147. Telegram From the Embassy in Nicaragua to the Department of State1
6022. For Deputy Secretary Christopher and Assistant Secretary Vaky from Bowdler. Subj: Nicaragua Mediation No. 155: NG Meeting with Somoza.
1. The NG met with President Somoza in the “bunker” at 3:00 pm local time.2 Only other person present was FonMin Quintana. The meeting lasted 70 minutes.
2. I started off the conversation by expressing appreciation for the prompt action taken in lifting the curfew and discontinuing requirement that all radio stations join in national chain for government propaganda programs.
3. Jimenez then presented the NG proposal (Managua 6018) which Somoza and Quintana read with great care.3 Somoza was the first to speak declaring “this amounts to a golpe de estado”. Quintana quickly echoed the comment. I intervened to say that this was a misreading of the proposal: a “consulta popular” was not a coup d’etat.
4. Quintana at this point took over the conversation to argue that the proposal was unconstitutional because it contemplated the possibility of the President leaving office before completion of his term in 1981. He also made a historical and legal distinction between plebiscite, [Page 394] referendum, and the NG proposal contending that what the NG suggested was without precedent and not contemplated in the constitution. A third argument he advanced was that the country was faced with a serious Communist threat and could not afford to let the totally inexperienced FAO group takeover the government.
5. Obiols and I refuted these arguments pointing out that the special circumstances confronting Nicaragua required a special approach to achieve a peaceful solution. Nothing unconstitutional was being proposed. The “consulta popular” was in effect advisory. If the result were adverse to the President, he had constitutional avenues for stepping down. There was no need to have a power vacuum in Nicaragua. Our proposal contemplated a negotiated settlement for a transitional government involving the opposition, Liberal Party and the Guardia Nacional.
6. Throughout the foregoing exchange Somoza made several short interventions. He complained that the proposal put all the responsibility on him—“it personalizes the whole dispute”. He turned to me at one point and strongly protested the personal vilification contained in today’s New York Times and Washington Post.4 Most interesting of all was the devastating confession that “I am afraid I would lose the vote you propose.”
7. While everything that Somoza and Quintana said indicates a strong opposition to the NG proposal, they accepted the document and said they would study it. Somoza went into immediate Cabinet session after we left.
8. The depth of Somoza’s feeling over the NG effort to turn his plebiscite proposal back to the central issue of his departure was reflected in his comment to me as we filed out of his office. I was the last to leave and as we shook hands he said with heavy sarcasm “Thanks for all of your help”. The tone was so biting that Obiols, who was within earshot, commented about it as we left the “bunker”.
- Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor Files, Country Files, Box 34, Nicaragua: 11/1–22/78. Secret; Niact Immediate; Exdis Distribute as Nodis. Sent for information Immediate to Caracas, Panama City, and San José. Printed from a copy that was received in the White House Situation Room.↩
- November 21.↩
- Telegram 6018 from Managua, November 21, included the Spanish-language text of the Negotiating Group’s proposal submitted to Somoza and the FAO–PC, which endorsed a popular plebiscite supervised by an international authority like the Organization of American States, an amnesty for political prisoners, and the elimination of censorship, among other issues. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P820112–0339)↩
- The references are to a New York Times editorial entitled “The Nicaraguan Exception,” November 21, 1978, p. A20, which noted that “General Somoza has made war against his own civilian population and alienated all the forces whose cooperation would be needed in a democratic society;” and to a Washington Post editorial entitled “D Day in Nicaragua,” November 21, 1978, p. A18, which described Somoza as a “bloody dictator.”↩