365. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in South Africa1

279478. For Ambassador from Secretary. Subject: South Africa Nuclear Program. Ref: State 278942.2

1. Secret-Entire text.

2. In light of the development reftel, we have reviewed the situation and believe that we should move immediately to discuss this matter at the highest level of the South African Government, the discussion should take place between you and the Prime Minister privately. [Page 1092] Following that discussion we will have to determine not only how we should proceed with the nuclear dialogue, but also with respect to expected actions in New York.

3. You should therefore seek earliest appointment with the Prime Minister and draw on the following points:

—A) I have been instructed by my government to see you privately to discuss the nuclear question.

—B) I want you to have a copy of the statement which the US Government has made concerning signals recorded on September 22. Since that time we have subjected this data to an intensive technical review and this review supports the conclusion that a nuclear explosion probably did occur.

—C) You will notice that our public statement on the subject has indicated clearly that ambiguities exist with respect to this signal and that we have carefully avoided pinpointing any country as being potentially responsible for the event if it did occur.

—D) The international community will certainly view this development with great concern, and in the absence of a commitment by South Africa to adhere to the NPT safeguards on all its nuclear activities, the pressure for drastic steps will grow and may become overwhelming.

—E) My government would like to have your comments on this latest development and a reaffirmation on the nuclear policy position taken by the former government and reiterated by the former Prime Minister in his October 1977 letter to President Carter.3 We would like to have your confirmation of our understanding that “South Africa has not developed, nor does it intend to develop, a nuclear explosive device for any purpose, peaceful or otherwise, and that South Africa would not undertake any nuclear explosive testing of any kind.” (You should hand the Prime Minister a piece of paper with the above statement of our current understanding of South African policy written on it.)

4. You will understand the desirability of an early meeting with Botha and the importance of a clear reply including continued confirmation of what South African policy actually is in this regard.

5. We note that you will be seeing Pik today and considered the possibility of your taking this matter up with him. While it is probably inevitable that the subject will come up during the meeting with Pik, we believe it best for you to deal directly and personally with the Prime Minister on instructions in paras 3 and 4.

Vance
  1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Cables File, State Department Out, Box 118, 10/21–31/79. Secret; Sensitive; Cherokee; Immediate; Nodis. Printed from a copy that was received in the White House Situation Room. Drafted by Pickering (OES); cleared by Moose, and Gerard Smith; approved by Christopher. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840175–2286)
  2. In telegram 278942 to all diplomatic posts, October 26, the Department noted: “US news sources reported evening October 25 that US has evidence of low-yield test over a month ago of nuclear device in region that points to South Africa. Press sources indicate no confirming information has been obtained. US Government officials have called evidence ambiguous.” The telegram also transmitted the text of the October 25 Department statement on the matter, which reads: “The U.S. Government has an indication suggesting the possibility that a low-yield nuclear explosion occurred on September 22 in an area of the Indian Ocean and South Atlantic including portions of the Antarctic continent and the southern part of Africa. No corroborating evidence has been received to date. We are continuing to assess whether such an event took place.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790490–0457)
  3. See Document 311.