353. Telegram From the Department of State to the White House and the Consulate in Cape Town1
24514. Subject: US-South African Nuclear Relations. Ref: Cape Town 98.2
1. (S-Entire text)
[Page 1075]2. You did an excellent job in reaching Fourie so quickly and in striking the right note in your discussion with him. Your summation of the feeling in Washington, that the time has come to fish or cut bait, was right on the mark. The SAG should understand that we expect it to take a political decision now on the settlement package, which would include agreement to conduct a safeguards development program at Valindaba. We would not see any purpose to further technical exchanges on the specific elements of that program until the political decision is taken. In the event of a positive decision by the SAG, of course, we would be fully prepared to work with it to develop a mutually acceptable safeguards development program that would lead to effective safeguards while protecting South Africa’s proprietary enrichment technology.
3. To elaborate on this point, we note Fourie’s understanding that agreement on a safeguards development program at Valindaba is a prerequisite for a settlement on the lines of the Joint Minute.3 Clearly, a safeguards development program is an integral part of the settlement described in the Joint Minute, and thus agreement to begin such a program is a prerequisite for the settlement. We would not accept, however, that detailed agreement on how to conduct the safeguards program is a prerequiste for entering the settlement. Indeed, as Fourie and Roux should be aware from previous discussion on this subject, detailed elaboration of the safeguards development program is technically infeasible until the SAG provides basic safeguards-related operating data on Valindaba. We presume the SAG would not be prepared to provide such data, an act it repeatedly has characterized as politically sensitive, until it has decided to enter the settlement set forth in the Joint Minute.
4. We assume Fourie will get back to you after checking on the status of the dialogue on safeguards (para 4 reftel). Although as indicated above we intend to avoid more technical talks until we have obtained the SAG’s political decision, it is our understanding that the ball is in fact in their court on this one. In our exchanges with the SAG leading to the November visit of legal experts to Washington, we indicated we would be prepared to discuss with SAG experts all the issues raised in the September 22 response,4 including our approach to safeguarding the US enrichment plant. The SAG did not accept that offer, on the ground that the team it proposed to send did not include appropriate expertise. The SAG has not since, until your conversation with Fourie, expressed interest in holding such discussions. We remain [Page 1076] prepared to discuss with the SAG at an appropriate time how we are approaching the question of peripheral safeguards on the US plant. However, in view of the limited relevance of safeguards as designed specifically for the US plant to those which must be designed specifically for the Valindaba plant (beyond the common element of a peripheral approach), we believe it would make more sense, once there is a political basis, to move directly to discussion of Valindaba safeguards. In the course of this discussion we could describe as necessary for illustrative purposes how we propose to safeguard the US plant.
- Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Cables File, State Department Out, Box 115, 1/25–31/79. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Sent Priority to Cape Town. Drafted by Lock; cleared by Keeley, Ambassador Smith, Van Doren, Kahan (PM), Guhin (OES/NET), and MacFarlane (AF/S); approved by Pickering. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840142–2045)↩
- See Document 352.↩
- See footnote 2, Document 343.↩
- See Document 348.↩