Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, Volume XXIII, Mexico, Cuba, and the Caribbean

120. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) and the Cabinet Secretary (Eidenberg) to President Carter¹

Washington, August 29, 1980

SUBJECT

• SCC Meeting—Cuban Refugees

The Special Coordination Committee met today to discuss the Intelligence report on a large ship in Mariel harbor which you indicated should be stopped from entering US waters—and several other topics related to the Cuban refugees. The results of that meeting were as follows:

1. Large Ship in Mariel Harbor. It appears that the Intelligence report on the large ship loading refugees in Mariel harbor was not very “fresh.” The Coast Guard reported at the SCC meeting that a large ship arrived yesterday in Key West with 298 Cubans on board—almost certainly the ship referred to in the report. This conclusion was supported [1½ lines not declassified]. You will recall that the Intelligence item estimated a capacity of 400 passengers for the ship—not inconsistent with the roughly 300 passengers on the ship that arrived yesterday. While the capacity of this ship was unusually large (the average has been about 60 passengers per boat), it is not unprecedented. You should also be aware that the daily arrival rate over the last few weeks has been two to three boats and about 180 passengers.

2. Interdiction of Southbound Boats. Based on a DOD options paper,² it is recommended that the Navy and Coast Guard be directed to supplement their forces in the area in order to increase the interdiction of southbound boats from the current level of about 50% to a level of 70–75%.³ The incremental cost, according to Graham Claytor, will be $75,000 a day. The specific Defense Department proposal is attached at Tab A.⁴

3. Interdiction of Northbound Boats. If you wish to interdict northbound boats loaded (usually overloaded) with refugees, this can be done either just outside Cuba’s claimed 12-mile limit or close to the US 3-mile limit. In either case, this will probably require the use of force and a possible loss of life for the passengers on the northbound boats. They also may simply jump into the sea in which case the Navy and Coast Guard have an international obligation to rescue them and bring them to the states. In this context, it should be noted that virtually all the passengers currently embarking from Mariel harbor are believed to be relatives of Cubans already in the US. An alternative to risking the lives of the refugees in the open sea would be to blockade Mariel harbor or otherwise threaten the Cubans with military action. This would involve penetration of Cuban waters and territory and almost certain conflict with Cuban armed forces. Thus, any decision to interdict northbound traffic involves the threat or use of force and possible loss of life as well as a major confrontation with the Cubans. You could decide to instruct DOD and the Coast Guard to deny entry to US waters to either all or large vessels. Assuming the Cubans would not permit these boats to return to Cuba, we would face the prospect of American-owned vessels loaded with Cuban nationals floating in the Florida straits with no available port of entry.

4. Negotiations. The State Department has developed some possible negotiating scenarios set forth at Tab B.⁵ They do not cover the possibility of a political message being delivered to Castro, but could, in fact, accompany such a message. Recent reports from Cuba indicate that the Cubans believe that they are not being provocative, but do not believe any genuine negotiations are possible until after our election. The State Department tends to favor Option 2 in the attached paper (Tab B), “Step-by-Step Talks with Minimal US Concessions.” Given the unproductive nature of the Tarnoff/Pastor conversations⁶ and the fact that the Cubans are after bigger game—lifting the embargo, achieving US withdrawal from Guantanamo, normalization of relations, etc.—it seems unlikely that this narrow approach would work. However, it is worth discussing with your principal advisers at the breakfast on Friday. In this connection, we will want to make sure that the level and type of representation of any diplomatic initiative does not give Castro the opportunity to embarrass us politically. Thus, you may wish to find a deniable way to probe his receptivity to productive negotiations.

5. Legislation. Justice and local enforcement officials have been ineffective in inhibiting the reuse of US boats to transport refugees from Cuba. Prosecution of boat owners has been at about 20%, due to the present need to demonstrate probable owner consent prior to prosecution. Justice will be making another effort to find some means of expediting prosecution of boat owners under existing laws. As previously reported to you, the Justice Department will be pressing for a review of the law that will permit seizures irrespective of owner consent or involvement. House action, however, is not expected until September 9 when Liz Holtzman, the designated Floor Manager of the legislation, will return to Washington. Justice, in concert with Frank Moore’s office, will be seeking an alternative Floor Manager in order to expedite this legislation.⁷

In addition to the continuing Cuban entries, we have been receiving approximately 50 Haitain refugees per day over the same period. The situation in south Florida is critical in terms of our ability to receive, process and settle these people. Presently we have 900 Cubans in a tent city in Miami; 1,000 Haitains in an unhealthy former Nike missile site in Dade County; and another 700 Cubans in a second former Nike missile site in Dade County.

We are developing urgent plans to deal with the situation which will involve relocating some of these people out of the south Florida area. Our relocation plans will be very sensitive to community attitudes.⁸

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor, Country, Box 18, Cuba, Refugees, 8/80. Secret. Sent for information. Carter initialed at the top of the page.
2. A copy of the paper is attached to the Summary of Conclusions in the National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P800128–1281.
3. In the margin to the left of the paragraph, Carter wrote, “do so.”
4. Not attached and not found.
5. Attached but not printed. On the attachment, Carter wrote at the top of the page, “Discussed at For. Aff. Breakfast—J.”
6. See Documents 41 and 108.
7. In the margin to the left of the paragraph, Carter wrote, “This is ridiculous! Find any ‛germane’ law & get it passed.”
8. Beneath this paragraph, Carter wrote: “Zbig—You & Lloyd [Cutler] compile a firm directive for me encompassing everything that we can do to minimize this illegal influx—Expedite—J. P.S. I called K.” Presumably a reference to Charles H. Kirbo, whom the President telephoned on August 29. (Carter Library, Presidential Materials, President’s Daily Diary)