51. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Jamaica1
146235. For Ambassador. Subject: Soviet-Cuban Intentions in Central America and the Caribbean. Ref: Kingston 3784.2
1. (S—Entire text.)
2. The Department prepared the following as a preliminary and partial response to inquiries from Kingston (reftel). It is transmitted to other posts since it may have broader utility. Policy analysis on the deeper issues raised in reftel is underway.3
3. Cuba’s approach in Central America and the Caribbean is two-pronged: a) to foster cooperation with “progressive” governments, and b) to maintain contacts with leftist revolutionaries in countries whose governments it regards as reactionary. Thus, Cuba has developed close [Page 112] ties with the Governments of Jamaica, Guyana, and Panama. At the same time, it has provided modest levels of assistance—training, asylum, propaganda support and some equipment and financing—to revolutionary groups in Nicaragua, El Salvador, Honduras, and Guatemala.
4. Until recently, primary Cuban emphasis seemed to be on developing political influence with the more progressive governments. It was more cautious in providing support to revolutionary groups, both because it was skeptical of their short-term chances of success and because of the reaction such assistance might have provoked from the U.S. and from Latin American governments it was trying to assure of its good intentions. Since the FSLN attacks of last fall and the recent coup in Grenada, however, Havana may well have revised upward its assessment of possible gains in the area and may now be willing to run greater risks. Cuban support for the FSLN in Nicaragua which has included some small arms and ammunition, had also been of modest proportions until recently but there are some indications that it has been increasing in scope over the past few weeks.
5. The coup in Grenada pointed up the vulnerabilities in the Eastern Caribbean.4 There is no evidence the Cubans specifically engineered it, but they at least had a previous relationship with the New Jewel Movement and may have had foreknowledge of the coup. They have long wanted an ally in the Eastern Caribbean and they moved quickly to exploit the Bishop government’s request for assistance. They would doubtless be ready to exploit any new opportunities. And given the serious social and economic problems faced by all the states of the area, and the political instability faced by most, the chances that such targets of opportunity could emerge are high.
6. Cuba’s tactical approach has been essentially opportunistic. As a result of the aforementioned reassessment, Cuban policy in the area may become more activist, but it is unlikely to become reckless or adventurist. Rather, Cuban strategies will continue to be geared to targets of opportunity, and the manner and degree to which they attempt to exploit any emerging opportunities will be circumscribed at least in part by their calculations as to how the U.S. is likely to react.
7. The Soviet approach to Central America and the Caribbean appears closely to parallel Cuba’s but the Soviets have greater concern over clashing with the U.S. in such an uncertain political environment. The Soviets probably share the perception that the “revolutionary potential” in the region has increased. However, at least in the period immediately following the U.S.-Soviet Summit, Moscow may be more [Page 113] sensitive than in the recent past to the potentially negative fall-out on U.S.-Soviet relations of Soviet support for Cuban opportunism in the area. This sensitivity, combined with Moscow’s desire not to risk disruption of state-to-state relations with key Latin American countries such as Venezuela and Mexico, suggest that the Soviets will, if anything, keep an even lower profile in the near future.
8. Within this general policy framework, Soviet-Cuban activities in Jamaica will depend very much on how far the Manley government will let them go. If the latter offers them opportunities, they will retreat. Likely U.S. reactions are also a factor in the equation, but the Soviets and Cubans are aware that so long as their activities are condoned by, or are conducted at the invitation of, the host government, the scope of possible U.S. responses is narrowed.
- Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor, Country, Box 13, Cuba, 6/79. Secret; Priority. Repeated for information to Havana, Bridgetown, Curacao, Georgetown, Nassau, Martinique, Paramaribo, Port au Prince, Port of Spain, Santo Domingo, San Salvador, Guatemala, Belize, Managua, San Jose, and Tegucigalpa.↩
- In telegram 3784 from Kingston, May 29, the Embassy requested guidance regarding “Soviet/Cuban intentions in Jamaica and the Caribbean and what, if anything, we should be doing about their growing role and influence.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790244–0571)↩
- In telegram 153514 to Kingston, June 15, the Department provided an overview of U.S. policy toward Jamaica. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790270–0116)↩
- The New Jewel Movement, led by Maurice Bishop, overthrew Grenadian Prime Minister Eric Gairy on March 13. See Document 313.↩