253. Editorial Note
At 10:30 a.m. on March 7, 1978, President Jimmy Carter welcomed Yugoslav President Josip Broz Tito to the White House with an arrival ceremony on the South Grounds. In his welcoming remarks, Carter called Tito “a remarkable man,” someone “who has understood for a long time our own Nation’s commitment to détente and the true significance of this misunderstood word.” Carter also underlined that “the independence and the territorial integrity of Yugoslavia is one of the basic foundations of world peace now and in the future.” In his remarks, Tito stressed the “continuing, successful, and comprehensive development of relations” between the two countries in “the already established principles of independence, sovereignty, mutual respect, and understanding.” (Public Papers: Carter, 1978, Book I, pages 473–475)
Following the welcoming ceremony, Carter and Tito, as well as the Yugoslav and U.S. delegations, met in the Cabinet Room for the first scheduled meeting between the two Presidents. No record of the conversation has been found. The Department summarized the visit in telegram 67384 to Belgrade, March 16. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780116–1326) The Yugoslav side prepared a transcript of the conversation which was found in the Archives of [Page 826] Yugoslavia, Belgrade, Serbia. A copy of the original document and an English translation are available at the Woodrow Wilson Center’s Cold War International History Project (CWIHP), from which the excerpts provided below were drawn.
The first of two conversations between the two leaders started in the Cabinet Room at the White House at 11:15 a.m. and lasted until 12:40 p.m. and included several U.S. and Yugoslav officials. (Carter Library, Presidential Materials, President’s Daily Diary)
The conversation between the two Presidents focused on international affairs, specifically, the situation in the Horn of Africa, the Middle East, and North Korea. Tito told President Carter: “Just prior to my arrival with the delegation to the U.S., I received messages from some heads of states in which they express their positions, and are asking me to convey them to you.” Tito continued: “I have accepted the invitation to visit the U.S. with great pleasure because I wanted an exchange of opinions about the current international situation as well as convey my impressions about some countries that I visited.”
President Carter began by summarizing the administration’s position on the crisis in the Horn of Africa and calling for Somali troops to withdraw from the Ogaden as well as stressing that Ethiopian, Cuban, or Soviet troops should not cross the border into Somalia. Carter told Tito: “Our country is refraining from sending arms, be it to one or another party. When the conflict ends, when the border is back to its original place, Soviet and Cuban troops should be withdrawn from that territory.”
On the basis of his extensive relationship with Ethiopian Emperor Haile Selassie and with Somali President Siad Barre, Tito described his understanding of how the situation reached a flash point. The revolutionary Government in Ethiopia “visited Yugoslavia three times,” Tito explained, and discussed the situation in Ethiopia with the Yugoslav leadership. “We advised them to go for an autonomous federation,” Tito recounted, but “they replied that it was not yet time and that this would have to be resolved by military means.” Tito continued: “Similarly, Siad Barre was also in Yugoslavia and I spoke with him about the question of Ogaden. He also said that it would be good for it to be federation, i.e. autonomy, but that Ogaden should be part of Somalia.” Tito also stressed that it was Belgrade’s understanding that other African countries were opposed to Somalia’s invasion of Ethiopia, and feared that a Somali victory “would set a precedent and that the war would spread throughout Africa, because there isn’t a single country there that does not have some border issue.”
“We believe,” Tito concluded, “that it is necessary to resolve the question of Eritrea and Ogaden, but within Ethiopia—to create an autonomous region within a federation. But this would require the [Page 827] support of the United Nations and of the Great Powers—first and foremost the U.S.” Tito told Carter “I received your [January 31] letter about our actions in the Horn of Africa. [see footnote 8, Document 251] I think that what you have asked is entirely correct, albeit not to be mediators but to continue further with our activity to contribute to a peaceful resolution of the issue there as soon as possible. We have already decided earlier that our Minister of Foreign Affairs, after our return from the U.S., will go to Ethiopia and Somalia.” Tito promised to inform the administration of the results of the Yugoslav diplomatic mission to the two countries.
Carter stressed that the United States was “worried about the permanent or occasional presence of the Soviet and Cuban troops in that region” and that he hoped Soviet and Cuban forces would withdraw as soon as peace was established. Carter continued: “I hope that the Soviet and Cuban troops will agree that the UN and the Organization of African Unity should be included in the resolution of that conflict, because we don’t want that part of the world to be a battlefield between ourselves and the Soviet Union.” The two Presidents also discussed Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs David Aaron’s diplomatic Mission to Ethiopia. Tito promised to continue the dialogue on the issue of the Horn with Moscow, saying that “I believe that the Soviet Union should hear our opinion about this question.”
The two Presidents also discussed at length the situation in the Middle East. While noting that some progress had been made—such as Egyptian President’s Anwar al-Sadat’s November 20, 1977, visit to Israel—Carter suggested that important problems still needed to be resolved: “First: withdrawal from the occupied territories; second: securing the borders; third: the right [of Israel] to existence as a nation; fourth: the orientation toward a peaceful solution to all problems; fifth: the Palestinian question.” Carter told Tito that “we don’t think that a separate solution between Israel and Egypt [alone] could be a lasting solution; we want an all-encompassing solution to this problem.”
For his part, Tito suggested that he had not agreed with Sadat’s visit to Israel since Sadat “did not consult with other Arab states that are at war with Israel.” “Of course,” Tito continued, “he did not ask me either, but that is how he operates, that is his style. We have distanced ourselves from this approach; we have been silent. It is true that this act was very courageous, but also very risky, and what happened, happened because no one supported him.” Tito also stressed that, despite his disagreement with Sadat’s actions, he had given his support to the Egyptian leader, because of the need to find a solution to the crisis in the Middle East. Tito also informed Carter of the contents of a letter he received from President Sadat on the situation in the Middle East and that he was planning a response to the Egyptian leader upon his return from Washington.
[Page 828]Regarding the situation in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Tito informed the President that North Korean leader Kim Il-song had asked him to convey a message on his behalf. “There is nothing new in this message beyond what I had already conveyed to you,” Tito told Carter, referencing his September 22, 1977, letter. (See footnote 5, Document 243.) “The most important point is that they want to have a dialogue, but not in the presence of the South Korean President Park Chung-hee.” Kim Il-song had given his assurances, Tito informed Carter, that the North had no desire to “impose their system into South Korea.” “If there would be a meeting,” Tito continued, “not at the top level but at the level of delegations of both countries, they could discuss that question [of UN representation]. That way, it would be possible to discuss the situation in much more detail, and what needed to be done would become clearer. Of course, the U.S. should provide its delegation as the third party.” “That is good advice,” responded Carter, suggesting that Secretary of State Cyrus Vance and Foreign Minister Milos Minic could further analyze the proposal. “I will inform Kim Il-song about it,” Tito offered, “but I need to know if you agree with my proposal.” Carter answered: “It would definitely be better for us and for South Korea that our delegations meet at the lower level; later we shall see.”
According to the English translation available in the CWIHP, the meeting concluded at 12:35 p.m.