Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, Volume XXIII, Mexico, Cuba, and the Caribbean

112. Telegram From the U.S. Interests Section in Cuba to the Department of State¹

Havana, July 4, 1980, 0158Z

5217. Subj: Call on Rafael Rodriguez. Ref: (A) State 174997 (B) Havana 5213.²

1. S—Entire text.

2. I called on Vice President Carlos Rafael Rodriguez at 1:30 p.m. July 3 and delivered Secretary’s message (Ref A). After reading it carefully, Vice President said he appreciated message. There were some barbs in it, but tone and intent he took to be basically constructive. And it was almost always better to handle difficult matters through direct and private messages rather than through public statements. To my comment that this was admonition he should make to his own government rather than to us, he chuckled (in agreement?) and said it was to be hoped two governments could in future deal with their problems more on this basis than on that which had characterized their exchanges of past few months.

3. With respect to specific issue of stateless vessel which might be loading in Mariel, Vice President said he could not respond immediately; indeed, he not personally familiar with circumstances of case. What he could say to us in strict confidence was that Castro has made decision to do nothing which could be construed as deliberately provocative during months ahead. Mariel would remain open, at least technically, and Cubans reserved their options, but Castro had given instructions that additional departures not rpt not be handled in such a way as to place Carter administration in more difficult situation. I might have noticed in today’s Granma, he said, that “News from Mariel” column will no longer be carried on daily basis (Ref B). This is meant as signal that a phase has ended.

4. I commented that loading of large stateless vessel would definitely be construed in U.S. as provocative. Vice President responded that while he would have to consult with Castro before giving us specific reply, he could repeat that they intended to take no action which could be interpreted as provocative. He suggested we leave it at that for moment. He will consult with Castro and then get back to me.

5. On matter of refugees in USINT, he said he had informed Castro of our conversation of June 30.³ They were considering ideas therein raised and he was trying to push matter in direction of solution—at least partial solution for moment which hopefully would then lead to full one. He was not yet in position to give me definite response, however. “I have to let Fidel mull it over another few days,” he concluded, adding that he would be in touch with me soon on matter.

6. I informed Vice President that Radio Free Cuba idea was initiative of Senator Helms, not the administration. He expressed relief, noting “our relations are bad enough as it is without adding more complications. What we need is truce, not escalation.”

7. Comment: Carlos Rafael Rodriguez’ response, while not definitive, was encouraging. I left convinced he intended use his influence to turn off loading of Kirk Dale if it was still ongoing. He may not have been aware of today’s SR71 overflight,⁴ however, and even if he was, it may result in his being overruled. Cubans will doubtless be angered over flight which resulted in loud sonic boom almost knocking members USINT from their chairs and almost certainly resulting in material damage in Havana area. I fully appreciate and share concern over loading of Kirk Dale/Blue Fire but would it not have been advisable to hold off on overflight at least until we heard what Carlos Rafael Rodriguez had to say on subject? If any progress was made in meeting with him this afternoon it may well have been counteracted by this morning’s flight.

8. Action Recommended: I would strongly urge that US Naval vessels, which I understand are now deployed close in to Cuban coast, be withdrawn toward Key West. They have doubtless already been seen on Cuban radar. Point has been made. Our seriousness of purpose, if that was intent in sending them, has been stressed. To leave them where they are will be seen by Cubans as blatant threat and they more likely to react in ways which would undercut any possibility accomplishment our aims.⁵

Smith

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 15, Cuba, 7–8/80. Secret; Cherokee; Nodis. The White House Situation Room repeated this telegram as WH80817 to Oakland, California, for immediate delivery to Susan Clough, Carter’s personal secretary, for the President.
2. Telegram 174997 to Havana, July 2, transmitted Muskie’s message. See footnote 3, Document 110. In telegram 5213 from Havana, July 3, the Interests Section reported that Granma was no longer publishing its “News From Mariel” column, indicating that traffic at the port had dwindled. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800320–0501)
3. In telegram 5172 from Havana, June 30, Smith reported on his meeting with Rodriguez, noting that Cuban attitudes toward the refugee situation in the U.S. Interests Section were becoming more flexible, but Cuban officials were concerned about the prospects of Radio Free Cuba. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P870149–0426)
4. According to Smith’s memoirs, Rodriguez, at one point, told him that the SR–71 overflights “almost ruined everything,” because Cuban officials wished to allow the Kirk Dale/Blue Fire to load in retaliation. (Smith, The Closest of Enemies, p. 233)
5. Telegram WH80817 contains a typed note by Brezezinski that reads, “Reference paragraph 8, I am making sure with Secretary Brown that we are not too.” The note is cut off at the bottom of the page.