136. Telegram From the Embassy in Nicaragua to the Department of State1
5746. For Deputy Secretary Christopher and Assistant Secretary Vaky only from Bowdler. Subject: Nicaragua Mediation No. 116: Conversation with FonMin Julio Quintana.
1. FonMin Quintana asked me to come to his office at noon today for a chat. He started off the conversation by asking whether the Negotiating Group could not go back to the FAO and ask them to change their rigid position on departure of the President. I told him that we had talked at length about this aspect with the FAO and it was clear to us that they would continue to insist on this point. My impression is that they were willing to negotiate all other aspects but not this one.
2. Quintana said that the President has the full support of his Cabinet, the National Guard and the leadership of the Liberal Party. They had all prepared documents manifesting their support. The President could not see why he should step down when he has this kind of backing as well as the popular following demonstrated in the rally last Sunday.2 Furthermore, added Quintana, the President is essential to the maintenance of law and order. Were he to leave, fighting would break out and the Sandinistas could well take over.
3. I responded that I thought the government misread the mood of the country. I told him I did not question his assertion that the Cabinet, Guardia and Party leadership were behind the President but in our almost six weeks in the country my colleagues of the Negotiating Group and I were persuaded that a very large proportion of the people, and particularly among those with influence in national affairs, sincerely wanted a fundamental change. Not everyone agreed on the specifics of the FAO plan, but we have found a widespread desire for the President to step down in order to bring about a national reconciliation. I asked Quintana if he had seen the communique published yesterday by the Chamber of Industries. He said he had. I noted that this conservative group had been specific in their call for the prompt change of government.
4. There followed another exchange about the rigidity and unconstitutionality of the FAO plan. I again explained to Quintana that my sense of the FAO position was one of strong adherence to the point [Page 360] that Somoza should leave but there was flexibility in negotiating how that might be accomplished and the nature of the government to follow. I told him that there need not be a political vacuum which would invite civil strife. The FAO and the Negotiating Group contemplate the negotiation of a constitutional transitional arrangement which takes into consideration the views of the FAO, the Liberal Party and the National Guard. Agreement on a transitional government which had the support of the three elements plus the backing of all the major professional and agricultural business associations would go a long way toward insuring peace and national reconciliation. I also told him that I did not share his fear about the danger of “Sandininismo” if a good arrangement could be worked out now rpt now. With such an arrangement the Sandinistas would lose their principal standard. Quintana said “what assurance is there that countries like Venezuela would not continue to support them?” I expressed personal confidence that if a settlement can be reached with the support of the three groups mentioned above, which also included the departure of Somoza and his family, I was confident that his concern would be unfounded.
5. Toward the end of the conversation I said to Quintana that I assumed that he knew that I had asked for an appointment with the President. He answered affirmatively, going on to say that the President had asked him to have his personal chat with me because he wanted to avoid being confronted by a request from the United States that he should step down. I told him that my instructions contemplated a conversation like the one we were having in which I could convey not an ultimatum but a friendly assessment of how we saw the reality of the Nicaraguan situation. It was not my purpose to threaten or demand but to reason with the President in a friendly way. Quintana said this placed a different light on my request for an appointment and he would go straight to the President to speak with him. The implication was that he would advise him to give me the appointment but Quintana was not explicit on this point.
7. Comment: The purpose of this meeting, I think, was twofold:
A. To try to persuade the NG to go back to the FAO to press them to be flexible about the President remaining in power and,
B. To test the purpose of my request for an appointment with the President.
Somoza for the past two days has been meeting with the leadership of the Guard, Liberal Party, and his Cabinet. He recognizes that he needs them and is obtaining certificates of fealty and support to use in buttressing a decision to hang on. All sources indicate that he now intends to give the NG a negative reply but he still has not made his move to call the NG in, wanting first to take another sounding of where he stands with the USG. I told Quintana that before the President [Page 361] answered the NG, it would be useful for the President and me to have a private chat. I think he is going to try to persuade the President to do this before closing the door.
8. Quintana has just called to say that the President will receive me in the morning.3 Still no move to meet with the NG.
- Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P780187–2438. Secret; Immediate; Exdis Distribute as Nodis.↩
- November 5; see footnote 2, Document 133.↩
- See Document 137.↩