97. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter1

SUBJECT

  • U.S. Policy on Cuban Refugees

The Vice President chaired a Cabinet-level meeting on Saturday to discuss U.S. options for dealing with the Cuban refugee problem. The meeting grappled with several problems:

1. The compelling emergency problems related to the hazardous weather conditions off Florida and the fact that 1,000 boats are between the U.S. and Cuba;

2. The enforcement problem;

3. The problems associated with what do do once the Cubans arrive (i.e., status and benefits);

4. The fact that Castro has thrown us on the defensive and converted an international issue into a U.S.-Cuban issue.

The participants agreed that the Vice President should issue a statement after the meeting, which indicated our deep and continuing concern with the problem, putting the onus for the dangerous situation clearly on Castro, asking the Cuban-American community to respect the law and stop the voyages, indicating that you have directed the Navy and Coast Guard to render all possible assistance to those at sea, calling upon Castro to resume the airlift and permit an orderly, safe and humane evacuation of refugees. In addition, as an olive branch to the Cuban-American community, the statement commits the U.S. to accept the plantados, those 200–400 Cuban political prisoners in Boniato Prison, who refuse to cooperate with the Cuban Government. The statement is attached for your approval (Tab A).2

The group reviewed an options paper prepared by my staff and Stu’s (Tab B).3 It describes four options:

1. welcome the Cubans;

2. try to control the flow;

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3. invoke national emergency powers and the most severe enforcement measures; and

4. position a ship to take Cubans to a third country.

The group agreed to recommend option 2, which includes the following components:

—stricter enforcement of existing laws as a deterrent;

—seek to pursuade the Cuban-American community to stop or at least discourage the boat lift. (Warren Christopher met with a group of 30 or so leaders Saturday afternoon as a first step in this process. Vic Palmieri is going to Florida Saturday evening to continue this process.)

—maximize international pressure on Castro to resume the airlifts;

—call for an international conference (preferably under UN auspices, and including those nations which already pledged to receive some of the Cuban refugees) to negotiate an international formula with Cuba to resettle Cuban refugees in a humane manner. (This could include an international processing center in Havana.)

The group recommended you present this approach in a speech early next week. Bob Pastor will work with the speechwriters on this.

The group also discussed the question of whether we should transform SOLID SHIELD 80, a massive U.S. naval exercise which includes the landing of Marines at Guantanamo, from a very sizable political liability to a significant humanitarian asset. At the moment, Castro is mobilizing countries in the Caribbean area to denounce what he, and unfortunately many, consider as a violation of the principle of non-intervention. While at the same time reaffirming our determination to oppose Cuba and Soviet aggression, you could announce in your speech your decision to utilize the naval forces, which would have participated in SOLID SHIELD, to serve as a rescue mission for ships in distress, and to be on hand to assist in the international solution to the problem. Defense and JCS oppose because they fear that any changes in the exercise could be viewed as a sign of weakness and indecisiveness. We will give you a memo on this Monday.

In addition, the group agreed that the Attorney General should set up a Task Force to coordinate the law enforcement effort, and the Director of OMB should chair a Task Force to consider issues related to determining the status of the refugees and budgetary implications. Both groups will prepare recommendations for you next week.

RECOMMENDATION:

1. That you approve the Vice President statement (Tab A).4

2. That you approve Option 2 (page 2, Tab B) as a framework for a strategy for dealing with the Cuban refugee problem.5

  1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country Chron File, Box 9, Cuba, 12/79–4/80. Secret. Carter initialed at the top of the page.
  2. Not attached. For the Vice President’s statement released on April 27, see the Department of State Bulletin, June 1980, p. 68.
  3. Not attached. A copy is in the Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Box 9, Cuba 12/79–4/80.
  4. Carter checked the approve option.
  5. Carter checked the approve option and initialed at the bottom of the page.