Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XXII, Southeast Asia and the Pacific

230. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, March 11, 1977, 6:15 p.m.

SUBJECT

• Call on the Secretary by the Australian Ambassador

PARTICIPANTS

• US

  • The Secretary
  • Richard Holbrooke, Assistant Secretary, EA
  • Christopher A. Squire, EA/ANP (Notetaker)

• AUSTRALIA

  • Alan Renouf, Ambassador

Saying that he regretted taking up the Secretary’s time, but that the matter was considered most urgent in Canberra, Ambassador Renouf handed the Secretary a “non-paper”² which read verbatim as follows:

“I have come to plead that the Secretary of State should try to resolve the question of the Prime Minister’s visit promptly. The matter may seem relatively unimportant but it is certainly not.

“We asked for agreement upon the dates as far back as 22 December 1976. We also asked for the dates 22 and 23 June which were, and which are still, so far ahead that they must be free. We also suggested that the Prime Minister would make himself free to make the visit at an earlier date to suit the President’s convenience. Despite constant reminders, even to the President himself, we are still no further advanced.

“In view of this, and in view of the fact that all that is involved is a talk and a function, it is becoming a matter of increasing worry to the Prime Minister that the United States cannot give its agreement.

“The Prime Minister appreciated the offer of a visit within the first week of June. Unfortunately, this is just about the only period he cannot come as he has been committed for some time to be in London during that week as the guest of the Queen, together with all other Commonwealth Prime Ministers.

“Mr. Peacock, it is true, is coming at the end of this month³ but to the Australian people there is nothing like a visit by the Prime Minister. In Canberra’s view the Peacock visit is a prelude to the visit by the Prime Minister, not a possible substitute.

“The Prime Minister regards himself, with good reason, as Prime Minister of a country whose relationship to the United States is one of the closest, if not the closest. Australia has under Liberal-Country Parties Governments, such as that Mr. Fraser leads, constantly stuck with the United States through thick and thin. Mr. Fraser is also the Prime Minister of a government which, upon assuming office, immediately set out to repair and repaired the damage done to that relationship by the previous Australian Labor Government.

“Australia has memories of being taken for granted by the United States (in part her own fault). The present Australian Government is keenly aware of this and is determined that it will not happen again. The Government has also some apprehensions that because of the Trilateral concept, Australia may be only on the periphery of United States’ interest. The delay in fixing the dates for the Prime Minister’s visit is giving rise to worries in these directions in Canberra. It would be as well to set such worries to rest promptly and before they increase further. Resolution of this matter has therefore become a serious and urgent matter.”

After having read it, the Secretary said that he would try to have the matter resolved over the weekend.⁴

The second matter, continued Renouf, concerned the Indian Ocean. Prime Minister Fraser was very interested in this subject, and frankly would have liked to know the matter would be raised with the Soviets, (as President Carter had stated explicitly in his news conference) in advance.⁵

The Secretary said he was sorry that prior consultation had not been possible. It was something frankly that the President had decided to raise at the last minute. The President’s proposal was along the lines of demilitarization of the Indian Ocean region. If the Soviets were really serious in their United Nations offer on the subject,⁶ this would be a means of finding out. The United States would like to hear what the Soviets really were talking about. If the Soviet offer appeared serious, the US would thereupon consult with all its affected allies before taking any further steps.

Ambassador Renouf noted that Australia had discussed demilitarizing the Indian Ocean with the Soviets some three years ago. The Soviets had said clearly that any demilitarization agreement must cover all installations in the Indian Ocean including the US defense-related installations in Australia.

The Secretary said that so far we just do not know what Soviet intentions were. The Soviets so often have taken the propaganda initiative away from the West in the past. This time we will show them we were open-minded, and call their bluff if it be bluff, or make them lay out their proposal in detail if they have a serious proposal. At least the propaganda initiative will not lay with the Soviets. We will not be dealing purely on the defensive. The President is positive on many of these types of initiatives, and is deeply serious on the disarmament question in general.

The Secretary in conclusion reiterated his earlier statement that he would try to get a resolution of the Fraser visit dates over the weekend.

1. Source: Department of State, Office of the Secretarial Staff, Records of Cyrus Vance, 1977–1980, Lot 84D241, Nodis Memcons, 1977. Confidential; Nodis. Drafted by Christopher A. Squire (EA/ANP) on March 14; approved by William Twaddell (S) on March 25. The meeting took place in the Secretary’s office.
2. Not found.
3. See Document 231.
4. March 12–13.
5. Reference is to Carter’s March 9 news conference. For his statement, see Public Papers: Carter, 1977, Book I, p. 348. Documentation on U.S. interest in the demilitarization of the Indian Ocean is in Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. XVIII, Middle East Region; Arabian Peninsula.
6. In a February 15 memorandum submitted to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, the Soviet Union expressed willingness to consult on the disarmament of the Indian Ocean. (Documents on Disarmament, 1977, pp. 62–63)