Foreign Relations of the United States 1977–1980; Volume XV; Central America, 1977–1980

253. Message From the White House Situation Room to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)¹

Washington, June 30, 1979, 2316Z

Sitto 96/WH 91450. The following is a retransmission of Managua 2919.² Subject: (S) Nicaraguan Scenario. Ref: State 168715,³ San Jose 2792.⁴

1. S at entire text.

2. Fear of reprisal by the FSLN and the lack of any assured security and support base are the principal factors inhibiting the individuals we have contacted from becoming part of a caretaker executive committee. They see the Junta in San Jose supported by a FSLN force and such countries as Panama and Costa Rica, while they would have nothing but helpful words from the USG as of the moment. Realistically, we have little prospect of interesting any individuals to play this hero role without greater assurances, here of the most important, would be some tangible evidence that a reconstituted GN would stand firm and support them.

3. I believe we must move with haste to help select a new Guard Commander so that he can begin putting a staff together, assuring that the rank and file of the GN will support him and offering support to a caretaker committee. If Col. Bermudez shows interest and looks as if he has the capacity to bring the GN together and deal in a transitional environment, we should urge him to move quickly. We should explore with him how he plans to proceed and how he can lend assistance. If he shows no interest then we must move to other candidates.

4. Among the issues we should cover with any candidate would be: a) the specific names of his principal subordinates (the illustrative list we sent forward⁵ can be of help b) early contact with prospective candidates for an executive committee to bolster their resolve and to make plans for the transition period; the opening of some liaison—beginning with a confidential feeler through a neutral intermediary with the FSLN command—to begin working out details of a cease-fire.

5. Once it appears that a reconstituted GN can hold, we will have a much better chance of attracting individuals to form part of the caretaker body. I am pleased that Calero will be here early next week. He may be an important catalyst. Meanwhile, I will continue to explore our scenario with others. It is extremely difficult making contact in the midst of a civil war. I have not been able to get to Fiallou, for example, because he is holed up in Leon. I have sent word to him, however, and hope to see him soon.

6. A third essential element in building the confidence of a caretaker group and a reconstituted Guardia Nacional is support by Andean group countries and other LA states. I will be offering some illustrative examples in a separate message of the types of things they can do.⁶ Contact and assurances by these countries and commitments to lend support once a cease-fire is attained and a new government reconstitution is formed should be attainable. I cannot emphasize enough the need for confidence building. We must mobilize the hemisphere to form a consortium in support of a democratic solution here in keeping with the OAS resolution. By internationalizing the search for a peaceful solution to the Nicaraguan tragedy we can attract more resources and spread responsibility around.

Pezzullo

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor Files, Country Files, Box 35, Nicaragua: 6/29–30/79. Secret; Nodis. Sent through Gates. Brzezinski wrote at the top of the page: “Bring Pezzullo back to brief the P.”
2. Telegram 2919 from Managua, June 30. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850036–1809)
3. See Document 248.
4. In telegram 2792 from San José, June 29, Bowdler reported on his talks with Calero. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840133–1529)
5. In telegram 2913 from Managua, June 30, Pezzullo sent Vaky a “list of officers who might be considered for taking command of the GN during the transition period following the departure of Somoza.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790296–0666)
6. In telegram 2915 from Managua, June 30, Pezzullo discussed his idea for a “‛consortium’ of the coordinated efforts of several OAS countries,” and the Andean Pact regarding Nicaragua. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850036–1804)