Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XVI, Southern Africa

33. Memorandum From Jerry Funk of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)¹

Washington, March 23, 1979

SUBJECT

• Angola

Vibrations on Recognition

As you are aware from my report of conversation with Tsongas,² he and others of our friends on the Hill are agitating for Angolan recognition. (C)

There continues to be modest agitation within State/AF in favor of such a move. The arguments run along these lines:

—U.S. presence useful in encouraging continued Angolan cooperation on Namibia

—Angola has been cooperative on stabilizing the Zaire border, and Shaba

—Recognition will encourage Neto on his “opening to the West.”

—U.S. presence could help to counter Soviet/Cuban presence.

—U.S. commercial interests would benefit.

There is validity in all of this. The argument really comes down to the tactical issue joined in my talk with Senator Tsongas,—is the best way to get rid of the Cubans to demand that quid pro quo before recognition, or to recognize and then work on the problem from closer quarters? (C)

Today, David Morse (Mobutu’s new attorney, who just returned from seeing his client in Paris), tells me that Senator McGovern (last week) asked him (Morse) to ask Mobutu if he would like to see U.S. representation in Luanda. Morse tells me that Mobutu said yes, and would do all he could to facilitate it. (Morse will report this to McGovern today). (C)

The point is, I think we can expect pressures from the Hill to grow in favor of recognition.³ (C)

Immediate Problem

Angola has been making noises recently about several potential aircraft purchases,—including Bell helicopters, C–130’s, and 747’s,—all just talk to date. (C)

But Rockwell International has informed State that the Angolan Ministry of Defense wants to buy 12 Rockwell Turbo-Commander 690–B aircraft (executive propjets) at $900,000 a copy, for surveillance purposes. (C)

(Note: Past sales to Angolan Airlines include three 737’s from Boeing,—approved without condition,—and two 707’s from third countries. And we approved the sale of two L–100’s (C–130’s) to the Angolan cargo airline “for civil and commercial purposes”.) (C)

The issue now is whether to approve the sale of 12 Rockwell surveillance aircraft, and if so, under what conditions.⁴ (C)

The preliminary and informal indications I get from State are that they will probably recommend to the Secretary a “wait and see” policy, while they try to get a feel for the climate on the Hill. (C)

RECOMMENDATION

1. We should weigh in early as being opposed to the Rockwell sale, as it has direct military application.⁵ (C)

Against Sale ______

For Sale ______

Wait for more Hill reactions ______

Other ______

2. That we adopt an active line. That we are in favor of “a series of steps toward normalizing relations, but should not start with full recognition, as demanded by MPLA, and that we hope for some meaningful reduction of the Cuban potential for further African adventurism”.⁶ (C)

Yes ______

No ______

Other ______

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Funk, Subject File, Box 110, Angola: 6/77–7/79. Confidential. Sent for action. A handwritten notation on the memorandum reads: “DA comments p. 2.”
2. In a March 22 memorandum to Brzezinski, Funk reported on his March 21 meeting with Senator Tsongas, in which they discussed the disagreement between the administration and Congress over the recognition of Angola. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Funk, Chron File, Box 121, 3/13–31/79)
3. In the right-hand margin next to this sentence, David Aaron wrote: “Fine let them grow into a chorus.”
4. Aaron and Brzezinski both wrote “no” in the right-hand margin next to this sentence.
5. Brzezinski checked and initialed the option “Against Sale.” Aaron concurred and wrote “my view” in the left-hand margin next to the option.
6. The “yes” option was checked, presumably by Aaron who highlighted the option and wrote “That has been our policy all along if by Cuban potential you mean Cuban troop levels. DA” below it.