab A are talking points for Ambassador Bowdler to use in such an approach to Somoza.3 In conjunction with this demarche, we would also be prepared to take a series of measures, such as withdrawing our military mission, to make our point as necessary.
Please inform us as soon as possible whether you concur in the use of the attached talking points.
- Source: National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Records of the Office of the Deputy Secretary, Warren Christopher, Lot 81D113, Box 22, Human Rights—Nicaragua VI. Secret; Sensitive. An unknown hand wrote “10/30/78” in the top right-hand corner of the memorandum and added, “Sent to White House at 5:20 p.m.” at the bottom of the first page.↩
- In telegram 5430 from Managua, October 30, Bowdler wrote to Christopher and Vaky that he had “reached the conclusion that we should make our big move with Somoza by next Thursday, November 2, before he makes his announced public statement on the FAO plan and hopefully before the Sandinistas launch another major action.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P780187–2484) Telegram 5424 from Managua, October 29, reported that “Somoza-controlled” Novedades had ridiculed the FAO proposal. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780446–0075)↩
- Attached but not printed are the draft talking points dated October 30.↩
- Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.↩