7. Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence Turner to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)1
SUBJECT
- Propaganda Exploitation of Soviet and Cuban Involvement in Angola
REFERENCE
- Your memorandum dated 27 June 1977,2 Subject: Cubans in Angola
1. This memorandum is in reply to your request in the referent memorandum to provide a report on our propaganda capabilities to exploit developments stemming from Cuban and Soviet involvement in Angola in response to the President’s expressed interest in this subject. Along general lines, we believe that the Agency can explore the possibility of influencing the propaganda content of certain foreign radio broadcasts to Angola; conduct related propaganda and political influence operations elsewhere in Africa; and use its international covert action infrastructure for propaganda outside of Africa, particularly in West Europe and Latin America.
[Page 14]2. In the field of radio broadcasts beamed to Angola, we could attempt to interest the [less than 1 line not declassified] in augmenting [less than 1 line not declassified] radio programs beamed to Angola and other African audiences with information from Agency and [less than 1 line not declassified]. Similar efforts could be attempted with other countries which are concerned over Cuban/Soviet involvement in Angola and Ethiopia. A number of countries come to mind in this regard including [less than 1 line not declassified], Zaire, Zambia, [less than 1 line not declassified].
3. Elsewhere in Africa we could undertake to make the Cuban/Soviet role in Angola known through a variety of means, including:
a. Providing intelligence briefs and analyses to African heads of state, key government officials and cooperative intelligence services.
b. Providing similar briefings to unilateral African agents of influence and other influential contacts in governments and political parties.
c. Providing guidance and tailored propaganda materials to agent assets with access to newspaper and other media outlets.
4. In other regions of the world, we would direct our media agents to increase their coverage of Angolan developments and, particularly in West Europe, we would concentrate our efforts on surfacing Angolan materials in reputable outlets for replay to African audiences.
5. In Latin America, we believe that the Cuban internal audience and leadership represents a secondary target for propaganda stressing the “quagmire” effect of Cuban involvement in Angola. In this regard there is still a considerable euphoria in Cuba over the Cuban success in Angola and the increased Third World prestige which the Cubans perceive they derive from this venture. [1 line not declassified] Elsewhere in Latin America we have a modest capability to conduct propaganda operations on this issue.
6. With regard to the foregoing proposals, you should be aware that the Agency, because of the so-called Tunney/Javits amendment, may face legislative restraints on the type of covert action that can be undertaken in regard to Angola. The problem here is that the language of this amendment, the purpose of which was to cut off the use of appropriated funds for our paramilitary operations in Angola, is sufficiently ambiguous as to raise questions on whether or not the Agency can conduct any covert action in regard to Angola. With this problem in mind, we are initiating contact with Senator Javits and others to seek clarification on the intent of the Congress in this regard. We will keep you informed on the outcome of this effort.
7. Finally, since your request involves options for overt as well as covert action, it is suggested that you may wish to refer this matter to the Special Coordination Committee Special Activities Working Group for further discussion and to firm up recommendations for action.
- Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Box 2, Angola: 1977–1978. Secret.↩
- See Document 4.↩