245. Telegram From the Embassy in Nicaragua to the Department of State1
2887. San Jose for Ambassador Bowdler. Subject: (C) Meeting With Red Cross President.
1. C-Entire text
2. At the suggestion of Emilio Alvarez, one of the principal advisors who helped during the mediation effort, I met with Ismael Reyes this afternoon to explore his interest in becoming a member of the transitional Executive Committee. Reyes has all the attractive attributes we are seeking, i.e., high prestige, respectability among the GN and the Sandinistas, and is a moderate who is currently the head of the Chamber of Industries. Reyes expressed grave concern about the human suffering his country is experiencing. He has traveled through the country as head of the Red Cross and been witness to human tragedy which he said is ten times as grave as that which existed in the aftermath of the [Page 617] 1972 earthquake. He was very pessimistic about the future and was fearful that public order might break down because of the human wave of despair which could descend on population centers.
3. He said the FSLN treated him well during his visits in recent days to occupied cities such as Leon and Esteli. He estimated their strength in the thousands, though I suspect that is an exaggeration. He feared that the FSLN, through force of arms, will impose an extreme leftist government.
4. I then outlined our strategy for ending the human suffering and bloodshed and hopefully permitting the more numerous moderate political forces to prevent leftist domination. I indicated that it depended on three key ingredients: The early resignation of Somoza; the selection of a highly-prestigious and independent caretaker committee or person who could with credibility make a call for national reconciliation, a ceasefire and humanitarian assistance; and the preservation of elements of the National Guard to prevent an FSLN takeover. Reyes was impressed with our scenario but asked whether it would be acceptable to the FSLN and the provisional Junta. I said that depended on the prestige of the persons involved in the transitional executive authority and public reaction to call for unity and ceasefire. He then asked how we could avoid this appearing to be a USG invention.2 He suggested it would benefit from Andean or Central American sponsorship. I said the countries in those areas would probably support a formula which would avoid a vacuum which benefited the extreme left.
5. I added that Archbishop Obando Y Bravo had indicated that he would support a formula which offered a peaceful solution to the current crisis. I then asked Reyes whether he would be interested in being a member of such an executive committee. He said he would have to think about it but there were too many unknowns for his comfort. He said he might be persuaded to participate should the momentum for such a formula develop in the hemispheric. I promised to keep in touch and asked him to call should he become more positively inclined.
6. Comment: We have contacted several potential candidates for an Executive Committee. Although all appeared fascinated by the idea [Page 618] and viewed it as a noble effort, I doubt that we can put together anything resembling a viable Executive Committee quickly. It appears to be a dead letter.3
- Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor Files, Country Files, Box 35, Nicaragua: 6/29–30/79. Confidential; Niact Immediate, Exdis. Sent for information Immediate to Caracas, Panama City, and San José. Printed from a copy that was received in the White House Situation Room. Pastor wrote at the top of the page: “interested—get hemispheric support.”↩
- Inderfurth underlined the portion of this sentence beginning with “to” and ending with “invention” and the sentence in paragraph five beginning with “he” and ending with “hemispheric” and wrote in the right-hand margin: “Bob—This is a pertinent, key point. Anything we (USG) insist on creating will suffer from ‛a kiss of death’—& those who may be members of it will probably be viewed as U.S. ‛puppets’—& become so tainted that their political effectiveness will be highly compromised. Perhaps the ‛Torrijos approach’ would be best. Rick.”↩
- In telegram 2794 from San José, June 30, Bowdler reported his conversation with Calero about Pezzullo’s “difficulty in getting moderate leaders to serve on an Executive Committee following Somoza’s departure.” Calero: “described the root problem as a lack of confidence of Nicaraguan moderates in the US” due to “our failure to react vigorously against Somoza after he had turned down the reasonable proposals of the mediators last December.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor Files, Country Files, Box 36, Nicaragua: 7/1–4/79)↩