36. Memorandum for the Record by the Under Secretary of Defense (Resor)1
SUBJECT
- Soviet Strike Aircraft in Cuba
I met with David Aaron, David Newsom, and Bob Bowie today to discuss Soviet strike aircraft in Cuba.
Aaron reviewed the terms of the Soviet commitment as evidenced first by the published records. He characterized the commitment in the words used by President Kennedy in his 20 November 1962 statement, namely that the Soviets had “agreed to remove from Cuba all weapon systems capable of offensive use (and) to halt the further introduction of such weapons into Cuba.”2
He then referred to an exchange with the Soviets which took place in 1970 in connection with the submarine base issue. As part of that exchange, the US referred to the Soviet commitment that “all offensive weapons be removed and kept out of the hemisphere in the future.” He said that the Soviets had responded that “they affirmed their strict adherence to the 1962 agreement.”3
Aaron then raised the issue of whether the MIG-23s were D or F models. The CIA did not have detailed information at the meeting.
[1 paragraph (8½ lines) not declassified]
Introduction of MIG–23D
Aaron then asked for views as to whether the introduction by the Soviets of nuclear capable MIG-23s into Cuba would violate the Soviet commitment. All present agreed that this would constitute a violation.
[Page 84]Introduction of Non-Nuclear Capable MIG–23
At my suggestion, the meeting addressed the issue of whether introduction of MIG-23Fs into Cuba would constitute a violation of the Soviet commitment if the aircraft had not been modified to be made nuclear capable.
State pointed out that the 1962 agreement had not required the removal of the MIG-19s. They went on to take the view that the MIG–23 represented an increased capability which might have been expected to be developed over the years since 1962 and that the agreement had not dealt with this case. Accordingly, in their view it was not covered by the agreement unless it was nuclear capable.
I pointed out that President Kennedy’s 23 October 1962 proclamation4 announcing the US’s intention to interdict delivery of offensive weapons to Cuba had specifically included in the prohibited material “bomber aircraft.” I noted that the MIG–23 ground attack aircraft was the first aircraft designed for ground attack to enter the Cuban air forces since 1962, that it had a range and payload comparable to the IL-28s and, accordingly, constituted aircraft with significant offensive capability. I gave Aaron a map showing the area which it could reach in the United States with its 615 mile radius.
I noted that President Kennedy’s 22 October 1962 television address,5 in addition to referring to offensive missile sites, had also stated that “jet bombers capable of carrying nuclear weapons” were being assembled in Cuba. However, I reported that General Smith’s recollection of the exchanges which led to the removal of IL-28s, reported in the 20 November 1962 Presidential announcement, had not focussed on the nuclear capability of the IL-28s but had treated them merely as bombers.
I indicated that DoD felt that the introduction of MIG–23 ground attack aircraft, regardless of whether they were nuclear capable, would probably violate the 1962 understanding since the aircraft had a significant offensive capability, comparable in range and payload to the IL-28s.
[1 paragraph (2 lines) not declassified]
Aaron did not try to develop a consensus as to whether only nuclear capable aircraft were proscribed by the 1962 understanding.
It was agreed that a decision should be made within the relatively near future.
- Source: Washington National Records Center, Files of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, and the Special Assistants to both, FRC 330–81–0202, Cuba. Secret; Sensitive. Brown initialed the memorandum indicating that he saw it. In a covering note to Brown, Resor wrote, “Attached is a memorandum for record of today’s meeting which was inconclusive.” Brown replied in the margin, “Stan: Good work.”↩
- See Foreign Relations, 1961–1963, vol. XI, Cuban Missile Crisis and Aftermath; Documents 95, 102, and 104. For President Kennedy’s statement, see Public Papers: Kennedy, 1962, pp. 830–831.↩
- In late 1970, the Nixon administration received assurances from the Soviet Government on the use of its submarine base at Cienfuegos. See Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, vol. E–10, Documents on American Republics 1969–1972, Documents 229 and 230.↩
- See Public Papers: Kennedy, 1962, pp. 809–811.↩
- See Public Papers: Kennedy, 1962, pp. 806–809.↩