Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XVI, Southern Africa

214. Telegram From the Department of State to Multiple Diplomatic Posts¹

Washington, September 28, 1978, 0219Z

246671. Subject: Rhodesia: Owen-Vance Discussions in New York.

Summary: Secretaries Vance and Owen met for nearly two hours in New York September 26 to review next steps in the Rhodesia negotiations. They were joined on UK side by Minister of State Ted Rowlands and UKUN Ambassador Richard and on US side by Ambassador Young, Under Secretary Newsom, Assistant Secretaries Moose and Maynes, Ambassador Low, and by miscellaneous others. Owen described the Callaghan-Kaunda meetings in Kano,² emphasizing Kaunda’s growing anxiety over the escalation of the Rhodesian conflict and the threat to Zambia’s security. The two Secretaries were able to resolve most of the major issues relating to our restatement of the AAP, including those sections dealing with the composition of the transition Governing Council, its relationship to the Resident Commissioner, the timetable for independence and security arrangements during the transition. They agreed on the urgency of convening an all parties meeting, at the latest by the end of October. At the end of the meeting, Owen suggested that in deciding how to handle the Smith visa request, the US might consider linking a Smith visit to the convening of an all parties meeting, perhaps in New York. End summary.

1. Kano meeting: Owen described the Callaghan-Kaunda talks in Kano as very positive. Discussion of UK’s “betrayal” of sanctions as revealed in Bingham report³ assumed minor proportions. Kaunda sought mainly to underscore his growing anxiety over Rhodesian situation. Both he and Nigerians fear time is approaching when PF will opt for military solution and forego further negotiations. Kaunda was aware of ZAPU plans for major Soviet-encouraged strike into Rhodesia, which he feared would provoke vigorous retaliation from Rhodesians and possibly South Africans. (In this connection both Owen and Secretary Vance noted recent unconfirmed reports indicating South African involvement in operations in Mozambique.) Kaunda worried that resulting escalation of the war could threaten Zambia’s security and generate strong pressures for turning to Soviets/Cubans for military help. Kaunda has no illusions about the risks of inviting the Soviets in, and he knows that Cuban Premier Castro described him to Prime Minister Trudeau as a “Western stooge.” Nevertheless this course might be forced on Kaunda in order to avoid a military humiliation by the Rhodesians. To avoid this chain of events, Kaunda urged that we move immediately to convene an all parties meeting. He also sought increased UK economic assistance to ease Zambia’s serious BOP and import problems, which Owen implied UK had agreed to provide. In summation, Owen described meeting as having placed Kaunda back on track with respect to our settlement initiative, at least for the next few weeks.

2. Revised Anglo-American Proposals: Discussion then turned to substance of the revised AAP which we intend to present to parties shortly as basis for convening an APM. Owen took the Secretary’s suggestion on the need to present a simplified document that would stress US/UK preference for one settlement formula. (As a result of working level meeting in Washington on Sunday, British had already prepared a redraft of their original paper along these lines.)⁴ Discussion then focused on specific issues.

3. Composition of Transition Council: Owen reviewed various attempts over the past several months to get agreement from the parties on a formula for representation on the Governing Council, all to no avail. March 3 agreement had changed the situation by adding Chirau to equation and polarizing internal vs. external parties. As a result, formula based on parity between Salisbury Group seemed most logical solution. Although the internals, Sithole and Muzorewa particularly, will certainly balk, the PF and Front Line would accept nothing less and in fact will continue to demand more. Secretary Vance agreed that parity formula is the only one that makes sense, but questioned whether this should be written into the revised AAP. Owen acknowledged that committing ourselves in writing to parity for ULA was a bold step, but that failure to state our position would be misleading and could complicate matters later. It was therefore agreed after considerable discussion, that parity formula would appear in the revised AAP.

4. Council Chairmanship: Secretary Vance stated strong US preference for retaining UK Resident Commissioner as effective Chairman of Governing Council, as envisioned in original AAP. This would clearly establish the impartiality of the transition process and assure smooth functioning of government in the event of a deadlock among the Council members. Owen noted that, in response to demands from all parties, the legislative and executive powers of the Governing Council have been greatly increased over what was proposed in the original AAP, with a corresponding diminution of the Resident Commissioner’s authority. Consequently, Owen argued, making RC Chairman of the Governing Council would embroil him in every controversy and encourage parties to behave irresponsibly. Thus he favored having a separate Council Chairman elected from among the Council members themselves, but he acknowledged that this could only work if there was agreement among the parties as to both the arrangement and the specific Chairman. Secretary Vance indicated that while he had no objection in principle to the idea of a separate Council Chairman elected by the parties, our proposals should make clear that in the absence of specific agreement among them to this arrangement, the RC would chair the Council. Owen agreed to this formulation.

5. Dominance during the transition: In noting our willingness in principle to accept the idea of a separate Council Chairman, Secretary Vance nevertheless took pointed exception to Owen’s having agreed with Kaunda that the PF should hold the position of Council Chairman. Our advocacy of position that gave the PF dominance during the transition could destroy our credibility with other parties as neutral mediators, as well as our public position of supporting an impartial settlement. Owen agreed that the questions of whether there should be a separate Council Chairman, and if so who, were best left to the parties themselves to decide.

6. Timetable for independence: Secretary Vance indicated his clear preference for a six-month transition period with elections prior to independence, as opposed to Owen’s option B formulation in which independence would be granted after a three month transition and a referendum, with elections deferred until sometime after independence. Owen explained that option B was designed to take account of the PF’s demand for a longer period leading up to elections. If the PF insisted on this position, HMG could not accept to exercise responsibility for an indefinite period of longer than six months, especially when the powers of the Resident Commissioner would be greatly diminished from those envisioned in the original AAP. The Secretary indicated his understanding for the British reluctance to be involved in a lengthy and indefinite transition but suggested that the solution lay in sticking to our original proposal of a fixed six-month transition period with elections before independence. Moreover, he favored vesting in the RC rather than the Council all the powers needed to administer the transition, including full control over the police. Our position on these issues should be clearly stated in the revised AAP. Owen agreed that option B should remain in the proposal only as an alternative in case the parties refused to accept a fixed transition period.

7. Other issues: After brief and inconclusive discussion of whether the Council should have the power to dismiss present justices on the high court, it was agreed to leave this issue for resolution at an all parties meeting. With respect to military arrangements, it was agreed that we would stand on Lord Carver’s proposals for the creation of a new army.⁵ The revised AAP would not explicitly state that the new army would be “based on the liberation forces,” which Owen and Ted Rowlands argued would only reignite the internals’ strong emotional reaction against this formulation and create another obstacle to convening an all-parties meeting. It would, however, include a reference to Owen’s statement on law and order of September 1, 1977, which states that position,⁶ and the annex outlining Carver’s plan would make this clear. In addition, our talking points for the PF and Front Line would make it clear that we have not withdrawn from our commitment to basing the new army on the Liberation Forces. On the organization of the police, the revised AAP would include a provision for police monitors, as agreed by Owen and Kaunda at Kano as a way to accommodate the PF’s demand for a greater role in this area. Because the internal Nationalists have become identified with the regime, the idea of three-men-in-a-Jeep (PF–UN-internal Nationalists) no longer made sense, and we should now think in terms of monitoring teams composed of two men (PF and UN) plus a police official who would serve as liaison. Otherwise, the Carver proposals for the police would stand, and the RC would retain full authority over the police at all times during the transition period.

8. All parties meeting: Taking into account the sense of urgency displayed by Kaunda at Kano, Secretaries Owen and Vance agreed that an all-parties meeting should be convened as quickly as possible, by the end of October at the latest. Once completed revision of the AAP is in the hands of the parties, the Front Line, Nigeria and South Africa, and after a brief period to obtain their reactions and comments, we would issue invitations for an all-parties meeting at a fixed time and place and meet with whichever parties attend to finalize our proposals. As agreed by the two Secretaries, we would shortly thereafter take the proposals to the UN Security Council for approval. There was insufficient time to complete the discussion of the timing and modalities for completing these steps, and the details were left to be worked out at the working level.

9. Smith visa: At the conclusion of the meeting Owen raised the subject of the Executive Council’s (EC) request to visit the US. While allowing that this is an issue for the US to decide, he volunteered the suggestion that we consider linking a possible visit by Smith and the EC with our plans to convene an all-parties meeting. He noted that convening the APM in the US, possibly in New York, would provide the incentive that has thus far been missing to get the EC to attend. At the same time, it would create an opportunity to further the negotiating process and might make it easier for the administration to justify a decision to allow Smith to visit. Secretary Vance took note of Owen’s suggestion but indicated he would have to give the matter further consideration. In the meantime he suggested we continue to look for alternative venues for an APM. In this connection, the possibility of Kano was considered briefly, but Mauritius emerged as the venue most likely to be acceptable to all parties.

Christopher

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Cables File, State Department Out, Box 113, 9/24–30/78. Confidential; Sensitive; Immediate; Nodis. Sent to Dar es Salaam, Lusaka, Lagos, Maputo, Gaborone, and Pretoria. Sent for information Immediate to London. Sent for information to the White House. Printed from a copy that was received in the White House Situation Room. Drafted by George Moose (AF/S); approved by Richard Moose. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840156–1377)
2. Callaghan and Kaunda met in Kano, Nigeria, September 22–23.
3. The Bingham Report, released September 19, exposed the violation of Rhodesian oil sanctions by British Petroleum and Shell, and disclosed that Harold Wilson was aware of the violations.
4. September 24. In telegram 250859 to multiple posts, October 3, Christopher transmitted the text of the revised Anglo-American Plan. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Cables File, State Department Out, Box 113, 10/1–16/78)
5. In telegram 2752 from Gaborone, November 6, 1977, Norland summarized the Rhodesia talks during the Carver/Chand visit to Salisbury. Carver proposed that the new Zimbabwe Army eliminate all-white units or subunits and “consist of six to eight battalions, three of the presently existing Rhodesian African Rifles, and three to five which were either from Liberation Forces or the citizenry at large.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840077–2275)
6. Owen’s statement, issued in Salisbury, reaffirmed that the Zimbabwe National Army would be “open to all citizens, but it will be based on the Liberation Forces.” (Keesing’s Contemporary Archives, 1977, p. 28648)