227. Memorandum of Conversation1
Vice President’s Meeting with President Ceausescu from Romania, Wednesday, May 7, 1980, Belgrade, Yugoslavia
Vice President: Mr. President, the loss of Tito is a great blow for Yugoslavia. It is our hope that Yugoslavia will continue to be a strong and independent nation.
President Ceausescu: Every action taken by Tito is lasting and durable. We believe the same policies will be further developed in the future.
Vice President: That is our hope. I met with President Kolisevski this afternoon,2 and I reaffirmed U.S. support and renewed the President’s pledge to work with Yugoslavia.
President Ceausescu: We do not consider there is any particular problem with either Yugoslav policy or security. We really believe the Yugoslav leaders will continue to promote the same policies developed by Tito.
[Page 722]But, in international life today there are many complicated issues. I see a serious deterioration of the international situation at present. What should be done to stop this course toward tension and strain and to search, instead, to solutions?
Vice President: Mr. President, when we came into office, I doubt that any Administration was more interested in detente than our own. We worked on SALT, MBFR, CTB, and liberalization of trade with the USSR. But it has proven difficult to maintain this policy. With the invasion of Afghanistan, attitudes in our country were poisoned. If we were to bring the SALT II treaty to a vote now it would be defeated.
I cite Afghanistan as the central problem in the world today. But, your point is valid. We have to seek a more stable, secure world. The independence your government has shown is important. The President appreciates your advice. He asked that I meet with you and convey his appreciation for the independence you have shown as a responsible actor on the international scene.
President Ceausescu: The fact is that many problems have accumulated in the world. If SALT II had been ratified last year, this might have influenced a number of events. Of course, events in Afghanistan have contributed to a worsening of the situation. Those events are only part of a longstanding process. I believe that in Afghanistan a political solution is necessary, not a course leading to further tension. A political solution pre-supposes a cessation of force, with no more outside forces and with withdrawal of Soviet troops. My view is that under present circumstances efforts should be made to have contacts and talks, first between the USA and the USSR. It is necessary to take care to observe the independence of all peoples and the renunciation of force. I believe that account should be taken of statements by the Soviet leadership that they are ready to withdraw forces if there is a cessation of activities by outside forces.
We have to prepare carefully for the European Security Meeting in Madrid this year. In my opinion we should do everything possible to overcome the present state of tension in the world. To be frank, I have the impression that the United States and the Soviet Union have engaged themselves in policies that further divide the two countries. And, it is not for me to emphasize the important role the US and USSR have in international life. It is also a fact that an increasing number of states have equality and independence. My main concern is that the current situation might get out of hand and reach a point where it would be difficult to step back.
Vice President: Afghanistan is important, and we are trying to get the Soviets to reconsider. They have used vague language on withdrawal, language similar to that they used in Czechoslovakia 12 years ago. One searches in vain for a single justification of the Soviet invasion. As [Page 723] a result the tension is regrettably there. I will report your views to President Carter.
President Ceausescu: Please convey my greetings and best wishes to President Carter.
I understand the present problems are complex and complicated. Under the circumstances, the USSR can’t use Afghanistan for a broader objective. I don’t wish to offer any guarantee on behalf of the USSR (laughter). However, I have discussed this with Gromyko, and he says the USSR should be believed that it has no other intentions.
Vice President: I don’t believe it.
President Ceausescu: It must be proven by the facts. There must be respect for the independence of Afghanistan. If Afghanistan’s neighbors could be counseled, it would be helpful to arrive at an understanding.
Vice President: If I understand you, you are saying the Soviets should get out, others should get out and leave it to the Afghans.
President Ceausescu: The Soviets do declare they are ready to withdraw under such conditions.
Vice President: They use weasel words. They want a government compliant to Soviet wishes if the USSR is to withdraw.
President Ceausescu: Since 1921, the Soviets have had influence and have had a military mission in Afghanistan. We want to work to find solutions.
Vice President: We do not support the idea of a government hostile to the USSR, but it has to be a government that does not have an occupying Soviet army.
President Ceausescu: The situation is a little bit more complicated. Without Iran we would not have had Afghanistan. We have a situation where certain forces, religious forces are moving around, taking strength in the feudal country of Afghanistan. The entry of Soviet troops was a result of this Islamic movement supported by outside forces. Another reason for the troop entry was the potential danger for a similar movement in one of the Soviet republics adjoining Afghanistan. This is why all outside support should cease.
Vice President: I appreciate having your views, Mr. President.
- Source: Carter Library, Donated Material, Papers of Walter F. Mondale, Box 35, Vice President’s Trip to Yugoslavia for Tito Funeral, 5/5/80–5/8/80: Background—Bilateral Meetings. Secret; Nodis. Following Tito’s death on May 4, Mondale traveled to Belgrade to attend the funeral as Carter’s representative. Clift forwarded the memorandum to Dodson on May 13 for further distribution.↩
- See Document 290.↩