54. Interagency Intelligence Memorandum1

NI IIM 79–10013J

POSSIBLE PRESENCE OF SOVIET GROUND FORCES IN CUBA2

1. This memorandum addresses evidence bearing on the possible presence of an organic Soviet ground force unit in Cuba.3 The issue is raised by fragmentary [less than 1 line not declassified] evidence gathered over a period of several years, indicating that Soviet units have conducted small-scale tactical exercises on the island since at least July 1976, and that these units may be subordinate to a brigade headquarters. The memorandum also reviews other evidence—[less than 1 line not declassified]—that might be expected to corroborate the existence of such a Soviet ground force presence in any significant strength.

[Page 116]

Background

2. After the withdrawal in late 1962 and early 1963 of Soviet strategic weapons and of some 20,000 combat troops from Cuba, the Intelligence Community estimated that 3,000 to 4,000 Soviet military personnel remained there. By the early 1970s this estimate had been lowered to approximately 2,000. Of these, some 1,500 have been estimated to be located at Lourdes, a large Soviet SIGINT facility southeast of Havana. The estimate of 1,500 was supported by [less than 1 line not declassified] two years ago. The balance of previously identified Soviet military personnel in Cuba, estimated to number roughly 500 (but possibly as many as 1,000), comprise the Soviet Military Assistance Group (MAG), also headquartered at Lourdes. [less than 1 line not declassified]

3. In March 1977, [3 lines not declassified] Soviet tactical training in Cuba—training unrelated to any Cuban [1½ lines not declassified] various small units such as platoons and companies, [1 line not declassified] evidence was insufficient to permit any confident judgment concerning numbers of personnel involved in the training, their organizational subordination, or their mission. Nor could it be determined if the Soviet personnel were drawn from the SIGINT or MAG units already identified or if they were a distinct entity.

4. On 13 July 1979, [4 lines not declassified] (Brigades are not a standard formation in the Soviet Army. We know of only three, possibly four—all apparently specially tailored units located in forward areas and manned in strengths ranging from 1,400 to 2,300).

5. Taken together, [less than 1 line not declassified] indicates that a Soviet ground force unit, [less than 1 line not declassified] a brigade, is present in Cuba and that it may be headquartered at Guanabo, just east of Havana. The brigade, commanded by a colonel, apparently has subordinate rifle, armor, and support elements. The subordinate elements include battalions and companies and may be located at Alquizar and the Candelaria/San Pedro training area.

[less than 1 line not declassified]

[5 paragraphs (38 lines) not declassified]

[less than 1 line not declassified]

[1 paragraph (12 lines) not declassified]

Missions

12. Depending on the size of the Soviet unit, [less than 1 line not declassified] its mission could include any, some combination, or all of the following:

—Training for Soviet personnel.

—Training for Cuban personnel.

[Page 117]

—Development of Soviet tactics and training, and evaluation of equipment, for tropical areas.

—A small but concrete commitment of Soviet military support for the Castro regime, which might be intended as the nucleus of an expanded Soviet military capability in time of crises.

The available evidence is compatible with any of these possibilities but inadequate to prove any of them.

Comment on Collection and Guidance

13. Efforts are under way to obtain more information on the presence of a Soviet ground force unit in Cuba:

—We are examining [less than 1 line not declassified] which has not been exhausted.

—[1½ lines not declassified]

—[less than 1 line not declassified] has been fragmentary and spotty; we are attempting to obtain [1 line not declassified] used by the Soviets.

—All available clandestine assets are being tasked but returns will come in only slowly and are not likely to be conclusive.

14. In sum, short of a breakthrough in [less than 1 line not declassified] we may remain uncertain about this issue for some time. The best near-term hope is information from the [1½ lines not declassified]

[3 images not declassified]

  1. Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 81B00401R: Subject Files of the Presidential Briefing Coordinator for DCI (1977–1981), Box 2, Folder 2: Cuba: Soviet Brigade. Top Secret; [handling restrictions and codewords not declassified].
  2. This memorandum was prepared under the auspices of the National Intelligence Officer for USSR and Eastern Europe in the Office of Political Analysis, National Foreign Assessment Center. It was coordinated within the Central Intelligence Agency; with the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State; with the Defense Intelligence Agency; with the National Security Agency; and with the intelligence organizations of the Department of the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force. Information available as of 1200 EDT on 19 July 1979 was used in the preparation of this memorandum. [Footnote is in the original.]
  3. The full range of issues involved in the Soviet-Cuban military relationship will be dealt with in a forthcoming Interagency Intelligence Memorandum. [Footnote is in the original.]