279. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Tarnoff) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)1

SUBJECT

  • Sanders Associates of New Hampshire—Maritime Surveillance System Contract with South African Government

Pursuant to the request the Department received from the National Security Council,2 attached is a paper setting forth the position of the Department of State on this matter.

Peter Tarnoff

Attachment

Position Paper Prepared in the Department of State3

SUBJECT

  • Sanders Associates of New Hampshire—Maritime Surveillance System Contract with South African Government

Background

Sanders Associates, a New Hampshire firm, has a contract for study of the South African requirements for maritime surveillance equipment with the South African Government. The contract was arranged pursuant to a White House determination in December 19754 that the U.S. would agree to a request from South Africa for cooperation in ocean surveillance. This agreement was opposed by the Defense Department, the NSC staff and the State Department, but the White House overruled these objections. The White House also authorized the State Department Office of Munitions Control to view sympathetically, but on a case-by-case basis, eventual exports of reasonable amounts and kinds [Page 854] of ocean surveillance equipment, which the study might show to be required by the South Africans.

In April, 1977, following a review of the matter, Secretary Vance determined that export of this equipment would be incompatible with the Administration’s policy toward South Africa, as well as inconsistent with our long-standing arms embargo.

Department of State Position

The Department of State continues to believe that sale of this equipment to South Africa, which is in effect military cooperation with that country, contravenes our present policy towards South Africa, and would expose us to sharp criticism. The following points argue strongly against authorization of the sale:

—Sale of this equipment would make a mockery of what the Vice President said to Prime Minister Vorster about our commitment to a progressive transformation of South African society. To follow that declaration with such a significant break with our arms embargo policy would indicate to the South Africans that we are not serious about our policy and that we have accepted their arguments on the strategic importance of their country to us.

—Military cooperation with the South African Government would undercut the progress we have made in generating better understanding and acceptance of American goals among black African states and other Third World countries.

—United States Government approval for this sale, when it became public knowledge, would have sharp domestic repercussions, generating adverse reactions in the Congress, the press and the public at large, and causing confusion about our intentions in southern Africa.

—The value of any intelligence we might obtain from such an arrangement would be far outweighed by the damage the sale would do to our new approach to South Africa as well as to our relations with black African countries.

  1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Richardson, Chron File, Box 105, 6–7/77. Secret.
  2. See Document 277.
  3. Secret.
  4. See Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, vol. XXVIII, Southern Africa, Document 80.