Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, Volume XXIII, Mexico, Cuba, and the Caribbean

110. Summary of Conclusions of a Special Coordination Committee Meeting¹

Washington, July 1, 1980 4:00–5:30 p.m.

SUBJECT

• Cuban Refugees

PARTICIPANTS

• State
• Secretary Edmund Muskie
• Deputy Secretary Warren Christopher
• John Bushnell, Ag. [Acting] Assistant Secretary for Bureau of Inter-American Affairs
• Ambassador Victor Palmieri, Special Coordinator for Refugees
• OSD
• Deputy Secretary W. Graham Claytor, Jr.
• Frank Kramer, Principal Director for ISA

• JCS

  • General David Jones
  • Lt General John Pustay, Assistant to the Chairman

• Coast Guard

  • Vice Admiral Robert Scarborough, Vice Commandant
  • Rear Admiral John Costello, Chief, Office of Operations

• Justice

  • Robert L. Keuch, Deputy Associate Attorney General

• DCI

  • Admiral Stansfield Turner
  • Jack Davis, NIO for Latin America

• OMB

  • John White, Assistant Director

• White House

  • Zbigniew Brzezinski
  • David Aaron
  • Lloyd Cutler
  • Gene Eidenberg

• NSC

  • Robert Pastor

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

(1) Status of Blue Fire. The Coast Guard claims that it has identified the Blue Fire, a stateless vessel, docked in Mariel, but the CIA has not confirmed this yet. CIA will alert us when they know for certain.² Since the boat could be loaded with 2,000 Cubans and on its way to the United States within 48 hours, we proceeded on the assumption that it is there and that there are other ships which could bring more Cubans to the U.S. illegally. (S)

(2) Objectives. Our objectives are to prevent any more boats from bringing Cubans to the U.S. illegally without unnecessarily endangering lives. The discussion focused on a range of options to achieve this objective. (S)

(3) Options. We explored the following options: (1) Step up current policy of trying to deter the flow through enforcement measures and trying to maximize international pressure on Castro to negotiate an orderly emigration program. (Comment: This has succeeded in reducing the flow, but boats are still coming, and there is a real possibility that over a period of time large numbers of additional Cubans will arrive.) (2) We could send these boats to third countries for re-settlement. (Comment: It is not clear that any third country would assume such a responsibility even if we were to agree to finance such an operation.) (3) We could station a U.S. vessel at 12 miles where we would process the Cubans, permitting some to go to the U.S., and excluding others. (Comment: It is not clear that we will have any more success in returning these excludables than any others—like the criminals—who we have asked Cuba to accept, but it is likely that our acceptance of some of these Cubans would be an additional incentive for other Cubans to leave.) (4) We should seek some way to stop the boats and force them to return to Cuba, first by private diplomatic means and then with some public display of force. The SCC pursued this option in greatest detail. (S)

(4) U.S. Policy. The SCC recommended the following steps:

(1) Secretary of State Muskie should send Vice President Carlos Rafael Rodriguez a strong note, which clearly, but in a non-threatening way, points out that we have reached the limit of our tolerance in permitting Cuba to send these vessels illegally to the United States.³ (S)

(2) We should position three or four U.S. naval vessels 12 miles from Mariel Harbor as a quiet demonstration that we are prepared to turn back vessels illegally bringing Cubans to the United States. (Because it may take as long as 48 hours for several of these vessels to reach that position, JCS has begun moving these vessels now.)⁴ (S)

(3) DOD will prepare a recommendation on whether we have the capability of intercepting boats going to Cuba with the possible intention of picking up Cubans for the voyage to the United States. State will look into the legalities of such an exercise. (S)

(4) DOD and the Coast Guard will prepare a plan on ways we could surreptitiously deposit the criminals and other undesirables, who have recently arrived from Cuba, somewhere in Cuba or on an island adjoining Cuba.⁵ (S)

(5) DOD and Coast Guard will examine a range of options on ways that illegal vessels can be stopped and returned to Cuba.⁶ (S)

(6) State will investigate the option of whether it would be desirable for us to process Cubans travelling on such vessels at sea.⁷ (S)

(7) Justice will pursue its investigations of anyone seeking to engage in the illegal trafficking of undocumented Cubans to the U.S.⁸ (S)

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor, Country File, Box 18, Cuba: Refugees, 7/1–5/80. Secret. The meeting was held in the White House Situation Room.
2. In telegram 174854 to Panama, July 2, the Department reported that the ship, known as the Kirk Dale/Blue Fire, had possible Panamanian registry, instead of British. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800318–1056)
3. In the left margin beside this paragraph, Carter wrote, “ok.” In telegram 174997 to Havana, July 2, the Department transmitted Muskie’s message to Rodriguez. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 15, Cuba, 7–8/80)
4. In the left margin beside this paragraph, Carter wrote, “ok.”
5. The CIA consulted with the Defense Department, and on July 11, prepared a report that discussed options for the clandestine return of the Mariel refugees. The report is attached to an August 7 note from Davis to Turner, in which Davis stressed that neither he nor Defense Department officials found the prospect of a clandestine return promising. (Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 81B00112R: Subject Files, Box 16, Folder 16: (SCC) Cuba)
6. Carter bracketed paragraphs (3), (4), and (5) and wrote in the left margin, “should have been done already. Expedite.”
7. In the left margin beside this paragraph, Carter wrote, “doubtful.”
8. In the left margin beside this paragraph, Carter wrote, “ok.” Below the paragraph, he wrote, “Prepare a public statement—have ready to issue when needed—J.” In telegram 5218 from Havana, July 4, the Interests Section reported that Rodriguez announced that the Kirk Dale/Blue Fire would not load refugees. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor, Country, Box 18, Cuba, Refugees, 7/1–5/80)