Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XIX, South Asia

285. Telegram From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State¹

Islamabad, June 7, 1978, 0920Z

5573. For Asst Secy Saunders from Hummel. Subject: Growing Need for Early French Notification to Pakistan on Reprocessing Plant.

1. We are much concerned here about evidence we are now seeing: (a) that Pak reaction to Agha Shahi’s two talks with Secy Vance² is generally negative and discouraged; (b) that plans are well along for Ghulam Ishaq (SecGen in chief and most senior civil servant) to visit Moscow for discussions of increased Pak-Soviet cooperation; and (c) that Agha Shahi will probably follow on with another visit at the invitation of Gromyko.

2. I draw the tentative conclusion that the GOP is seriously planning a warming-up of Pak-USSR relations as a means of postponing, countering, or diminishing the Afghan pressures that they expect. We have said before, and still believe, that any such warmth will be limited by the attitudes of Pakistan’s close friends the PRC, Iran, and the Saudis, as well as by deeply-held suspicions of Sovs among most Pakistanis (septel).³ Nevertheless, it would be unfortunate if the Paks begin these moves as a result of wrong assumptions about future US support and cooperation, and take some steps that might further inhibit our ability to be helpful.

3. I would hope that this vexing situation could quickly be exposed to the French, therefore, as a means of speeding up their notification to the Paks of the cancellation of the reprocessing contract, thus freeing us to offer the Paks the kind of US assistance that might change their minds about approaching the Soviets.⁴ Although I can’t pretend to any insights into the French scene, I wonder if the French bureaucracy might be tempted to try negotiating with us specific assurances of cooperation in Pakistan before they notify the Pakistanis, thus delaying the exposure to the Paks of the full range of Pak options in the new, post-reprocessing era.⁵

Hummel

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840163–1771. Secret; Priority; Nodis.
2. For Vance’s May 25 meeting with Shahi, see Document 281. Telegram 141229 to Islamabad, June 3, reported that at a June 2 meeting, Vance informed Shahi that Newsom planned to visit Islamabad in July. According to Vance, the purpose of the visit was to see what the United States could do in the region in response to events in Afghanistan. Vance also addressed the nuclear issue and informed Shahi that there would be benefits in the form of military and non-military aid if Pakistan stopped its efforts to acquire nuclear reprocessing technology. Shahi responded that he would consult with his government. (Department of State, Under Secretary for Political Affairs, David D. Newsom Subject Files, Lot 81D154, Box 3, Iran, India, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, July 1978)
3. In telegram 5631 from Islamabad, June 8, the Embassy offered an analysis of possible Pakistani policy initiatives toward the Soviet Union. The Embassy reported that Pakistani moves to court the Soviet Union “may now be seen by some Pakistanis as their most effective lever in extracting greater support from the West; by others it is seen as their only real defense against the use of Soviet power and the activities of Soviet surrogates; and by still others is seen to be useful for both purposes.” (National Archives, RG 59. Central Foreign Policy File, D780247–0070)
4. In telegram 146509 to Islamabad, June 9, Saunders responded to Hummel’s report: “I completely agree that the sooner the Paks are informed of the French decision the less chance there is of substantial damage to US/Pak relations. We are giving urgent consideration to this question and will keep you fully informed as we move ahead.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840128–2162)
5. In a June 7 memorandum to Brzezinski, the Global Issues division of the National Security Council Staff reported: “In a truly breathtaking display of chutzpah the French have come back to us with a statement that they will finally cancel the Pakistani reprocessing plant if we will provide $250 million in credit for the Paks to buy French Mirages. Besides being totally unacceptable, this would be illegal. My view is that they probably will stick with the decision to cancel and are just trying to see what they can hook us for.” In the right-hand margin next to the mention of the French statement, Brzezinski drew a diagonal line, beside which he wrote “no.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Global Issues, Oplinger/Bloomfield Subject File, Box 36, Evening Reports: 4–6/78)