251. Message From the White House Situation Room to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)1
Sitto 76/WH 91433. The following is a retransmittal of Managua 2911.2 Subject: (S) Somoza: The Third Meeting.
1. S-Entire text.
2. Somoza had expanded his team when I arrived this evening to include Luis Pallais and his son Tachito, in addition to FonMin Quintana and Minister of Finance Genie. I told him Washington was pleased he had finally decided to resign, and was in the process of preparing the stage to ensure that his departure did not leave a vacuum which could be exploited by the extreme left. We sought to preserve segments of the National Guard to maintain public order and were hopeful of ensuring that all opposition factions would be represented in the transitional government. Our aim was to arrange an effective ceasefire, prevent reprisals and begin the process of social and economic recovery. Since we were not prepared yet to specify the timetable within which his resignation should take place, I was instructed to delay presenting a complete scenario. I promised to be in touch with him as soon as we were prepared to go forward.
3. Somoza somewhat melodramatically said that we had made him a prime target for assassination by giving the press all the details of our confidential conversations. He referred specifically to a Miami Herald article which I assume covers the same story the Post and NYTimes printed earlier.)3 This complicated his position with the National Guard, he lamented. Nonetheless, he said, he and his government would be true to his word and he would resign, repeating again that “I would be crazy to think I could ignore the will of governments that lead 300 million people”. (Quite clearly, no single act has stung him as sharply as the OAS resolution). I assured him that we had not violated the confidentiality of our discussions. The press reports I had [Page 626] seen noted that my mission was to implement our commitment under the OAS resolution, which included seeking his resignation and supporting the development of a broadly-based, democratic transition government. None of the press accounts I had seen confirmed his decision to resign. I suggested he take the line with the press that he is not about to be talked into resigning by anyone. He nodded.
4. We then turned to the post-Somoza period, specifically to the survivability of the National Guard. Young Tachito was their principal spokesman. He said he was hopeful that a truly democratic process following his father’s resignation would work to the benefit of all Nicaraguans, even if “I have the most to lose.” He professed to be keeping a close eye on the morale of the GN and the attitudes of its officers since the news of his father’s resignation became widespread. He found morale excellent and was convinced that the officers at the Lt. Col. level and below were pragmatic and flexible enough to weather a transitional period. He acknowledged that all of the current Guardia leadership would have to leave. The new Guard leadership had to be composed of self-reliant officers capable of acting in a less controlled environment. He was optimistic that with careful selection, an officer leadership corps could be put together which had no taint of Somocismo and had the respect of subordinates.
5. Somoza was equally optimistic about the survivability of the guard. He said “they will serve any democratic government with loyalty.” He pointed to how well the GN had stood up under the severe current conditions as evidence of its durability. He noted that it had not faltered nor had desertions become a problem. He concluded that the “GN is a better fighting force than most people believed.”
6. I acknowledged that the GN had stood up remarkably well, but asked whether it would hold together during the transition period when adaptability would be the chief requirement, not responsiveness to command. Tachito said flexibility and self-reliance were more characteristic of the officers at the Lt. Col. level and below. The senior officers were the more tradition-bound and, consequently, the ones who would have to go when his father left. Tachito was equally certain that morale would not sag. He asserted that the knowledge of his father’s imminent resignation is common knowledge throughout the GN.
7. Tachito suggested that the GN could be bolstered during the transition period if: a) the US makes an early show of moral support (both Somozas kept repeating that the GN looks to the USG, because of our close relationship in the past); b) Guatemala, Honduras and El Salvador could provide the material needed to replenish drawn-down stocks; and c) as soon as the GN was incorporated within a new government that the USG offer military assistance.
8. Comment: The discussion was calm and dispassionate and largely devoid of the posturing of the first two sessions. Somoza is [Page 627] tired and ready to step down. We should not delay too long. He is under severe strain, and the assassination possibility cannot be discounted entirely.4
- Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor Files, Country Files, Box 35, Nicaragua: 6/29–30/79. Secret. Sent through Gates with a request to deliver at the opening of business.↩
- Telegram 2911 from Managua, June 30. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850036–1819)↩
- Reference is to Alan Riding, “Nicaraguan Moderates Reject U.S. Plan for Conservative Interim Regime,” New York Times, June 30, 1979, p. 8. Riding reported that Somoza had “told United States officials that he will step down if the ‛institutionality’ of the Guard and the Liberal Party is respected.” See also, John M. Goshko, “Somoza to Quit, Leave Nicaragua,” Washington Post, June 28, 1979. p. A1.↩
- In telegram 2939 from Managua, July 1, the Embassy reported to Vaky, Pezzullo, and Bowdler an additional point made by Somoza’s son during Pezzullo’s third meeting with Somoza: “Tachito’s point was that the hard-line FSLN adherents (i.e. the GPP and TP factions) are likely to be more intact following this offensive than the terciaros, in whose ranks most of the non-Communists chose to fight. Secondly, if the FSLN did come to power, they still would have an unfinished struggle ahead to determine which faction will be dominant.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850036–1830)↩