Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XVI, Southern Africa

220. Telegram From the Embassy in South Africa to the Department of State¹

Cape Town, February 19, 1979, 1930Z

310. Dept pass NSC for Brzezenski and Aaron. Subject: Rhodesia: Moose/Duff Discussions With Fourie.

1. C–Entire text.

2. Summary: Dick Moose and Tony Duff, accompanied by Ambassadors Edmondson and Scott, and George Moose, met for four hours February 19 with Brand Fourie and General Dutton to discuss situation in Rhodesia. Morning session was devoted almost entirely to respective assessments of military, economic and political situation in Rhodesia and surrounding areas. Afternoon session, in which Funk also participated, mainly devoted to presentation of US–UK views on what should and could be done now to avert worsening situation and to move toward internationally acceptable solution. While Fourie, and Dutton generally agreed with our assessment of present military and economic situation, Fourie in particular was inclined to give most optimistic interpretation possible to prospects for a solution emerging after April 20. Duff and Moose stressed frailty of assumptions on which Fourie tended to base his more optimistic assessment and dangers for all of us of simply leaving matters to chance. Fourie did not reject suggestion that the SAG should join with UK and US in attempting to influence and impose some kind of structure on developments in order to try to ensure an internationally acceptable resolution to the Rhodesia conflict. However, he indicated that SAG’s participation in effort to promote a settlement based on impartially administered and supervised elections was a major proposition that would have to be carefully considered at political level. He did not know how soon he could promise SAG’s considered response, but held open possibility of further discussions on Wednesday morning (February 21).² End summary.

3. As previously agreed, Duff took lead in morning session in outlining purpose of visit and our desire to reach, if possible, shared assessment of current situation in Rhodesia and surrounding states and common appreciation of where events are likely to lead over next several months. He noted that idea of discussions with SAG grew out of Owen-Vance talks in Washington and our shared concern over steady deterioration in Rhodesia and diminishing prospects for viable political solution. Moose underscored Duff’s statement that if it was possible to reach common appreciation of the situation and its likely consequences, our hope was then to reach agreement on what our three governments, working together, might do to alter the present course of events.

4. Duff proceeded to give joint UK/US assessment of current military situation, to which Fourie and Dutton took little exception. Fourie did question our perception of a growing Front Line (FL) receptivity to greater Soviet/Cuban assistance and involvement, implying that economic difficulties, food shortages were creating greater internal opposition to the war and to FL support for ZANU and ZAPU. We noted that one of the more alarming aspects of situation is that growing military and economic problems created by the war appear to be breaking down previous FL resistance to outside intervention. Fourie also questioned our view that Cubans, despite heavy commitments elsewhere in Africa, might become more involved on behalf of Mozambique and Zambia. In general, however, both Fourie and Dutton agreed that while collapse was not imminent, both military and economic indicators—and leaving political factors aside—suggested a steady deterioration.

5. Fourie was less prepared, however, to accept our assessment of gloomy political prospects facing Salisbury. While a month ago he would have accepted that the position of the internal black leaders was weakening, he now felt that their political standing had been enhanced by virtual certainty that Smith would no longer be a factor after March 12 (nomination day) and by the January 30 referendum’s overwhelming approval of majority rule. In this connection, he cited Muzorewa’s recent rally which turned out an estimated 150,000 supporters and Salisbury’s claims of increasing “feelers” from ZANU (Mugabe) since the referendum. Fourie also predicted that whites would cease to play a “confrontational” role in Rhodesia politics after April 20, and this too would enhance the position of the internal black leaders. He held out the possibility that Muzorewa might now be in a position to win an absolute majority in Parliament (51 seats) and that the overall turnout in the April elections might be higher than previously anticipated. He acknowledged that Smith’s predictions of immediate international recognition following the elections were unrealistic and were not believed by anyone. What Muzorewa and Sithole did see, however, was prospect for a gradual change internationally, wherein sympathy on the part of some states would eventually lead to recognition and broader support.

5. Fourie summarized by saying that he saw little, if anything, that could be done before April 20. The PF seemed in no mood to negotiate. After the elections, there would be a clearer picture of the extent of black support for the new black government, and to what extent PF guerrillas might defect. Thereafter, depending upon how the new black leader (presumably Muzorewa) viewed the situation, new negotiations between the internal and external parties might be possible. Fourie thought it likely that the attitude of either ZANU or ZAPU toward joining the internal settlement might change after April 20. Personally he felt it would be easier for Salisbury to negotiate separately with the two wings of the PF, and that it would be easier for Muzorewa to come to terms with ZANU than with ZAPU.

6. Moose and Duff countered by challenging the overly optimistic premises on which Fourie’s assessment seemed to be based. It was far from certain that Smith really intended to leave the scene, and his most recent public statements suggested that we [he] would not. There was no assurance that Muzorewa, if he won, would be prepared to negotiate with the PF, either together or separately, or that whites in the government would permit him the flexibility to do so. Nor could we conceive of either ZANU or ZAPU moving to join the internal settlement except on condition that power be transferred to them. The January 30 constitution³ was unacceptable as a basis for a deal with the PF and would severely cripple any chance the internal leaders might have of drawing broad black support. Rather than greater flexibility, the April elections are likely to produce a situation in which there is less flexibility for negotiations.

7. Moose and Duff concluded by stressing that while Fourie’s optimism might be borne out, there was a strong likelihood that it would not. The one certainty is that the war will continue. We must therefore weigh the costs of doing nothing in the interim and leaving everything to chance. In our view we could not afford to wait because there is likely to be even less flexibility in the positions of both sides in six months than there is now.

8. Without acknowledging that he accepted our line of reasoning, Fourie proceeded to ask what we, in light of our assessment, thought could be done in present circumstances. Duff and Moose suggested that this might be a convenient place to break and resume discussions in the afternoon.

9. When discussions resumed in the afternoon, Moose began by reiterating weakness of the premises on which Fourie seemed to base his optimistic assessment of prospects for post April 20 negotiations. In particular, he noted that Fourie’s assessment seemed to assume that the international context would remain static. It seemed to ignore the increasing scale of the fighting, the declining resistance of the FL to outside assistance and involvement, and the likelihood of increased pressures in the UN for measures against Rhodesia or possibly South Africa. In this light, SAG’s seeming equanimity about the situation, and the prospects for its own increasing involvement, however reluctant, was difficult to understand. Clearly the SAG has an interest in Rhodesia, which is not entirely consistent with Salisbury’s. Likewise, the Front Line has an interest in a solution that conflicts with that of the PF. It should therefore be possible to find a way to work together, as in Namibia, to find a solution that serves not only SAG’s interests but ours and the Front Line.

10. Fourie noted that our assessment of what was possible in present circumstances seemed unrealistic. The SAG’s position was based on the recognition that there was nothing that could be done now to bring the internal and external parties together. Therefore the best thing to do was to allow for the emergence of a new situation after April 20. Duff and Moose pointed out that since SAG seemed to accept the necessity for further negotiations, would it not be better to begin now to set up those negotiations.

11. Fourie did not disagree with our suggestion that impartial elections seemed to offer the “best” basis for a solution. But he argued that our previous efforts to achieve solution through the AAP had floundered because Salisbury could not accept the arrangements under which the elections would be held. In particular they could not accept that the new Zimbabwe would be based on the liberation forces. He noted that the issues relating to the transition arrangements would have to be dealt with if both sides were to agree to impartially administered elections. There would have to be a ceasefire. There was the question of who would maintain law and order, since he doubted that the UN could or would accept that responsibility. The Namibia example was not encouraging, since a final agreement there had still not been reached. Moreover, Rhodesia was even more difficult.

12. Duff and Moose acknowledged that a solution would not be easy. Many aspects of the AAP might still be relevant. It was unfortunate that the parties had not given AAP elements, such as Lord Carver’s proposals,⁴ the consideration they deserved. Our hope now was to begin a new and hopefully simplified process of negotiations beginning with the acceptance by both sides of impartial, internationally supervised elections. If this is accepted, then there would be a basis for further discussions.

13. Fourie asked whether we saw this process beginning before the April elections and indicated that he saw little prospect that Muzorewa or Sithole would come out publicly in favor of UN supervised elections at this stage. Duff replied that ideally we would like the Salisbury parties to set aside the April 20 elections in favor of UN supervised elections. In any event, we would like Salisbury’s acceptance at some point that there must be UN-supervised elections, without specifying when. For our own purposes, we will take the view that the April 20 elections are irrelevant to the process of achieving an internationally acceptable settlement. What we should focus on is what is necessary to have UN-supervised elections.

14. Duff asked Fourie whether he thought SAG would be prepared to work with us, and with the Front Line, to gain the acceptance by Salisbury and the PF of UN-supervised elections. Fourie said he could not reply on behalf of his government. SAG’s decision to become involved would be a major one and would have to be carefully considered at the political level. Duff acknowledged that at some point the discussions might have to be carried on by our respective Ministers. Fourie did not know how soon we might expect a definitive response, but promised that it would be a matter of days rather than weeks. Duff and Moose expressed our hope that SAG would take our ideas in the full seriousness with which they were presented and offered to remain in Cape Town through Wednesday morning if Fourie saw any utility in a further meeting. Fourie replied that the SAG has always highly prized the goal of an internationally acceptable settlement in Rhodesia and would give our ideas serious consideration. He agreed that it would be useful to keep open the possibility of a final meeting on Wednesday morning.

15. Comment: While the SAG appears to share our general assessment of the military situation, Fourie, at least, clearly believes there will be time for a future round of political negotiations on the part of a new black government with some or all of the external Nationalists. If the SAG has a clear idea of how this would work, Fourie did not reveal it. Based on what he said, the SAG’s current objectives seem to be the departure of Smith and the installation of a black government. Fourie was extremely reluctant to consider embarking on a process in Rhodesia which would present even more of the sort of difficulties which currently plague the Namibia negotiations.

16. In recent weeks, Fourie has seemed not to be in close touch with Pik Botha. The latter is doubtless preoccupied with Namibia (primarily in sounding off to the press) and, with the opening of Parliament, domestic politics, including the still bubbling “Infogate” scandal. Fourie at least gave us a thorough hearing, the results of which he and General Dutton will undoubtedly pass up the line to their superiors.

17. Unfortunately for us, a Cabinet meeting is scheduled tomorrow morning and a question period in Parliament during the afternoon. These commitments militate against Fourie’s being able to brief Pik Botha fully and Pik’s being able to consult the Prime Minister. Our Wednesday meeting may, therefore, be nothing more than a formality except that Fourie may seek some further clarifications from us.

18. If further inquiries by Fourie seem to open the way to a more detailed discussion, we may go into our concept of the basic principles for an internationally acceptable election. The Department will note that we did not do this today, nor did we put oil sanction proposition directly to Fourie or broach the possibility of a public statement on elections. Fourie’s manner was so guarded that we saw little point and some risk in pushing these matters further than we did. Our initial judgment is that, as we anticipated, it is going to be exceedingly difficult to get the SAG to take the large step we have in mind. Thus we decided not to risk scaring them off or seeming to be threatening.

19. We plan to talk with Duff tomorrow about how a possible Ministerial level meeting might be structured. Duff also plans to suggest a meeting with David Owen in London on Friday morning. We plan to leave Cape Town Wednesday noon by train for Johannesburg and take the overnight plane Thursday for London. If the SAG chooses to pursue further what we laid down today, we will revise our schedule. If, after receiving this message, Washington wants us to push further into our talking points, whether or not Fourie gives us a natural opening—we can do so Wednesday morning.⁵

Edmondson

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Cables File, Africa, Box 20, 1–2/79. Confidential; Sensitive; Immediate; Nodis. Printed from a copy that was received in the White House Situation Room.
2. See Document 221.
3. The new constitution, published on January 2 and approved in the House of Assembly on January 20, was submitted to the white electorate on January 30. (Keesing’s Contemporary Archives, 1979, p. 29578)
4. See Document 172.
5. In telegram 43215 to Cape Town, February 20, the Department provided further instructions for the second meeting with Fourie, which included reiterating U.S. concern about outside intervention by the Soviets and Cubans and emphasizing that the internal black leaders would be less inclined to negotiate with the Patriotic Front about a second round of elections and vice versa. The Department noted: “We believe there should be a clear statement at the closing session of what the US and UK are asking of South Africa and Salisbury: A public commitment to the principle of UN supervised elections, agreement to negotiations between the PF and Salisbury on that basis, and South Africa’s private commitment to seek Salisbury’s acceptance of the basic elements of a settlement that would underlie impartial elections.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Cables File, State Department Out, Box 115, 2/14–28/79)