129. Telegram From the Embassy in Nicaragua to the Department of State1
5549. For Assistant Secretary Vaky from Ambassador Solaun. Subject: Embassy Views on the Current Political Situation.
Summary. Since the FAO presented its plan to the NG I have had several conversations with moderate liberals and conservatives and businessmen, who see no chance for rapid movement in the negotiations, which they all agree is essential, until Somoza is forced to accept the inevitability of his resignation. On the other hand, these contacts indicate Somoza will be harder to convince unless he can clearly see an exit which he does not view as a sell-out of the interests of the family, the PLN and the GN. Even though we are hearing, and have reported, that some elements in the PLN and the GN, under proper circumstances, accept the need for his resignation, Somoza is not receiving the same message, and these elements will not likely speak up until he has indicated that he will resign. The sources also believe that Somoza and his supporters will find serious problems with the FAO plan because it forces not only Somoza to resign but also the PLN to give up its hegemony in the Cabinet, Congress and local government. Thus we have a paradox whose solution might require two phases: (1) persuade Somoza to resign and get from him a counterplan accept [Page 342] able to him (i.e., his “Puente de Plata”) and (2) negotiate such a plan with the FAO and the private sector. End summary.
1. All recent contacts with moderate liberals and conservatives and businessmen have yielded the same common themes: (a) the issue of timing is now of critical importance, (b) there currently is high expectation for the NG’s success, (c) if there is not rapid, tangible progress, there will be an enormous let down which will weaken moderate forces and strengthen radicalism, (d) the current FAO plan is a thinly disguised coup d’etat which will be unacceptable to the GON because it reduces the PLN to a position of impotence, (e) Somoza must resign now for true political compromise to take place, (f) once Somoza’s resignation is assured moderates will be strengthened and an acceptable constitutional provisional government can be agreed on.
2. The general feeling is that a true breakthrough in the negotiations is necessary within the next week or two. By that, our interlocutors mean Somoza’s resignation. Several opposition contacts said that if that happens, the FSLN would lose credibility, its banner.
3. Moderate sources from both parties argue that the FAO plan hinders rapid progress because it is an unacceptable starting point for negotiations as it only provides an insignificant role for the PLN in the transitional government and would be a threat to the GN. In one conversation, two distinguished independent liberals said the PLN could not accept surrendering entirely their control because they have not yet lost the war. This same thinking is likely to be found in the GN. What the FAO plan does is to unite the PLN and the GN behind Somoza, several sources said. Another two said that the plan does not provide Somoza’s “Puente de Plata,” and that his acceptance of any plan is a sine qua non for success of the mediation. A conservative said the junta concept was unworkable because it could not constitutionally be implemented before 1979. The common denominator in these positions is that the urgent need, the first priority, is not structural reform but rather the removal of the person who has perverted the constitutional structure, i.e., Somoza, and that to obtain this Somoza must be asked by the U.S. to resign and propose his “Puente de Plata.”
4. A problem in dealing with the PLN and a significant sector of the PCN is that they suggest only minor changes of personalities, structures and laws following a resignation. They would like an interim President until 1981 with a continuing Congress. Conservative sources describe the need for a person honest and not discredited on the basis of past close allegiance to Somoza, while at the same time being acceptable to the GN and Liberal Party. They argue that Nicaragua needs a referee in the presidency like Balaguer, not another strong, military charismatic leader. A few think such a person could even be found within the liberals in the Congress.
[Page 343]5. The difficulty with this analysis is that it is unacceptable to the non-traditional political parties and groups which have the majority and loudest voice in the FAO. The [omission in the original] basically is that most FAO groups have no participation in the current Congress or other formal government institutions, that traditional liberals and conservatives that are in the government are currently largely discredited, and that there is a need for a thorough electoral reform. In sum, as an immediate election is impossible, a national reconciliation solution requires a transitional, provisional government with a new constitutional structure capable of representing FAO groups and interests.
6. In response to these contacts I have urged that all concerned Nicaraguans must make their voices heard, that they should work to provide a climate of flexibility and maintain contacts with all key sectors. To the liberals I have urged that they work within their party to emphasize their perceived need for change and to seek clarification from the FAO as to the future role of the Liberal Party and the GN. I have emphasized that I believe that the intent of the negotiators is to assure guarantee for PLN and the GN, and that PLN role in any future government is still negotiable. To all I have emphasized that they must not simply criticize the FAO plan but rather formulate and foment constructive suggestions and counterproposals.
7. Comment: From these contacts, I get the impression that there is a misconception with regard to the FAO plan. Many see it as a fait accompli rather than a negotiating document. Nevertheless, these comments about the plan reflect a true problem in that the PLN and the GN likely do not see any guarantees for themselves. To the extent that this is the case, the plan does not contribute to soften Somoza’s position, as he cannot betray his loyalists by resigning under these conditions. For this reason many of our contacts want the NG to immediately explore with President Somoza his terms for a “Puente de Plata.” Assuming Somoza cooperates, then true negotiations based on the premise of Somoza’s departure can succeed and, thereby, minimize the potential for chaos and the collapse of public order. I have kept Ambassador Bowdler informed of these conversations and my thinking on these issues.
- Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780453–0174. Secret; Immediate; Exdis.↩