239. Telegram From the Embassy in Nicaragua to the Department of State1
2870. San Jose for Ambassador Bowdler. Subject: (S) The Current Scene. Ref: Managua 2857,2 Panama 04860.3
1. S-Entire text.
2. After less than one day here, it is apparent that we have little if any chance of putting together an Executive Committee of any size. The opposition figures we identified have either openly supported the provisional junta or are fearful of playing any independent role. The best we can hope to engineer is for Somoza to turn power over to a member of Congress or a member of his Cabinet and that the successor then call for a cease-fire, cooperation in forming a government of reconciliation (GNR) while announcing new GN leadership and appealing for humanitarian assistance.
3. At this afternoon’s meeting with Somoza, I would like to establish a departure date so that we can have something specific to point toward. I was thinking of next Tuesday.4 I will insist that he abide by the understanding we reached yesterday that he resign and work out precise details of his resignation with us. He should have no doubt after yesterday’s conversation that we will not consider material support to the National Guard during his presidency or during the caretaker [Page 605] period, but that it is possible if it is requested by a GNR. I will pursue the things he can do on or before his departure to build GN morale and play on their military duty to support any successor government loyally. His appeals to his northern neighbors indicates he will pursue every possible avenue of military support.
4. I think we now have a clearer picture which argues strongly in favor of pursuing with Torrijos and with the provisional junta the points made in paragraph 10 of Panama 04860. We should disabuse Torrijos of any thought of sending Panamanian troops here. Such a move would internationalize the conflict and could trigger a kneejerk response from San Salvador and Guatemala, possibly through Condeca. Attempting to bring Gutierrez into play looks like too much of a long shot at this point. Besides, I learned here that his reputation among opposition groups is not repeat not good. I think a more fruitful course of action would be to encourage the contacts between FSLN elements and Guardia Nacional elements to begin the negotiations of a cease-fire and GN reorganization.
- Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850036–1790. Secret; Flash; Nodis. Sent for information Immediate to Caracas, Panama City, and San José.↩
- See Document 235.↩
- See Document 231.↩
- July 3.↩