466. Telegram From the Embassy in Costa Rica to the Department of State1
2098. Department pass all American Republic diplomatic posts except San Jose. Subj: Conclusions of U.S. Chiefs of Mission in Central America.
1. (Secret-Entire text)
2. The following are the major conclusions of the Chiefs of Mission and Charges from Central America, Panama and Venezuela meeting May 17–18 in San Jose with Assistant Secretary Vaky and other Washington officials.
3. The northern tier of Central America is in crisis. Despite country differences, the region is gripped by a polarizing dynamic of violence, repression and radicalization. Pessimism is pervasive, and political uncertainty is unusually high.
4. Three trends in the subregion are particularly worrisome:
—Government leadership is generally mediocre;
—Institutions of all kinds—from public order and social services to press and political parties—are being undermined by socio-economic pressures, human rights violations and terrorism;
—Domestic deterioration and international uncertainties are expanding opportunities for anti-American activities and inviting external intervention.
5. We are part of the problem. Central Americans of all persuasions see us as uninformed, vacillating in our response to developments, and adding to the quicksand around them by withdrawing from the region.
6. The Central American crisis matters profoundly to U.S. security, self-image and values.
7. Our first priority must be to put our own house in order. Whatever policies emerge from the PRM process2 should:
—Reverse perceptions of U.S. withdrawal (positive local reactions to this COM meeting demonstrate this can be accomplished in many ways);
—Clarify our objectives (and make clear that no one, least of all Somoza, speaks for us);
[Page 1202]—Broaden our contacts, improving our understanding of left and right extremes as well as centrists and moderates.
8. Once we have reached agreement among ourselves (and this will require closer consultations with Congress), we should move to help address underlying components of the Central American crisis as identified para 4. Without prejudging the PRM process, we believe the long-term challenge centers on the forging of legal/institutional processes capable of expressing greater social and political pluralism in an orderly fashion. Elections, political parties, public administration, and military institutions must all be factored in, as must the regional integration movement and the cooperation of neighboring democracies.
9. The deepest social crisis is that of El Salvador, but the unsettled situation in Nicaragua is the chief political catalyst for regional turmoil. The longer the succession crisis festers in Nicaragua, the greater the breakdown of authority, the greater the spillover of violence, and the greater the likelihood that Cuba will be drawn into a situation beyond either our control or that of our democratic allies.
10. We are preparing regional and country strategies for the PRM that will address these issues, including consultations with Congress, leadership development, institutional linkages, resource needs, and the timing of specific initiatives in particular countries.
- Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790226–0916. Secret; Immediate.↩
- See Document 465.↩