26. Memorandum of Conversation1

SUBJECT

  • Belize

PARTICIPANTS

  • BELIZE

    • George Price, Premier
  • U.S.

    • The Secretary
    • Terence Todman, Assistant Secretary
    • Linda Pfeifle, ARA/CEN (notetaker)

Price recalled that in his November conversation with the Secretary they had discussed cession of territory including the sea bed and sea shelf. The land involved contains nine communities with 2,000 people. This is the area where the oil companies are drilling and the cays included some of Belize’s best cays. Both Belizean political parties have agreed not to cede territory and Britain’s Labor Party also opposes [Page 71] land cession. Belize is prepared to offer a sea package which would permit Guatemala free access to the Bay of Amatique. In the future when Belize and Honduras extend their territorial sea to 12 miles, Guatemala’s access to the Caribbean would be cut off, but the Belize offer would give Guatemala access and 300 square miles of sea bed. This does not conflict with the Belizean policy of not ceding one square inch of land.

Belize faces a dilemma. The British proposal is to cede land, but Belize cannot accept this. The status quo is difficult—it would give Guatemala the opportunity to subvert Belize over time. Thus the Commonwealth Caribbean, meeting recently in Belize, decided on a multilateral security guarantee.

Price had discussed the idea of a multilateral security guarantee with the British who did not object to his pursuing it. He alleged that the U.K. had said it would agree to take part in the guarantee if a Spanish speaking country were included. Jamaica, Barbados, Guyana and Panama offered to share in the guarantee but he has not made Panama’s participation public. Price thus is counting on the British taking part in the security guarantee.

Price related that he had spoken twice in the previous ten days with Venezuela’s President Perez. In the first conversation Perez had tried to convince him on the necessity for land cession. Price explained to Perez the Belizean offer to Guatemala of a sea passage. Two years ago Price discussed the sea passage concept with Guatemalan Vice President-elect Villagran Kramer. When Price told Perez he planned to visit Canada to ask for its participation Perez said if Canada agreed it would be interesting. On that basis Price was hopeful if he got Canada’s cooperation Venezuela would also participate. Price told Perez that what happened to Belize and Guatemala would affect Venezuela and Guyana. The Secretary noted that Perez said he is ready to make a settlement with Guyana based on land cession. Price replied he had been surprised to hear of Venezuela’s position and had suggested to the Venezuelan Foreign Minister that he consider working on a solution similar to that Belize was proposing.

Price recounted he had visited Trinidad and Tobago but was not received by Dr. Williams. Trinidad and Tobago did not agree to participate in the security guarantee. Price related that he discussed with Guyana’s Burnham the possibility of using the U.N. umbrella as a way to include non-Carribean commonwealth of countries, such as Panama, in the guarantee. Price also said he had written to India about the guarantee.

Price had not yet worked out the details of the guarantee, but he envisioned about the same number troops as Britain now has in Belize to be supplied by Britain, Jamaica, Panama, maybe Venezuela and [Page 72] Canada. He expected Britain to be prepared to send in more troops if necessary. This arrangement would be encompassed in a separate treaty, which Guatemala would not like. With the treaty Belize could proceed to unilateral independence.

Ambassador Todman pointed out that Guatemala was very firm that in case of unilateral independence it would take military action. Any solution without the participation of Guatemala would be precarious. The Secretary said a negotiated settlement is certainly preferable. Price replied that they had been trying to reach a negotiated settlement since 1962 without success.

Ambassador Todman described the political situation in Guatemala as more difficult for negotiations. President-elect Lucas is more inflexible than President Laugerud and the right made a strong showing in the election.2 However, Vice President-elect, Villagran Kramer, is more liberal and is in search of a solution to the Belize dispute. He has said the new administration would be willing to accept a solution which includes a slice of territory.

Price responded that there would still be an impasse and that is why the Caribbean Commonwealth wanted a multinational security guarantee. Price asked for U.S. support for the multilateral security guarantee.

The Secretary made no comment with reference to the guarantee and said he would be discussing Belize with the Venezuelans and British.

Price asked if he could come back and talk to the Secretary. The Secretary replied he could come any time.

  1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor Files, Country Files, Box 2, Belize: 2/77–10/80. Confidential; Exdis. Drafted by Pfeifle; cleared by Todman; approved by Anderson (S/S) on April 14. The meeting took place in the Secretary’s office.
  2. Guatemala held Presidential elections on March 5, 1978. In telegram 1559 from Guatemala City, March 14, the Embassy reported that the Guatemalan Congress had confirmed Lucas as the next President following review of the disputed election tallies. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780114–0108) In telegram 1913 from Guatemala City, March 31, the Embassy concluded that “substantial fraud marred” Lucas’s election “but probably less than was the case in President Laugerud’s 1974 victory.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780142–0024) Lucas’s inauguration took place on July 1, as reported in telegram 3877 from Guatemala City, July 3. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780274–0791)